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The U.S. Empire Brings Globalization  
This is a story of appropriation, making unfamiliar foodstuffs familiar. The diverse pro-
cesses and phases of the familiarization of foreign foodstuffs in South Korea provide insights 
into equally various processes and meanings of globalization at the intersection of the local 
and the global. For the period from 1945 to 1972, South Korea changed from receiving for-
eign foodstuffs as emergency aid in the immediate postwar era, to purchasing them in the 
global market, and finally to achieving domestic production of the foodstuffs, now national-
ized in the process of being appropriated. My work investigates multifarious processes of 
globalization through the foodstuffs’ distribution channels, which reflected particular politi-
cal and historical situations of their times and the places. While foodstuffs as commodities 
retained their traceable national-geographical and political origins, the content of the mean-
ings of the origins were produced by interacting with the social and cultural meanings of the 
commodities’ distribution and consumption on the ground in the locality.  
I argue that the cultural and social contexts of the distribution channels of foreign food-
stuffs such as general rationing, free feeding stations, school-lunch programs and work-relief 
(kuho kŭllo) self-help programs, shaped the ways in which local recipients experienced the 
foodstuffs. The local experiences changed and newly imparted the meanings attached to the 
foodstuffs. Thus, the meanings associated with U.S. wheat flour and powdered milk given as 
foreign aid could not be separable with the historical contexts in South Korean and the mean-
ing of U.S. hegemony in post-1945 Korea that instigated the supply, distribution and con-
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sumption of the foodstuffs. Over time, the meanings attached to foodstuffs changed with the 
changes in distribution channels, which served varied purposes from military-administered 
emergency relief from 1945 to 1955, to humanitarian assistance from 1955 to 1961, and to 
economic development from 1961 to 1972. By the mid-1970s, the meanings of foodstuffs 
were overlapped with very different messages over time, and the earlier messages were not 
erased, but they were re-interpreted as overcoming of the past.   
My study of the meanings imparted by foodstuff’s distribution channels contribute to the 
field by establishing the period from 1945 to 1961 as a crucial period in the history of South 
Korea’s development. It does so by demonstrating the significance of the period from the 
perspectives of distribution and consumption of foreign foodstuffs. I argue that the processes 
of distribution and consumption prior to industrialization and mass consumer market are 
equally important to the story of development as the story after the instigation of industrial-
ization. South Korea has long been cited as the case of successful economic development un-
der American auspices. However, this story we are told about begins in 1961 with Park 
Chung Hee regime’s state-led industrialization, which only emphasizes export-led production 
(Woo 1991; Janelli 1993). In this, 1950s in the history of South Korea has largely been disre-
garded as a politically corrupt and economically stagnant period ruled by an idiosyncratic 
and authoritarian Rhee Syngman.  
Recently, however, scholars such as Brazinsky and DeMoia produced much needed 
works that highlight the important developments of the 1950s before industrialization 
(Brazinsky 2007; DiMoia 2013). Brazinsky emphasizes the transfer of ideas of democracy 
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while DiMoia focuses on the transfer of the concept of hygiene and health through local edu-
cation, and exchanges of experts and students.  
On the other hand, I approach the field differently by following the movements of food 
materials through multiple distribution channels. True, U.S. givers of food had the transfer of 
democracy and science looming at the back of their minds as the ultimate goal that Koreans 
should aspire to with the help of U.S. food. However, each of U.S. food programs had more 
immediate and concrete goals for action such as preventing starvation and social unrest by 
feeding (1945-1955), educating about nutritional science and hygiene (1955-1961), and pro-
viding work for unskilled unemployed workers (1961-1972). By examining the contacts that 
new foodstuffs made with the locals in the space provided by particular distribution methods, 
my work reveals the ways in which the holders of ration or relief cards, and forestal and fish-
ing villagers at the peripheries of the Korean peninsula interacted with the intermediaries 
such as foreign voluntary agencies and Korean local government officials. In doing so, I am 
also able to show how the local meanings of democracy, science, and economic development 
were produced in association with particular context of each distribution channel.  
By returning to 1945 and investigating the processes of familiarization of foreign food-
stuffs, I maintain that South Korea’s industrialization in the late 1960s and the 1970s was not 
built on the ingenuity of Park Chung Hee’s regime and the voluntarist zeal of the Korean 
people alone, as had been the official interpretation widely espoused. I argue that South Ko-
rea’s industrialization in the 1960s and the 1970s should be seen as a continuation of the de-
velopments that began during the colonial period and the period from in 1945 to 1972 that 
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depended on the supply of U.S. surplus foodstuffs.  Thus, by focusing on the period 1945 to 1
1972, my work provides a missing piece thus far between colonial modernity (1910-1945) 
and Third World Developmentalism after 1960. Also importantly, I examine shifts instigated 
by the transition from the Japanese empire to U.S. hegemony in the post-1945 period. I end 
this project with 1972 when U.S. Congress terminated major parts of U.S. surplus food pro-
grams, a.k.a. Public Law 480, to South Korea and when South Korea’s industrialization plans 
were already producing results.  2
The period from 1945 to 1965 (~1972) were crucial as during this period, school aged 
children from destitute families, housewives, and the villagers at the nation’s peripheries 
were introduced the knowledge and practice of nutritional science, child care, and self-help, 
in the processes of receiving U.S. foodstuffs. The knowledge on nutrition and child care 
formed the basis for nation-building by the way of taking care of its population. Surplus food 
programs in the period also set the rudimentary approaches to later national social welfare 
system in South Korea.  U.S. surplus food programs also consolidated the South Korean state 3
apparatus since the sales and distribution of U.S. foodstuffs generated a significant amount of 
money and political power for the state. By the same token, however, U.S. concessional sales 
program also provided the structure for the corruption that the South Korean state and its 
elite industrialists have been criticized for by the political opponents.  Further, the Rural De-
 For an example of developmentalism during the Japanese colonial period, see Carter J Eckert, Offspring of Empire: 1
the Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945. University of Washington Press, 
c1991.
 Title II (Self-Help Programs) and Title III (Voluntary Agency Programs) of U.S. Public Law 480 were terminated 2
in 1972 in South Korea. However, other Titles lingered on until 1981. 
 Won-gyu Choi, Activities of Foreign Voluntary Agencies and their Influences upon Social Work Development in 3
Korea,” Ph.D. Dissertation. Seoul National University, 1996.
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velopment Programs in the 1960s prompted Korean local villagers to the practice of “self-
help (chajo)” by giving U.S. grain donations only as a payment for work in provincial devel-
opment. Thereby, U.S. Food for Peace Provincial Development Programs in South Korea 
reached out to the remote villages in Korea and mobilized the local villagers before the South 
Korean state did. We can conjecture the importance of Food for Peace developments of the 
1960s in South Korea’s development by Park Chung Hee’s continuation of basically the same 
programs under a different name, the New Village Movement in the 1970s.  
By the same token, investigating various meanings and processes of the spread of foreign 
foodstuffs also open up a venue to discuss the processes and meanings of U.S. influence in 
post-1945 South Korea. In 1945 Korea, U.S. and Soviet military advisors replaced the Ja-
panese colonizers. Yet, U.S. imperial governance was different from the Japanese gover-
nance, and the new U.S. imperial strategies changed over time. Partly, food distribution 
shows a picture of U.S. power expanding in Korea through the channels of commodity sup-
plies like blood transfusing through veins and then to their myriads of capillaries.  
There are scholars who already moved in the direction of linking U.S. imperial strategy, 
food, and science. Matthew Connelly‘s work on population control in India in Fatal Miscon-
ception and Nick Cullather’s work on the Green Revolution of India in the Hungry World 
study population control and food questions in order to discuss U.S. intervention in the Third 
World.   4
 Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: the Struggle to Control World Population. Cambridge: Belknap Press of 4
Harvard University Press, 2008 Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle against Poverty in 
Asia. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010. 
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I share the topic with them since the objectives of U.S. Food for Peace Program and the 
overall U.S. food assistance was to tackle the problems of population increase and food shortage 
in the Third World, which was gaining political urgency in the Cold War competition in the 
1950s. Starting immediately in the winter of 1945 and 1946, famine was a worldwide problem. 
In 1946, U.S. government estimated that the tonnage of wheat required to avert starvation in al-
lied and potentially friendly nations was 17 million tons. In order to alleviate the situation, the 
United States committed to provide 6 million tons of surplus wheat to its allies.  In this context, 5
the Pacific Theater which included Korea, Japan and the Ryukyu Islands in U.S. occupation zone 
was only one in the long list of recipient countries of U.S. surplus wheat flour. 
Compared to Connelly and Cullather’s works, that show U.S. organizations such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation and U.S. agricultural experts brining contraceptive devices and agri-
cultural science to the Third World people who were not necessarily enthusiastic about them, 
my study reveals much more mutual interaction among U.S. governmental and civilian vol-
untary agencies, Korean recipients of food, and Korean central and local governments. As a 
result, my study gives a picture of decentralized and multifarious actors by breaking the 
agency down to individuals such as U.S. volunteer workers and soldiers, and Korean relief 
recipients, farmers, fishermen, and foresters in investigating locally produced meanings of 
the new habits and commodities.   
Thus, I add to the works by Connelly and Cullather the perspectives from the ground re-
cipients and their interactions with U.S donor-institutions and local Korean authorities. I was 
 To this American offer, wheat from Canada, Argentina and Australia was supposed to match that 6 million ton5 -
s.However, the sum of 12 million tons was still 5 million tons short of the requirement to avoid famine. Fortune 
Magazine, May issue, 1946
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able to see the contacts formed around U.S. foodstuffs by investigation the various distribu-
tion channels of them. The movement of commodities from one location to other locations 
bring forth the interactions on the ground. Thus, U.S. commodities and the U.S. personnel 
who controlled their distribution in Korea as the agents of producing an imperial power only 
tell half the story. The other half is to study the contexts in which U.S. commodities and per-
sonnel contacted local Koreans in order to see the process of producing meanings and nu-
ances of US influence in South Korea. In doing so, I was able to trace crucial intermediary 
processes that were necessary to artificially construct an humanitarian image of U.S. food 
assistance. In another channel of distribution through U.S. Food for Peace Program, relief 
recipients and local bureaucrats in provincial governments interacted with U.S. officials in 
Korea through the medium of U.S. food assistance.  
The changes in U.S. policy, from emergency food relief from 1945 to 1955, to civilian 
humanitarian food programs from 1955 to 1961, and finally to the work-relief programs of 
the 1960s, were instigate by the responses of the recipients. After merely giving relief food 
(1945-1948) failed to foster the goodwill of the Korean recipients and the press that were al-
ready politically against USAMGIK’s decision on national division and trusteeship in Korea, 
the U.S. Department of State changed its strategy to civilian humanitarian food assistance in 
1955. Further, in step with the political and social changes in Korea such with Park Chung 
Hee regime’s Five-Year Industrialization plans, U.S. Food for Peace program its surplus 
grain program to work-relief programs in the 1960s. The changes in the uses of U.S. surplus 
grain over time demonstrate that USAMGIK and later U.S. Operations Mission learned from 
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their initial failures to bring “democracy” to the people and how they changed their strategies 
by “assessing” the different needs of the recipient country.  
On the other hand, U.S. tendency that stayed constant throughout the period from 1945 to 
1972 was their continued effort to form direct relationships with the locals. Forming direct 
relationships was possible because the contacts were established when giving grains to the 
locals. Cash aid or transfer of science and technology were less conducive to forming direct 
relationships on the ground. Administrators of U.S. Food for Peace Program such as Richard 
Reuter, Director of Food For Peace Council and Special Assistant to President Kennedy from 
1962 to 1965, assumed a division between state and society in foreign nations, including the 
dictatorial regimes. Thus, people like Reuter sought to exploit the fissure between the state 
and the people through their direct food assistance to local people.  For example, in South 6
Korea in the early 1960s, U.S. government made a partial attempt to overcome its close asso-
ciation with the corrupt South Korean regime by forming direct contacts with local govern-
ments and villagers. However, these decentralized multiple direct relationships existed in 
parallel to the state-to-state supply which continued in order to maintain a friendly regime in 
Korea.  
In fact, giving weight to forming direct relationships on the ground was intended on the 
American belief about the process of seeding and sprouting democracy in the Third World; 
democracy was naturally attractive to any people, and when people had direct contacts with 
U.S. aid commodities and were fed, they would naturally choose democracy and capitalism. 
Thus, it became crucial to reach the local people directly. All of the humanitarian assistance 
 Richard W. Reuter, Special Assistant to the President, Director Food For Peace, to the National Conference on 6
Food for Peace, September 30, 1963, 4/329 (note 5/67); #1; P153; RG 286
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programs via U.S. voluntary agencies and rural self-help programs were efforts to reach the 
locals directly. Starting from 1955, using U.S. foreign voluntary agencies as intermediaries 
and distributers opened up multiple civilian channels of relief commodity supply that by-
passed the central state of South Korea. In the latter 1960s, U.S. Food for Peace’s Compre-
hensive Provincial Development Program (CPDP) implemented small village-scale self-help 
work (chajo kŭllo) programs, working directly with provincial government and paying the 
workers with surplus grain. 
The U.S. belief about local people’s “natural” predilection for liberal capitalist “democra-
cy” formed an interesting contrast with the communist conceptualization of their “democra-
cy” in North Korea, China and the Soviet Union. The communists acknowledged that their 
“revolutions” had to be brought about artificially. By contrast, U.S. givers of food believed 
that what was required to lead Koreans towards democracy and capitalism by themselves was 
to “Help the Koreans to help themselves.” Thus, while changing tactics to humanitarian as-
sistance and to self-help, U.S. givers of food continued to believe in giving food to Koreans 
because they believed in the natural and universal attraction for democracy.     
More fundamentally, the reason why U.S. initially failed to produce legitimacy by feeding 
the Koreans from 1945 to 1955 was because of the competition and comparison with the Com-
munists in the north. When Communists were as successfully and as unsuccessfully feeding the 
people in the north, American food gifts to southern Koreans was rendered politically ineffective. 
Besides the communists in the north were also claiming democracy as seen in the name, the Peo-
ple’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Thus, after this initial U.S. failure, what gave an advantage for 
the U.S. Cold War camp was to define American “democracy” by setting it apart from commu-
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nist “democracy.” This difference between U.S. democracy and communist democracy was arti-
ficially constructed through instituting humanitarian food assistance. 
Chapters are organized chronologically to demonstrate the changes in the Korean recep-
tion of new foodstuffs and U.S. food assistance policy to Korea. I arbitrarily divide my peri-
od from 1945 to 1972 into three phases: Emergency food relief phase from 1945 to 1955 is 
covered in chapter 1 and chapter 2, the second phase of civilian humanitarian food assistance 
from 1955 to 1962 is covered in chapter 3 and 4, and lastly, the self-help work (chajo kŭllo) 
program in the 1960s is covered in chapter 6. The latter three chapters 4, 5, and 6 are orga-
nized according to the three Titles of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 
(Public Law 480) of 1954, later also known as the Food for Peace Program.  
In chapter 1. IMPERIAL SURPLUS: POLITICIZED GRAIN, 1945-1950 traces the 
process in which US surplus wheat flour spread through general rationing and emergency 
relief networks under U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) from 1945 to 
1948, and for the first two years of the new South Korean state from 1948 to 1950. The chap-
ter ends with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The chapter is divided into three 
sections, eventually leading up to the politicization of U.S. surplus wheat in south Korea:  
Section 1 of chapter 1 focuses on the period before USAMGIK began importing wheat 
from July 1946. Before the importation of wheat, which was from September 1945 to July 
1946, USAMGIK only managed to collect half of the required rice harvest and failed to keep 
the price of rice under control. The failure of USAMGIK’s food policy provided a field to 
satirize Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP)’s decision on the national divi-
sion of Korea and putting them under UN Trusteeship. I provide several examples from the 
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Chayu Sinmun, which used foreign food and inadequate food provisions as a political 
metaphor to taunt U.S. imperial motivations, and ultimately, its indistinguishability from the 
communists in the north. It conveyed the message that the United States and the Soviet 
Union were equally imperial, or at times, the communists were doing better in the north. The 
cartoons in the newspaper taunted USAMGIK for putting Korea under UN trusteeship and 
failing to tackle the food shortage. Further, it mocked USAMGIK for hoping the Koreans to 
choose the U.S. side of the camp in the Cold War while even failing to feed the people. In 
this way, food was politicized in multi layers.      
Section 2 of chapter 1 traces the meanings and history of wheat flour during the colonial 
era during which the wheat flour industry and market began. During the colonial period, 
1910-1945, wheat flour was identified with the new-style cooking, and also with the modern 
machine-milling industry, originating from Japanese capital. On the other hand, wheat flour 
was also known as a substitute for rice for the poor. This second usage of wheat flour was 
extended and overtook wheat flour’s link with “modern” lifestyle once USAMGIK began 
overhauling large shipments of wheat in the post-1945 period. This shift in association was 
largely shaped by the change in the main channel of distribution which was general rationing 
under USAMGIK.   
Section 3 of chapter 1 explains the shifts in the meanings in wheat flour after USAMGIK 
began importing wheat en-mass to substitute for rice, which was from July 1946 onwards. 
Despite the dislike of wheat flour, the Korean recipients had to eat it because they did not 
have other food given the shortage of rice and the post-liberation poverty. In other words, it 
was involuntary consumption. The tension between not liking wheat flour but having to eat it 
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in order to keep survive had impacts on the politicization of wheat flour in this period. The 
politicization as a result of this tension is important for my argument throughout the whole 
project since it imparts a comment on processes of globalization that was inseparable with 
locally produced meaning and uses. I argue that the distribution channels of foreign relief, 
which were general rationing and relief programs,  gave meaning to wheat flour as an inferior 
substitute for rice, and it was embedded in the memories of post-liberation poverty and U.S. 
occupation. Most importantly, the identification of wheat and wheat flour with USAMGIK’s 
food assistance already linked wheat with USAMGIK’s earlier failure in food policy and the 
earlier politicization as a metaphor of U.S. imperial motivations and its indistinguishability 
with the imperial communists in the north.  
In my larger argument of the whole project, examining the failure of USAMGIK’s food 
policy of this period is crucial since the lessons learnt from the failure was what instigated 
the changes of later decades to the conceptualizations of humanitarian food relief and also 
rural self-help programs.  
Chapter 2. THE KOREAN WAR AND THE INVASION OF AMERICAN FOOD-
STUFFS, 1950-1953, demonstrates that US foodstuffs such as powdered milk and factory-
manufactured foodstuffs spread in the context of two massive population movements, pro-
duced by the internationalized Korean War. Firstly, the Korean War refugees, numbering ap-
proximately 3 million during the war, were fed with powdered milk at Free Milk Stations, 
administered by the South Korean Ministry of Social Affairs, U.S. Military, and later also by 
U.S. voluntary agencies. Importantly, powdered milk was served as a substitute for rice and 
other grains in a dish invented as “milk gruel.” The choice of powdered milk as relief food to 
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substitute for grain was incidental, depending on the particular year’s surplus stock in the 
United States. Thus, as an example of a process of globalization, this indicates that the famil-
iarization with milk was not an inevitable result in South Korea, but was historically pro-
duced. The second population movement that I deal with is the influx of a large-scale U.S. 
army contingents to South Korea. U.S. Military brought with them the pipeline of military 
food provisions, including factory-manufactured foodstuffs such as Spam, chocolate, beer 
and whiskey. Then, these commodities were illegally diverted to the local black market and 
sold to Koreans. Thus, in this case, the familiarization of these food commodities was an un-
intended result of the presence of a large-scale U.S. army contingents. 
Chapter 3. THE INVENTION OF HUMANITARIAN FOOD RELIEF, 1953-1955, inves-
tigates the ways in which the UNICEF milk feeding program in the mid-1950s made pow-
dered milk familiar to school-aged children. During the colonial period, milk was available in 
the market, but the scale of its market was small, and even less familiar was the milk coming 
in non-fat powdered form. However, the UNICEF program collaborated with the local com-
munity volunteer groups and employed concepts such as food hygiene and nutritional needs 
of school-aged children in distributing powdered milk. Within the larger framework of this 
project, the chapter is designed as a bridge-way to chapter 4, which examines the develop-
ment of the Voluntary agency program of U.S. Public Law 480 of 1955. The U.S. Department 
of State had initially objected to UNICEF’s using U.S. government donated powdered milk 
for the milk program in Korea in 1953. Over time, however, the food administrators in the 
U.S. Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul observed the effectiveness of health and 
nutritional education and mobilization, and began channeling positive reports to the U.S. De-
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partment of State. In the next chapter, I argue that part of the process that instigated the De-
partment of State to conceptualize the tactics of UNICEF as humanitarian food assistance 
was drawn from the success of its milk programs, and thus the Department instituted it as the 
Voluntary Agency Program, Title III, of U.S. Public Law 480. 
Next three chapters 4,5, and 6 each deals with a title in U.S. Public Law 480, known as the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistant Act. U.S. Public Law 480 was a global program 
that channeled U.S. farm surpluses to foreign nations. For twelve years from 1955 to 1966, U.S. 
Public Law 480 moved $15.5 billion worth of U.S farm commodities to eighty developing coun-
tries.  South Korea, Pakistan and India were the major recipients of the Public Law 480 aid 7
throughout all three decades. In the 1950s, Israel and Turkey received major portions of the Pu-
blic Law 480 aid, and in the 1960s and the 1970s, South Vietnam was the single largest benefici-
ary. Until 1972, ten countries - South Korea, Pakistan, India, Israel, Turkey, South Vietnam, 
Egypt, Yugoslavia, Indonesia and Brazil - received more than half of the total Public Law 480 
shipments. 
Within the structure of U.S. Public Law 480, chapter 4 investigates Title III of Public Law 
480, called the “Voluntary Agency Program,” by which the U.S. Department of State donated 
surplus food to U.S. voluntary agencies for general distribution in foreign nations. Chapter 5 
examines Title I of Public Law 480, called the” Concessional Sales Program,” by which the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture sold U.S. farm surpluses to the South Korean state at one tenth of the 




market price. Chapter 6 studies Title II of Public Law 480, which had been initially intended for 
short term emergency fund, but then was changed to “Self-help Program” in the mid 1960s.  8
Chapter 4. C.A.R.E. AND THE NEW COLD WAR POLICY, 1955-1962, discusses a turn to 
civilian humanitarian food assistance in U.S. foreign policy and the impacts this new concept had 
in Korea. Voluntary Agency Program, Title III, of U.S. Public Law 480 authorized the U.S. De-
partment of State to donate surplus food to U.S. foreign voluntary agencies and international or-
ganizations for free. In other words, the U.S. Department of State inserted foreign voluntary 
agencies as intermediaries to deliver PL 480 surplus food to the Korean recipients. This opened 
up multiple channels of contacts with the local Koreans. However, the identity of the original 
donor, the U.S. government, was intentionally de-emphasized, and this formed the key in foste-
ring an image of civilian humanitarian assistance.  
When foreign voluntary agencies distributed food to the locals, the locals’ contact with the 
civilian agencies de-emphasized the role of the original donator, the U.S. government. As a re-
sult, Koreans (mis-) understood food donations as civilian endeavors. Thus, it was possible for 
the U.S. Department of State to personalize food aid through a two-stage fictional process: First-
ly, U.S. voluntary agencies distributed food, which was donated by U.S. government. However, 
more importantly, the second step was to set up a construction that relief food and fund was vo-
luntarily donated by individual U.S. citizens to the voluntary agencies. Despite the fact that most 
of the food was donated by U.S. government, it was advertised that these institutions were patro-
nized by individual citizens who voluntarily donated their small moneys to help the Koreans. An 
image of American citizens’ donating money decentralized the agents of food assistance even 
 Title VI of the 1966 amendment is not covered in this piece.8
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further away from the U.S. government. This was helpful as, in chapter 1, Koreans were suspec-
ting the U.S. government of imperial motivations with regards to the issues of national division 
and U.N. trusteeship. The construction of donors as U.S. individual citizens enabled “imagined” 
person to person connection between American donors and Korean recipients. It was no longer 
the U.S. state that was “taking care” of the Korean people. Instead, from the U.S. to Korea, each 
bag of reinforced added wheat flour and powdered milk were transmitted from the “People of the 
United States” directly to the needy families in Korea.  
Importantly then, the U.S. Department of State visualized “democracy” for the Korean 
people as a system in which small individual citizens made decisions towards the whole, just 
like small people making decisions to voluntarily donate money. Thus, this humanitarian ma-
neuver helped artificially construct a difference between US capitalist democracy, which had 
humanitarian assistance, and communist democracy, which was constructed as without. This 
way, humanitarianism was used as a tool to persuade the Koreans towards democracy. How-
ever, this was in addition to the function of humanitarianism which had already been natural-
ized and universalized as good. 
Thus, when Voluntary Agency Program, Title III, of Public Law 480 authorized U.S. 
government to donate surplus food to U.S. civilian agencies, the program produced a new 
relationship between U.S. food and politics by seemingly breaking down the link between 
food assistance and U.S. imperial motivations, which had been suspected by the Koreans. 
Title III broke the link by hiding the original donor as U.S. surplus food was distributed by 
civilian voluntary agencies. Thereby, instead of being bogged down by the suspicion of the 
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imperial motivations of U.S. government, U.S. voluntary agencies were able to claim giving 
food solely for humanitarian reasons.  
However, the broken link between food and politics was only to be immediately restored, 
but this time in a reverse order through the naturalization of humanitarian assistance and 
democracy. Principles such as humanitarian food assistance was based on the belief of its 
self-legitimatizing power. Its self-legitimateness was argued as a universal value, in which 
rough simplification the food safety and human decency assumed to be granted for the gener-
al Americans was made applicable to all other peoples. Thus, what Koreans were getting 
were the replications, or multi-plications, on a new “imperial” scale.  
Then, how did it move from the approval of humanitarian food assistance to the promo-
tion of “democracy”? The linkage between the two did not function by any logic. Rather, the 
linkage worked by imaginary associations, and through personal feelings and impressions. 
The feeling that associated humanitarian food assistance with democracy was that the two 
shared their originating place, which was construed as coming from the power by the sum of 
individual U.S. citizens. of the foodstuffs and donations, which was also where the individual 
American donators were. The foodstuffs were construed to be donated by individual U.S. cit-
izens who adapted the system of democracy, one of which dispersed practices was voluntary 
donation of food to Koreans.  
Thus, under Voluntary Agency Program, Title III, of Public Law 480, humanitarian food 
assistance was an artificial political construct, staged by the U.S. Department of State. In this, 
politics was merely delayed, only to come back more perversely. In reality, the actual dona-
tions through civilian voluntary agencies were in small amounts in comparison to the U.S. 
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government donations. However, the political image exploited from an image of humanitari-
an food assistance by civilian voluntary agencies produced disproportionately strong impres-
sion and propaganda success. 
Chapter 5. FEEDING CORRUPTION: Failed naturalization of wheat and the April Rev-
olution of 1960 demonstrates the ways in which the South Korean state’s artificial effort to 
naturalize the consumption of wheat flour backfired in its entanglement with the politics of 
PL 480. The South Korean state attempted to create a commercial market for wheat flour so 
that it could create a market to sell the U.S. surplus wheat flour it purchased from U.S. gov-
ernment at concessional prices. The Concessional Sales Program, Title I, of U.S. Public Law 
480 authorized the sales of U.S. farm surpluses to the Korean government at one tenth of the 
market price. In this structure of Concessional Sales Program, the South Korean state reaped 
90% profit through this, and this exceptional profit rate motivated the South Korean state to 
encourage wheat consumption. This encouragement of wheat flour consumption was differ-
ent from the earlier Save Rice Campaign from 1948 to 1952, in which the state tried to sub-
stitute rice with wheat flour. In the late 1950s, the state actually aspired to create a commer-
cial market. Thus, it instigated a mass campaign, “Improvement on Eating Life” by coopting 
nutritional scientists, and by advertising wheat flour as a nutritiously superior food. 
The state coopted nutritional science and their practitioners in order to establish wheat flour 
as a politically neutral and nutritional food. However, nutritional propaganda failed to induce the 
increase in consumption that absorbed the ever increasing amount of surplus wheat that the 
South Korean state purchased from the U.S. government. The market for wheat flour was suppo-
sed to be encouraged  by categorizing wheat flour in terms of nutritional science which was pro-
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moted to be universal. However, instead of accepting wheat flour as cleansed of its previous poli-
tical tints of U.S. imperial implications, quite the opposite was the result.  
Major South Korean newspapers such as Kyŏnghyang and Tong’a mounted yet another layer 
of meaning to wheat flour. These newspapers scandalized the access to the U.S. surplus wheat 
flour as a major channel of political and business corruption in South Korea. Thereby, wheat 
flour coming under the Concessional Sales Program was associated with the corrupt South Ko-
rean state. This was especially a focal issue in the aftermath of the April Revolution of 1960. In 
spite of the fact that the instigators of the electoral bribery and collusions were the South Ko-
reans, this did not replace earlier suspicion of U.S. imperial motivations. Instead, newspapers 
such as Sŏul Kyŏngje extended the corruption, associated with wheat flour, to its originating pla-
ce, the United States, because the United States continued to be the sole supplier of concessional 
wheat to the corrupt South Korean state. 
Chapter 6. FROM DEPENDENCY TO SELF-HELP: AMERICAN FOOD RELIEF TO 
THE KOREAN PERIPHERIES, 1962-1972, focuses on the U.S. Food for Peace’s Provincial 
Development Program from 1964. The chapter discusses the significance of this Provincial 
Program that excluded the use of technology and capital in their vision of a Third World de-
velopment. In this case, U.S. surplus carried out the development. The program employed 
unskilled workers on the state’s relief rosters, and paid them in U.S. surplus grain. The wages 
in grain funded self-help projects such as reforestation, marine life cultivation, and land 
reclamation. The U.S. Provincial Program was a global program funded under Title II of 
Public Law 480 with developmental projects in countries such as Taiwan and Israel. The 
global application of Title II programs urges that we need to re-contextualize the origins of 
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the New Village Movement under the Park Chung Hee regime in the 1970s in a larger global 
context, and I lay the groundwork for the 1960s in this chapter.      
In summing up the introduction, imagined person-to-person connections triggered by 
humanitarian food assistance, Title III, and self-help, Title II, of Public Law 480 programs 
attempted to legitimatize U.S. hegemony by urging the Koreans to “catch up with” the Unit-
ed States. Thus, U.S. surplus programs applied U.S. domestic policies in Korea. For example, 
in 1963, Korean social works experts introduced the Comprehensive Provincial Development 
Programs (CPDP, a work-relief program) of 1964 to Koreans as an application of Roosevelt’s 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and the Work Project Administration 
(WPA) programs during the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States, with a gap of 
thirty years.  
Did the applications of the same policies display U.S. imperial tendency to see Korea as 
an extension of its own territory? Can it be compared to internal colonizations as in the Mani-
fest Destiny? In fact, this question misses the point. Rather, what I observed in the documents 
of the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State was that U.S. officials were 
working within clearly set bureaucratic procedures. U.S. inter-governmental communications 
showed a picture of cooperation, mostly exchanged in numbers of dollar values and metric 
tons. After all, U.S. officials in the Army and the Department of State practiced the adminis-
trative accounting that they knew, and they did not consciously display, nor knew, what they 
plan to make by treating Korea as an extension of the United States.  
Method of Research 
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In terms of my method of research, I focus on the process of familiarization of wheat 
flour and powdered milk because these two unfamiliar foodstuffs were visible and known for 
originating from the U.S. food assistance. Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, wheat flour 
and powdered milk were almost solely imported from the United States. Thus, by following 
the movements of these foreign objects and examining the local uses of them, I could open 
up spaces to discuss the relationship between U.S. influence in Korea and Korea’s modern-
ization, and the role of the local Koreans in it. For example, novelist Yi Hoch’ŏl, who fled the 
north and was taking refugee in Pusan, pointed out the visibility of U.S. surplus wheat flour 
during the Korean War. in the structuring of the wartime state and capitalism in his autobio-
graphical novel, So Simin (Little Citizen), he singled out wheat flour for structuring the be-
ginning of a new capitalism. In other words, Yi Ho-ch’ŏl identified U.S. aid wheat flour as 
the source of power, the accessibility to which arranged the newly emerging political and 
economic elite hierarchy in wartime South Korea.   9
Since the program’s inauguration, Korean public had been well informed about U.S. Pub-
lic Law 480 as the source of wheat flour and powdered milk. The vibrant scholarly discus-
sions about the “Three White Industries (Sambaek Saŏp)” since the 1950s show the signifi-
cance of U.S. surplus farm commodities in the perception of Korean economic growth. In 
this, Korean economy of the 1950s was argued to have entirely depended on U.S. surplus 
agricultural commodities, especially wheat flour, sugar and cotton. 
As a history of objects, it was possible to link the interaction between local Koreans and 
various U.S. offices with U.S. foodstuffs because for the period between 1945 and 1972, 
 Yi Hoch’ŏl, So Simin (Little Citizen), serialized from July 1964 to August 1965 in Sedae (Generation)9
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most of U.S. assistance to Korea was in materials. For example, cash aid would lose the track 
of its origin once it is exchanged with the local currency. However, the foreignness of materi-
als such as wheat flour kept the history of its origin throughout various stages of its travel as 
a substance of U.S. food assistance, and the origin played a big role producing the local nar-
ratives. This was possible because Korean end-users consumed the commodity with the im-
perial marking on it.  
Sending aid in materials, and not in cash, was useful for U.S. government as well. U.S. 
government could maintain and foster its influence in Korea to by channeling its aid materi-
als to programs and regions that it selected. For example, in chapter 6, U.S Operations Mis-
sion in Seoul shaped and exercised its power within Korea by delivering foodstuffs directly 
to the provinces and to local villagers in rural areas. Food supply channels provided a space 
to forge a direct relationship with the locals.  
In the list of U.S. commodities in Korea, surplus food was only one of many possible 
choices such as used clothing, bio-medicine, and chemical fertilizers that the United States 
donated and sold to Korea. Apart from surplus food, U.S. civilian relief materials included 
other options for research such as construction materials and machines, medical and sanitary 
supplies, cotton cloth, sewing thread, blankets, socks, soap, laundry, finished clothing, coal 
bituminous, and used vehicles.  After a preliminary survey of a comprehensive list of U.S. 10
commodities in Korea, I decided to limit my discussion to surplus foodstuffs because it best 
brought out the picture and the arguments that I could make, my research reached “satura-
tion” on the topic of surplus foodstuffs, as sociologists use the term. 
 [Community Development and Relief Category] CRIK Programs; #11; 1267; RG 46910
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Food aid for civilian feeding in Korea was a significant part of U.S. aid materials. Since 
U.S. Public Law 480 from 1955 only traded U.S. farm surpluses, we need not doubt the 
weight that food carried in Public Law 480. However, even before the implementation of 
U.S. PL 480 for the period between 1945 to 1955, U.S. surplus foodstuffs comprised approx-
imately 50% of the total foreign civilian relief materials to Korea. Also, an overwhelming 
majority of the material aid came from the United States. From 1950 through 1955, U.S. 
Congress funded approximately 80% of the total U.N. civilian relief supplies to Korea. In the 
overall U.S. economic aid to Korea for the same period, military aid received 75% of the 
fund and civilian relief materials was allocated approximately 8%.  Military funding also 11
included expenses for foodstuffs to feed the U.S. military contingents, part of which were 
illegally diverted to the local black market and made impacts in the Korean everyday life.  
From 1951 to 1955, all civilian relief supplies, including food, had to be processed by the 
Civilian Relief in Korea (CRIK), subordinate the U.S. Eight Army. The CRIK Program for 
1953 had $55.2 million, and of this, $40.2 million was released by the Foreign Operations 
Agency (FOA), subordinate to the U.S. Department of State. The rest $15 million belonged 
to the SUN Part Programs, as in sundry programs, and the fund was contributed by other 
member nations of the United Nations and by foreign civilian voluntary agencies. In 1953, 
relief grain to Korea was valued at $24.3 million, and relief milk at $0.7 million. In addition, 
U.S. government sent salable commodities to Korea. Over 30% was foodstuffs to be sold in 
 For example, in 1954, civilian relief goods took up 7.7% of the total aid. Office of the Economic Coordinator, FY 11
1954, Raw materials and merchandise $200 million, 52.7%; materials required for installations, $120 million, 
34.3%; relief goods $27 million, 7.7%; technical assistance 3 million , 0.8%; In Economic Rehabilitation Program 
for Korea 699,400,000 dollars program for 1955; #11; 1267; RG 469
"23
Introduction
the Korean market to bring in local currency for military spending. In 1955, the value of sal-
able commodities to Korea was $288 million.   12
In the organization of my dissertation, 1954 is emphasized as a key year in which U.S. 
Congress inaugurated the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistant Act, known as Pub-
lic Law 480, that linked the sales and disposal of U.S. farm surpluses to U.S. foreign policy 
in the Cold War. On March 24, 1954, New York Times published an article by Fred Spark, 
“Free Asia Turns to U.S.” Spark’s article captures the 1954 moment which I see as a begin-
ning of the U.S. Cold War foreign policy which enlisted humanitarian assistance and Third 
World development in its larger politics. Fred Spark wrote this article in anticipation of the 
Geneva Conference which was held from April to June 1954. The question of Korea’s na-
tional division was discussed at the end of the Geneva Conference, and for this, Spark’s 
American compatriots had sent around Help Korea Trains around the cities in the United 
States to display the American solidarity with the South Koreans. Spark’s article was reprint-
ed in over 20 newspapers around the globe, including the Korea Republic, and it text is re-
produced below. 
I have seen the face of Asia. It is turned our way. 
The face of Asia is the face of the young Vietnamese soldier in a primitive village studying, 
as if it were a Bible, an ancient copy of the Saturday Evening Post, studying the four-color ads 
that speak of a world he aspires to.  
The face of Asia is the face of the aged North Korean, in utter rags, who walked into our 
command post during the fury half dead with cold. He clutched this note, written on a torn bit of 
C-ration tissue paper: “We are three wounded GIs.. . Hiding in a hut.. . This man will lead you to 
us.. . You can trust him.. . He has been good to us.”  
 From 1950 to 1953, U.S. aid to Korea was all together was $657 million. In 1955, Korean Program, the U.S. 12
pledged $231 million out of total U.N. commitment of $281 million. The U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency 
(UNKRA, 1953-1958) contributed $50 million dollars. However, only $ 190 million arrived to Korea, among which 
for Community Development and Relief, $54 million was allotted, and military spending received $125 million, 
Funds-Programs; #11; 1267; RG 469. 
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The face of Asia is the laughing, if shocking, face of the leper girl in the hills of Formosa 
playing jacks with a burly U.S. Sergeant at a pleasing sanatorium paid for by the U.S.A.  
The face of Asia is the collective face of perhaps one billion brown and yellow people, long 
double-crossed by foreigners, who look to this strange America, so far away, to help them gradu-
ate to full membership in the human race. 
This I believe.  
I leave to historians and sociologists the explanation for this phenomenon. As a reporter I 
merely record its existence. In lands where millions cannot read, children know Lincoln. In lands 
where millions have never seen a movie, all know the mighty jeep.  
Those of us who have visited with average Orientals often disagree how to exploit the rich 
soil of good will. But we agree it is there.  
Good Salesmen  
The mystery is how to hold and inflate it. For if Lincoln and the jeep are good salesmen for 
America- only the color of our skin is bad.  
I recall sitting cross-legged in a native hut near Kuala Lumpur in mid-Malaya. As green 
lizards scampering on the bamboo walls chirped like crickets, my host said: “It is a shame your 
Americans are white men.” 
We must rise above being “white men” in the sense he meant it, because the white man, the 
colonialist, the “pukka sahib” snot with his polo ponies and restricted clubs, is through in that 
world. 
It’s unfortunate that in many places, Malaya, Indochina, we are associated with the “wrong 
kind of white man”- even if in the right kind of struggle. 
Good Will Helpful 
Our good will was earned by stories of America’s growth and opportunities, by fair American 
businessmen, by kindly American missionaries. Some of our government representatives are do-
ing little to consolidate these gains.  
A Filipino told me: “You Americans say you come here to help the poor- but you live with 
the rich.” 
The Orient’s gaudiest gin mills teem with U.S. Bureaucrats. Their cars crowd ox-carts off 
narrow alleys. The finest homes are American.   
Of course, you can’t expect a man raising an American family to live in a thatched shack. His 
wages locally converted make him today’s pukka sahib. 
Need New Pioneers 
But without the right kind of administrators, even the right kind of Point Four project is 
wrong. We need new pioneers. What a challenge for young Americans with an eye for adventure. 
They need the faith of missionaries- and the digestion of a boa constrictor.  
Today our missions cluster in capital cities where people have already made up their minds. 
Communist propaganda has not been via airwaves or four color ads, but by Tammany Hall ward-
heeling methods knocking on doors, person to person. Our new pioneers must knock on more 
doors.  
Nixon Welcomed 
Don’t forget the magnificent reception to Vice President Nixon when he shook more humble 
hands in a few weeks than our diplomats had touched in years. 
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It’s an error to create the impression we’re anxious to finance everybody’s opium pipe dream, 
including fresh sewers in Rangoon and stop lights in Jakarta. 
English is the second tongue in most Asiatic countries- and not in spoken with an Oxford ac-
cent. For generations Chinese studied in the U.S. I recall a barren Korean hillside where two Co-
lumbia graduates- class of ’49- held a reunion. One was a U.S. Lieutenant, the other a captured 
Red soldier. 
Won No Popular Support 
Realistic intelligence agents insist the war against our GIs won no popular Chinese support 
and desertions among U.S. or missionary schooled Chinese was massive. The total of those who 
refused repatriation is final proof.  
Education in the U.S. is our best long-term investment, but we must give Asiatics a political 
motive as well as chemistry. It will help keep our white faces at home and let our young friends 
advertise America among their own. 
Russia’s greatest asset has been “war by remote control.” She keeps her white face out of 
places like Korea and Indochina, working through stooges primed at Moscow’s College of 
Communist Knowledge. 
Asia is the future; Europe is the past. And the face of Asia is turned our way- hopefully and 
also fearfully.  13
In his article, Spark maintained that U.S. hegemony until 1954 had been conjured up by 
the media propagation of its capitalist material plentitude, by humanitarian assistance em-
ploying its advanced medical science, and by the civilian contacts made by its businessmen 
and missionaries. While these signatures of U.S. hegemony set the United States apart from 
the Communists, Spark argued that the 1954 moment called for the United States to go fur-
ther if it wanted to compete with the Communists who were making person to person con-
tacts in rural villages. To counter them, Sparks exhorted that the United States should dis-
patch young U.S. persons abroad to work directly with the locals, and that it should also edu-
cate the locals to propagate the American political and religious ideals in their home coun-
 Fred Sparks, New York (NEA), “Free Asia Turns to U.S,” New York Times. Also see Korea Republic, April 10, 13
1954, “We Must Consolidate Our Good Will Gains: Asia Turns Its Face Hopefully Toward America, but Fears Out-
come at Geneva”; Times Daily, March 28, 1954; Chester Times, Wednesday, March 24, 1954, p. 2; Sarasota Journal, 
March 31, 1954, p. 16; the New York World-Telegram; Sun: El-Paso Herald Post, among other newspapers. Picture 
of three Asians: caption reads, “EXPECTANT- the coming Geneva parley means much to Asians like the three 
above, who have cast their lot with America.” Ogden Standard Examiner, Monday March 29 1954 p. 3
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tries. Not only would these two tactics enable the U.S. Cold War camp to win over the locals 
away from their Soviet counterparts, they would also establish U.S. hegemony as different 
from the ones by Asia’s former European colonizers. Spark was not alone in thinking about 
the new direction in U.S. foreign policy, and the Voluntary Agency Program, Title III, of U.S. 
Public Law 480 reflected such consensus in the United States. In 1954, Fred Sparks was ar-
guing that if the Soviets were running their empire by “remote control,” he anticipated the 
Americans to counter the Communist one through civilian humanitarian assistance, self-help 
development programs, and by instigating material changes in the everyday life of the local 
people. My works demonstrates how all these were done by channeling U.S. surplus food 
abroad. 
I conclude the introduction by going back to my earlier statement that in less than three 
decades, South Korea changed from receiving foreign food aids in the immediate Postwar 
era, to purchasing food in the global market in the 1960s, and to building domestic food in-
dustry by the mid-1970s. My dissertation ends at 1972 when Park Chung Hee declared Ko-
rea’s food self-sufficiency in 1972, confident of Korea’s successfully industrialization, and 
while appropriating the U.S. Food for Peace self-help programs into the New Village Move-
ment. The occasion in 1972 was celebrated by abrogating the ban on brewing wine with rice 
(makkŏlli), which had been substituted with wheat flour for some time. However, it was not 
the erasure of the memory of U.S. food assistance from 1945 to 1972, of humanitarian food 
relief by U.S. civilian agencies nor of rural self-help programs with U.S. surplus grains. In-
stead, Instead of erasing the past stories, the state appropriated the memory, and private indi-
viduals’ recollections and literary representations readily adapted the state’s new interpreta-
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tion. Now, the memory of U.S. food assistance was celebrated as part of the overcoming of 
the depredation of the wartime, in which Koreans had to depend on unappetizing foreign 
food and foreign occupations, and much of the overcoming and “catching-up” had specifical-
ly American origin. 
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Chapter 1. 
IMPERIAL SURPLUS: POLITICIZED GRAIN, 1945-1950 
: Receiving food was one thing, politics was another 
The U.S. military Lieutenant General Hodge’s XXIV’s corps landed in Korea in September 
1945 to take over the administration south of the 38th degree north latitude from the defeated 
Japanese imperialists. The U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK, September 8, 
1945- August 15, 1948)  was now in charge of food distribution in a divided country that had 1
been depleted after years of Total Mobilization drive under the Japanese colonial rule, and the 
debacles of Japan’s imperial collapse and the liberation of Korea.  The shortage of food was 2
severe in the winter and the spring of 1945 and 1946.  
Starting in April 1946, USAMGIK imported foodstuffs for civilian feeding programs in 
Korea. Funds were provided by the Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) 
Program. The first shipment arrived in the form of 7,800 metric tons of wheat in May 1946, and 
 The U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was called 1
Chaejosŏnmiyuggunsalyŏngbukunjŏngch’ŏng in Korean.
 For Japan’s total mobilization plan after 1938 towards the end of the Pacific War (Fifteen-Year War from 1931 to 2
1945), see Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941. 
Cornell University Press, 1988, c.1987, pp. 96-102; For the chaos and hopes of the 1945-1948 period, see Bruce 
Cumings, The Origin of the Korean War. Vol 1. Princeton, 1981. pp. 267-444.
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U.S. Senator: "First we've got to feed the people. We can't have them 
eating out of garbage dumps."  
An elder Republican: ”I'm all for feeding the people, but we've got to let 
them know where it's coming from."  
Leftist of the group: "If you send a hungry man a loaf of bread, it's 
democracy. If you leave the wrapper on, it's imperialism.” 
- (On the reconstruction of Berlin) in A Foreign Affair, Dir. Billy Wilder. 
1948 Film
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further 8,200 tons of wheat followed in June.  However, the first substantial shipment of food 3
assistance did not arrive until July with 24,000 tons of wheat.  For the months of May through 4
December 1946, the civilian feeding program in Korea received 163,477 tons of wheat and 
wheat flour, and 15,655 tons of corn from the United States. Thus, wheat and wheat flour 
composed 91.26% of the total 179,132 metric tons of food imports in 1946.  For the months of 5
January through May 20, 1947, the percentage of wheat and wheat flour was reduced to 59.3% 
of the total food imports. For the months of May 1946 through August 1947, USAMGIK hauled 
over 19,455 tons of wheat and wheat flour in monthly average.  While machine-milled wheat 6
flour had been introduced to the consumer market in the 1920s in colonial Korea, USAMGIK 
increased the consumption of wheat flour south of the 38th Parallel by 6.5 times in comparison 
to the peak consumption during the colonial period.   7
Further, in the chapter, I argue that the main distribution channels of U.S. surplus wheat flour 
contributed to associating wheat flour with foreign relief and U.S. occupation. U.S. surplus 
wheat and wheat flour became familiar in the Korean daily life through general rationing and 
relief programs during the period from 1945 to 1950. In other words, wheat flour spread as a 
substitute for rice. Noteworthily, Koreans generally showed an aversion to wheat flour. However, 
 “Food Situation Import Program Shipment,” 396; Staple Food- Korea, 1946-1950, #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. 3
However, Tong’a reported that the first shipment of U.S food aid was 8,200 tons of wheat received in Pusan on May 
24, 1946. Tong’a, January 11, 1947.   
 Ibid.4
 From Headquarters, USAMGIK, “Food Position Report for South Korea, December 1946-30 November 1947” 5
dated 17 December 1947, 396; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331
 Calculated from the figures given in Kyŏnghyang, October 18, 1947.6
 The peak consumption during the colonial era which was in years from 1932 to 1936. “Yearly Results of Important 7
Exports from Japan Proper to Korea in Different Categories,” ref. 300-302; Foodstuff Import File, #6429; Economic 
and Scientific Section, UD 1733; SCAP, 1946-1951, RG 331, National Archives, College Park (NACP). 
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a vast majority of those who consumed wheat flour did so because they did not have access to 
rice and thus had no choice but to eat rationed wheat flour. Thus, wheat flour would not have 
spread as rapidly as it did in south Korea had a large quantity of it not been distributed for 
general rationing, and this has a consequence in our understanding of a process of globalization. 
The spread of wheat flour in south Korea - as an example of globalization - was not inevitable, 
but it depended on a series of historical coincidences. What if the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
had not had surplus wheat flour, what if it had sent potatoes or corns instead of wheat flour, or 
what if there had not been a shortage of rice in south Korea under U.S. occupation in 1945? An 
“if” would have changed the beginning of the mass circulation of wheat flour in south Korea.   
In fact, wheat and wheat flour was not the prioritized substitute crop that Koreans anticipated 
to cope with hunger and the shortage of rice. It was potato. During the colonial period, 
agricultural scientists paid attention to the potential of potato as a crop that did not know bad 
harvests.  Also, in early 1946, which was before USAMGIK began importing wheat, Nongmin 8
Chubo, USAMGIK’s official gazette for farmers, emphasized potato as a good substitute crop.  9
In other words, the dramatic increase in the consumption of wheat flour was by no means an 
 Annual production of sweet and white potatoes averaged 395,000 tons per year in the southern zone of Korea, 8
Foodstuff Requirement: Korea, 1946; 307; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. Potato had been encouraged as a substitute 
crop since 1938, the Total Mobilization period. Potato varieties in Korea and in Japan were those of Irish seeds that 
came through the United States. Potato as a crop did not know bad harvest since potato was not sensitive to weather 
conditions. For the importance of potato as a substitute crop during the colonial period, see Tong’a, August 26, 
1939. 
 During the month of hunger in the winter of 1945 and 1946, potato, instead of wheat, was encouraged as a 9
substitute. In January 1946, the officially published Weekly News for Farmers, Nongmin Chubo, emphasized potato 
as a substitute. In April 1946, 280 tons of potato (maryŏngsŏ) seeds were imported from the United States. During 
the colonial period, the imported potato seeds had come from Hokkaido, Japan. However, after the demise of the 
empire, importing potato seeds from Japan was infeasible. Nongmin Chubo, May 4, 1946; Also, see throughout the 
January 1946 issues of Nongmin Chubo.
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inevitable result, but it was a direct result of U.S. congress’s funding and USAMGIK’s 
importation of U.S. surplus wheat for civilian rationing in Korea. 
Therefore, in larger framework, the spread of wheat flour in South Korea as part of 
globalization was historically specific to the transition from Japan’s colonial rule to U.S. 
hegemony. Its popularization was not market demand-driven, nor industrial production-driven. 
Instead, the imperial transition had aggravated post-liberation poverty and the shortage of rice 
which compelled the Koreans to adapt to the habit of eating wheat flour. Further, since 
USAMGIK initiated and oversaw the general rationing of wheat flour, U.S. occupation and its 
continued hegemony in Korea was the crucial factor that ensured the familiarization of wheat 
flour in south Korea. By the same token, USAMGIK’s relief distribution of wheat flour imparted 
to recipients the memory inseparable with the experiences of U.S. occupation, national division, 
UN Trusteeship, and the Cold War rivalry with the Communists, all of which were entangled 
with the interjection of this new food into a traditionally rice-eating culture. In these ways, the 
distribution channels of USAMGIK’s rationing and relief programs changed the social and 
cultural meanings of wheat flour away from those of the 1920s and 1930s colonial period, which 
had been oriented towards the consumer market and modern industrial production.  10
While wheat flour may have had more intense impacts on lower income groups such as the 
returnees from former Japanese empire, orphans, the unemployed and under-employed, and 
students from destitute families through specific relief programs, it also affected much broader 
sections of the Korean society through general rationing when over one third of the population 
received rationed food. The number of persons with ration cards progressively increased from 
 For the cultural and social meanings of wheat flour during the Japanese colonial period, see the second section of 10
this chapter [Meanings of Wheat Flour in Colonial Korea]
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5.6 million in July 1946 to 8.9 million by January 1948 while the number of population 
approached 18 million in U.S. occupation zone.  In particular, general rationing affected people 11
in urban areas where people did not self-cultivate crops. In May 1946, USAMGIK distributed 
ration food to 6.7 million persons. 3.96 million people had no means of self-supplying 
foodstuffs, and therefore, they were qualified for full rations, and 2,7 million people, who were 
partial self-suppliers, received half of the full ration. USAMGIK assumed that the rest two thirds 
of the population were self-cultivators, and therefore, they did not need rationed food. The 
number of people eligible for ration food was 7.4 million in December 1947, and 8.9 million in 
January 1948.  The numbers are significant as we consider that the beginning of familiarization 12
of wheat flour in south Korea. The numbers which stayed consistently over a third of the total 
population signify the number of people who were subject to the involuntary consumption, as 
opposed to the consumption through market demand. Further, the consumption through rationing 
associated wheat flour with post-liberation poverty and U.S. occupation as people who obtain 
wheat flour from different distribution channels tended to use wheat flour differently, for 
example, by using different recipes.  13
Then, a perplexing question is, why after giving large quantities of wheat flour and thereby 
 403; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331; March 7, 1947, ref. 318 and January 13, 1948, ref. 387; #6428; Foodstuff import 11
files, 1946-1951; SCAP, RG 331.
 Food position of South Korea as of May 1, 1946; 303-308; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. The relief ration for 12
general population continued until 1955 when the U.S. Office of Economic Coordinator in Seoul handed over 
rationing to the South Korea state, which practically dropped relief work from its state agenda except for some 
56,000 inmates in institutions.
 Aside from free distribution as emergency relief by USAMGIK - and through the South Korean state after 1948-, 13
wheat was also one of the commodities sold to local Korean buyers. The sales was designed to bring in local hwan 
currency for state spending, particularly pertaining to military expenditure. The portion of sales of wheat for the 
Counterpart Fund was insubstantial in the period from 1945 to 1950. However, it becomes crucial after 1955, and 
this will be dealt in chapter 5. 
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saving many Koreans from starvation, U.S. still failed to win over the hearts of the Korean 
masses in the Cold War rivalry? It was rather ironic that up to a third of the south Korean 
population fed on U.S. wheat flour, but they did not link the appreciation for food assistance to 
supporting the U.S. camp in the Cold War rivalry. Of course, USAMGIK was not without their 
firm supporters among Koreans, and the U.S. imperial motivation conspiracy was not shared by 
all. For example, Sasanggye, a magazine subsidized by USAMGIK, supported U.S. policies. 
However, both USAMGIK and Kim Il-sung, in pleading Stalin for a war in Korea, shared the 
prediction that if there would be a national election,  which did not take place in the end, the 
socialists would receive the majority votes in the south. The same question was echoed in the 
letters that U.S. personnel in Korea wrote to their mothers, apparently. These Americans were 
perplexed that “Koreans” were ungrateful even after the United States freed them from the 
Japanese rule, and even after the United States saved them from starvation and disease by giving 
wheat flour and DDT. In August 1947, Tong’a editorial answered the question that the Koreans 
had complaints because the United States was not giving Koreans the independence.  14
Following up on this insight, I argue in this chapter that what these U.S. personnel missed 
was the earlier history of U.S. occupational politics in Korea and USAMGIK’s food policy 
before wheat flour was rationed out from August 1946. In that earlier period before the injection 
of wheat flour, it took a particular process, or steps of linkage, for agents like the Chayu Sinmun 
to turn both the shortage of food and foreign food into the metaphors of foreign occupations and 
U.S. imperial motivations. In other words, the process was more complicated than USAMGIK’s 
rationing imparting the associations with national dependency and U.S. imperial motivations to 
 Editorial, Tong’a, August 12, 1947. p.114
!34
Chapter 1. Imperial Surplus
wheat flour. 
To lead through the processes in which wheat flour was associated with the suspicions about 
U.S. imperial motivations, the chapter is divided into three sections: Section 1 focuses on the 
period before August 1946, U.S. wheat flour began to be rationed out throughout south Korea. 
came in. The section investigates the ways in which USAMGIK food policy was a failure in 
1945 and 1946, and the ways in which its failure made the politicization of the food question 
possible to link it to U.S. imperial motivations. Section 2. explores the history and meanings of 
wheat flour during the colonial period. By comparison, this would bring out the continuities and 
shifts instigated by USAMGIK’s rationing. Section 3. covers the rapid spread of U.S. surplus 
wheat flour during the period between May 1946 and June 1950. The section focuses on the 
changes instigated by the distribution channel of general rationing and relief programs. 
In section 1, the question of grain was already politicized by newspapers such as the Chayu 
Sinmun that opposed the national division and UN Trusteeship. Grain was politicized in three 
steps in comparison to the communist north Korea. This politicization may have contributed to 
the causes why U.S. food assistance failed to win the hearts of the Korean masses such as in 
projected results of a national election. Firstly, before food policy, USAMGIK’s involvement in 
national division and later UN Trusteeship had already failed to win over the Korean masses. 
Those Koreans who opposed UN trusteeship considered it to be a betrayal of the principle of 
“self-determination” in their misconstrued understanding of Wilson’s historical Four Points. 
Secondly, USAMGIKs food policy for the winter and spring of 1945 and 1946 failed to 
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adequately feed Koreans, and the failure gave fodder to the South Korean newspapers like Chayu 
to politicize the question of grain.   15
Thirdly, USAMGIK’s limited success, or failure, in the civilian feeding program did not 
stand out favorably in comparison to the food situation in the Soviet occupation zone of north, 
which also had mixed outcomes with land reforms and collectivization.  When the food 16
situation both in the south and the north were deemed to be equally incompetent, politically 
oppositional newspapers against trusteeship politicized the question of lack of grain by poking 
fun at the USAMGIK’s failure to distinguish itself from the communists in the north. The 
indistinguishability of the imperial twins posed the question what would be a reason for the 
Korean people to choose U.S. administered democracy over communist managed one when both 
USAMGIK and the Soviets seemed to harbor same the imperial motivations as shown from the 
trusteeship issue.  In the case that north was excelling in its food management, the political 17
question was even easier. Why would the Korean people choose the U.S. side to starve when the 
north has plentiful grain?  
Importantly, I argue that the local interpretations of the food assistance of Wheat flour after 
August 1946 had already been shaped by the failures and resultant politicizations before August 
1946. If USAMGIK harbored wishful thinking for U.S. food assistance to foster a goodwill 
 All parties involved -  state officials under USAMGIK, newspapers, family consumers, and experts such as 15
economists and medical doctors - assessed USAMGIK’s initial grain policy to be a failure. Kyŏnghyang, October 7, 
1946, p.3
 See for example, [Sisa Manhwa] in Chayu Sinmun, February 23, 1946, p. 1. 16
 Although not specifically on grain, foreign food was used as a metaphor. For example, on November 9, 1945, 17
Chayu Sinmun published a cartoon with a prompt, “Which glass would you choose (between cocktail and wine)? 
Both cocktail and grape wine were foreign to Koreans. Not only were the two similarly foreign, the glasses also 
came espousing similar values such as patriotism, national heroes. A traditionally dress Korean man looks at the 
glasses with unappetizing expression. 
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among Korean recipients, it only scored limited success because wheat flour inherited 
USAMGIK’s earlier failure which it tried to remedy.  By all means, wheat flour rations after 18
August 1946 were also too little to give 375 grams of rationing, and the taste of wheat flour was 
unfamiliar and generally disliked by the Koreans. 
The rationing of wheat flour did alleviate the food problem. However, the foreign imports 
also resulted in a different nature of politicization. The political accusation against U.S. 
imperialist motivations, which were formed before wheat flout, got infused with the physical 
(taste bud) dislike of wheat flour and cultural unfamiliarity. Personal dislike of the taste of wheat 
flour associated the dislike to the origin of wheat flour, which was U.S. surplus donated by U.S. 
government. Wheat and wheat flour imported to south Korea most entirely came from the United 
States, except a modicum amount from the Philippines, Manila, and Canada.  Freighters of 19
GRIOA grains departed from the ports of Philadelphia, Baltimore, Mobile, Houston and New 
Orleans. The ports of Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles were also used to upload 
and dispatch grains for distribution in the Pacific theater, which included Japan, the Ryukyu 
Islands and Korea below the 38th parallel.  Since wheat flour was visible as a new insertion from 20
the United States, wheat flour, rather than barley or rice, provided a suitable field to discuss U.S. 
 Among examples of failing to win the goodwill of the Koreans despite giving food and other material assistance, 18
see Tong’a, July 13, 1947. 
 For wheat flour imported from the Philippines, see June 15, 1947; 285-6; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. Also see 204 19
(Manila) and 194-204 (Philippines); #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. Also see Kim Hyŏng-su, Kang Yong-hui, U Ch’ang-
myŏng, and Yi Sŏ-rae, “Kuksan wŏllyo rŭl sayonghan pokhap’pun kaebal e kwanhan yŏn’gu.” Han’guk Sikp’um 
Kwahak Chi, No. 2, 1973. Also see, the Korea Bank statistics says ninety-nine to hundred percent wheat were 
American until 1970. The wheat imported from the Philippines and Canada were negotiated and administered by the 
United States on behalf of South Korea. Statistics by Korea Flour Mills Industrial Association (KOFMIA) and U.S. 
Wheat Association in Seoul has that in 1986 and 1987, of imported wheat, 88.2% was from the United States, 8.0% 
from Austria, 0.7% from Canada, and 3.1% from Argentina.
 In the Postwar (1945-55) Korea and Japan were linked as Pacific theater, and it was still under the War 20
Department of the United States, September 8, 1950; 230; #6429; UD1733; RG 331
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hegemony.   21
Wheat and wheat flour took up a significant portion of the foodstuffs imported by 
USAMGIK. For the months of May 1946 through August 1947, wheat and wheat flour took up 
64.8% of the total grain imports.  In 1947, when rationed food was planned to be all in grain 22
and cereals, other rationed grain included barley, corn meal, and rice.  While wheat and wheat 23
flour was mostly from the surplus stocks of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, USAMGIK 
imported other foodstuffs through international trade with other non-Communist nations, often 
bartering them with U.S. farm surpluses such as wheat. Thus, other foodstuffs such as “foreign” 
rice and sugar had less of an identification with the United States as their origin. Besides wheat, 
other farm commodities strongly connected with the United States were cotton and sugar. In 
addition, USAMGIK also occasionally rationed out other foreign foodstuffs such as butter, 
cheese, powdered skim milk, cotton seed oil and candies.  24
From May 1946 to August 1947, USAMGIK imported a total of 480,134 tons of grain, and 
this makes up approximately 14% of the total grain consumption by civilian population in south 
 In the Postwar (1945-55) Korea and Japan were linked as Pacific theater, and it was still under the War 21
Department of the United States, September 8, 1950; 230; #6429; UD1733; RG 331
 From May 1946 to August 1947 (16 months), USAMGIK imported total 480,134 tons of grain (30,008 tons per 22
month). Kyŏnghyang, October 8, 1948; also see, 197, 201-2, 208, 212, 216, 318-9, 307, 309, 380, 386-7, 390, and 
396; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331.
 194; #6429; UD 1733; RG 33123
 For the distribution of candy, see 219 and 251; #6429; UD 1733; RG 33124
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Korea.  This provided average 30,008 tons of imported grain monthly, of white rice, corn, pea, 25
soybeans, corn, oats, barley, and wheat and wheat flour.  However, in order to ration 358-370 26
grams of grain per adult, USAMGIK needed to import 40,000 tons of gain monthly.  Therefore, 27
imported 30,008 tons per month was 25% short of the grain import requirement for civilian 
feeding.  USAMGIK estimated 358 grams of grain to give 1,255 calories for an adult daily. 28
Assuming that Koreans could procure 295 calories from unrationed food, the average calorie 
intake per day was set at 1,550 calories in 1947.  Although the rationed grain was only sufficient 29
to provide some 941 calories per day, it is without doubt that the food imports from the United 
States prevented the food situation deteriorating to mass starvation. 
Before we investigate the familiarization of wheat flour in south Korea, section 1 explores 
the ways in which the question of food was politicized. This first section examines the period 
before the shipments of wheat and wheat flour set roughly as August 1946 when wheat began to 
be rationed throughout the provinces. Since the shortage of rice in 1945 and 1946 provided the 
condition for the rationing of wheat, I start the section with the origins of the shortage of rice, 
and the failure of USAMGIK to handle the food question in 1945-1946. The indistinguishability 
 For indigenous grain and pulse production in Korea south of 38th degree north latitude, imports from Manchuria 25
and export to Japan for years 1940-44, 1945, and estimated 1946, see Table 1, ref. 306; #6429; UD1733; RG 331. 
For the period from 1 July 1946 to 30 June 1947, total estimated indigenous production of grain and pulses available 
for human consumption was 2,225,000 metric tons (185,417 metric tons per month), ref. 402. From May 1946 to 
August 1947 (16 months), USAMGIK imported total 480,134 tons of grain (30,008 tons per month). Out of total 
grain imports, wheat and wheat flour took up 64.8%. Kyŏnghyang, October 8, 1948; also see, 197, 201-2, 208, 212, 
216, 318-9, 307, 309, 380, 386-7, 390, and 396; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331.
 Kyŏnghyang, October 8, 194826
 225, 384, and 391, Jan 6 1947; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331 27
 225, 384, and 391, Jan 6 1947; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331 28
 194; #6429; UD 1733; RG 33129
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of USAMGIK’s food policy from the Communist ones in the north made it possible for 
newspapers like Chayu Sinmun (Freedom Press) to politicize U.S. imperial motivations using 
food as a metaphor.   
SECTION 1. 
THE FAILURE OF USAMGIK’S FOOD POLICY, 1945-1946 
This section looks at the politicization of the grain question before a large-scale injection of 
U.S. surplus wheat in late 1946. During the period between 1945 and 1950, USAMGIK provided 
wheat flour to Korean recipients as a substitute for rice. In other words, the reason why wheat 
flour was able to spread despite the general dislike of wheat flour amongst Koreans was that 
Koreans did not have rice, and at this historical juncture, USAMGIK supplied wheat flour for the 
civilian feeding in Korea. Thus, in order to understand the processes through which this 
unfamiliar food spread rapidly, we need to investigate the reasons for the shortage of food 
immediately after the liberation in 1945 and 1946. This first section focuses on the period from 
September 1945 to July 1946. It is a period before the entry of wheat flour in the daily Korean 
life as it was not until July that the first substantial sum of food assistance arrived from the 
United States in the form of 8,200 tons of wheat.  The historical context before wheat flour 30
became relevant to the Korean daily life imparted crucial meanings to wheat flour when it 
entered the scene in south Korea. 
In the winter and the spring of 1945 and 1946, following September 1945 when the XXIV 
 396; #6429; UD 1733; RG 33130
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Corps occupied Korea south of the 38th degree north latitude and established USAMGIK, the 
shortage of food had several causes. USAMGIK’s food policy during the period from 1945 to 
1948 was mostly improvised, which made a competent policy outcome unlikely. Lieutenant 
General Hodge’s XXIV’s corps of the U.S Army was extemporaneously diverted from the 
occupation of Japan and its dispatch to Korea in 1945 was unexpected. Thus, USAMGIK did not 
have time to consider a coherent food policy for the 15.5 million Koreans under its control. 
Further, the number of population was rapidly increasing. USAMGIK thus limited the goal of its 
food policy to prevention of mass starvation and resultant social unrests. However, the failure of 
USAMGIK’s food policy was only the secondary cause of the shortage of rice. More important 
historical reasons were the consequences of the chaos after the demise of the Japanese empire, 
and the demographic changes caused by the influx of compatriots returning from the former 
empire and from Soviet occupation zone in the north. 
The sudden breakdown of the Japanese empire contributed to the shortage of rice in U.S. 
occupation zone south of the 38th parallel for several reasons. Firstly, the bulk of food scheduled 
to be imported from Manchuria did not arrive after Manchukuo demised with the collapse of the 
Japanese empire. Bad weather in the summer of 1945 had stalled the grain harvest in Korea at 
only 36 percent of the average harvest of the period between 1940 and 1944. To prevent 
starvation, the Governor-General of Korea had planned to import 400,000 tons of grain and 
pulses from Manchuria for 1945. However, Korea only received a quarter of the scheduled 
imports before Japan surrendered, and the remaining shipments did not leave Manchuria.   31
The Food Administrator, Lt. Col. Carroll Hill, of USAMGIK construed the impacts that the 
 394; #6429; UD 1733; RG 33131
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sudden demise of the colonial administrative apparatus had on the food situation as follows, 
The confusion and dislocation following the Japanese surrender resulted in rapid dissipation of 
most Government-held stocks, which totaled about 203,000 metric tons in south Korea on 1 
August 1945. The Japanese distributed both paper currency and food in lavish fashion between 
their surrender in August and the American occupation in September and there was also 
considerable looting of food stocks by Koreans. The resulting temporary “abundance” plus the 
fact that the current rice crop to be a bumper one, tended to make the newly liberated Koreans 
and the occupying authorities overoptimistic about the food situation during the Fall of 1945. 
The Japanese in Korea stimulated this overoptimism by presenting the food situation in a most 
favorable light, perhaps in the hope of getting Korean rice for export to Japan. The American 
Military Government, which was faced with a tremendous administrative job with very limited 
personnel was not in a position to reestablish food control measures in the autumn of 1945 and a 
“free market” for rice and other foodstuffs was declared.  32
However, liberation from the colonial rule had the most direct impact on the food situation 
by unleashing rapid influx of compatriots to U.S. occupation zone. Within a year and half, 
approximately 3 million Koreans returned from Japan, and formerly Japanese imperial and 
conflictual zones in Manchuria, North China, and South Asia, and also came down from north 
Korea. The rapid increase in population aggravated the shortage of rice. In the “Food Position 
Report for South Korea,” USAMGIK informed Washington that the Korean population below 
the 38th parallel had doubled in the past thirty years. On May 1, 1944, the population south of the 
38th parallel was 15.9 million. After the Japanese surrender, approximately half a million 
Japanese civilians were repatriated to Japan by the end of April 1946. However, this outflow was 
offset by much larger influx of population returning to Korea from abroad.  Headquarters of 33
USAMGIK counted an increase of 2.1 million Koreans, repatriated from Japan, Manchuria, and 
South Asia, and also fleeing from Soviet occupation zone in the north from August 15, 1945 to 
 From Carroll V, Hill, Lt. Col. CE, National Food Administrator, Headquarters, USAMGIK, “The Food Position of 32
South Korea as of 1 May 1946,” 304; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331
 304; #6429; UD 1733; RG 33133
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December 1, 1946.  The increase of 2.1 million were broken down to 1.1 million persons 34
repatriated from Japan; 390,250 persons taking refugee from north Korea in official counts; 
368,555 returning from Manchuria and North China (Pukchi); and 33,667 repatriated from other 
areas. USAMGIK Headquarters also estimated the number of clandestine entries from North 
Korea at around 210,000 persons.  By January 1, 1947, the population below the 38th parallel 35
increased to 18.8 million. Headquarters also expected an additional increase by 80,000 Koreans 
who would return to the homeland in 1947, bringing an estimated total to 19.2 million by the 
beginning of 1948. Interestingly, USAMGIK figures did not take account of the number of 
persons who crossed to north of the 38th parallel from the south. I could not find an official 
counting of this number, but the number could be as large as 2 million persons, and this would 
have offset the increase in population.    36
Following the liberation, the question of returnees posed a serious social threat, and as a way 
of solution, relief works presented an increasing burden commensurate to the number of 
returnees. They needed to be fed, if only to curb possible social unrests in urban areas where the 
homeless and unemployed returnees tended to conglomerate. From some ports of exit, the 
returnees were permitted to bring only 1,000 yen, and with such limited resource, a substantial 
number of them were unable to find housing and employment.  In addition, the spectacle of the 37
returnees in rags also disconcerted the moral of the existing urban dwellers. A large number of 
 “Food position report for South Korea, December 1946- 30 November 1947” Headquarters, U.S. Army Military 34
Government in Korea, National Economic Board, Seoul, 393; #6429; Food Import File, UD 1733; SCAP 
1946-1961, Economic and Scientific Section, RG 331
 400; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331 35
 Kyŏnghyang, October 7, 1946. pp.3-436
 304; #6429; UD 1733; RG 33137
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returnees gathering around big train stations and forming shanty towns in run-down and deserted 
market places provided some observers with the source to visualize the sorry state that the capital 
had fallen into after liberation and U.S. occupation.   38
For example, the Chayu Sinmun published a letter from a contributor who identified herself 
or himself as “a country person, who came to Seoul,” on October 29, 1945. Its title was “(I) 
Cried When (I) Came to Seoul.”  The contributor took the opportunity as the Chayu Sinmun 39
solicited letters within the limit of three hundred characters on a topic of any choice. The letter 
gives a sense of debacle experienced after liberation. 
I am not sure if I should laugh with happiness, or cry with grief as I see the streets of Seoul, 
changed unrecognizably since August 15.  It is incredible that people in Seoul are still able to 40
hold on to their sanity when the streets are covered with human excrements, trash, and dust while 
on the other side, rice broth, biscuits and household goods that Japanese evacuees had left behind 
are piled up like mountains. It is sufficiently a sorry picture that Seoul has risen rapidly as the 
city of consumption and the city of pleasure with cafés, bars and dance halls, which occupy 
every other house after another. Sorrier still is that, who would have even imagined that the 
hearts of people in Seoul would become so cold and cruel as they turn blind eyes to the returnees 
who are getting off at Kyŏngsŏng Station and Ch’ŏngryangri Station each day while they spend 
millions and hundred thousands of wŏn to build these amenities.     41
Interestingly, the letter writer identifies Seoul as a city of consumption. Further, as she or he cites 
the frivolous commodities and cultures of which origin was the United States, she links the new 
consumption to the presence of U.S. troops and U.S. occupation.   
In order to assuage the problem of hungry and unsettled returnees, conducive to social 
 The Chayu Sinmun, October 16, 1945; Also see the Puin Sinmun, January 28, 1950 (4283) and February 21, 1950 38
(4283)
 [Kamkwang P’an] “Sŏul wasŏ ulŏtta (Cried upon coming to Seoul)” written by Sŏul watdŏn sigol saram (A 39
country man, who came to Seoul).” Chayu Sinmun, October 29, 1945.
 August 15, 1945 was the day of Liberation from the Japanese colonial rule.40
 [Kamkwang P’an] “Sŏul wasŏ ulŏtta (Cried upon coming to Seoul)” written by Sŏul watdŏn sigol saram (A 41
country man, who came to Seoul).” Chayu Sinmun, October 29, 1945.  
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despair and instability, USAMGIK prioritized the refugees and returnees in the lists for the 
distribution of relief food. This also meant that the impacts of relief rationing was especially 
large on the returnees. Returning bare-handed and lacking means to procure other foodstuffs, 
they tended to depend on what was given to them in rations and in refugee camps. From March 
1946, the Bureau of Social Affairs of Seoul distributed 75 grams of barley and 75 grams of wheat 
flour daily to returnees and refugees in the city. 150 grams of grain would only give about 500 
calories for an average adult. The ration was supplemented by an additional supply of bread, 
canned vegetables, salt, sugar and beans.  Although small in scale, returnees and refugees were 42
the first group to receive U.S. wheat flour and barley since the general rationing of wheat flour 
did not start until the end of July 1946.  
Next year, in April 1947, USAMGIK set up more refugee camps near the 38th parallel for the 
refugee from the northern regions (ibuk ijae tongp’o suyong’so) in the cites of Ch’ŏngdan, 
T’osŏng, Kaesŏng, Tongdu-ch’ŏn, Ŭichŏng-pu, Chumun-chin, Ch’unch’ŏn, and P’och’ŏn. For 
the three month period from April to June 1947, these camps accommodated 92,584 refugees 
while a similar number of northerners were estimated to have crossed the 38th parallel without 
going through the camps.  U.S. Military provided tents for these camps. For example, Ŭichŏng-43
pu camp had 68 U.S. military tents, each putting up 50 refugees, and Tongdu-ch’ŏn camp had 20. 
At the camps, refugees received breakfast and dinner each day, which were approximately 345 
grams of either wheat or wheat flour, and some canned food.  On the other hand, the sick were 44
 In terms of approximate weight. 1 hop= 150 grams, 1 jak= 15 grams. In terms of the volume of grains, 1 jak= 42
18ml. Thus, 5 jak=90ml, Tong’a, March 17, 1946.
 Tong’a, August 7, 1947. p.2 43
 2 hop and 3 jak is approximately 345 grams.44
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given a preference treatment with rice, and rice gruel. Refugees usually stayed at the camps for 
any period between three to seven days before USAMGIK transferred them to more permanent 
settlement centers in the provinces, with an exception of Seoul.  45
In 1947, USAMGIK reported that 163,000 refugees passed 
through the collection stations, and estimated that a number 
larger that this likely had bypassed them. The refugees from the 
north in 1948 was not any less than the number in 1947.   46
On the other hand, conditions of the shortage of rice and the 
influx of population alone did not provide sufficient fodder to 
turn the question of food into a political metaphor and parody. 
Newspapers like the Chayu Sinmun (Freedom Press) employed 
certain techniques to turn the question of food into a metaphor of 
U.S. imperial motivations suspected in its support for national 
division and U.N. trusteeship. In particular, the Chayu Sinmun 
often juxtaposed an image of the refugees with an image of the 
post-liberation “decadence.” The Chayu Sinmun was a newspaper 
born out of the fervor of the People’s Committees immediately 
after the liberation and which supported the Provisional 
Government, of the independence fighters mainly exiled in 
 Tong’a, August 8, 1947. 45
 315; #6429; UD 1733; RG 33146
!46
Figure 1.1   [Hyŏngmaeng’a] 
by Lim, Tong-ŭn in the Chayu 
Sinmun, December 17, 1945
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Manchuria.  When the newspaper opposed national division and U.N. Trusteeship, it exploited 47
the shortage of rice by making it into a topic of political satire and sarcasm. 
Noteworthily, the adjective, “decadent (t’oep’ye chŏk)” was frequently invoked to condemn 
the changes in consumption patterns, perceived to be influenced by U.S. occupation and the 
presence of a large scale U.S. military contingents. Decadence was visualized in images of 
cabaret (dance halls), bars and café culture.  Produced in U.S. food commodities such as coffee, 48
whiskey and beer were assumed to be from the 
U.S. military camps since they were not officially 
imported to Korea. Thus, their massive availability 
was believed to be the results of illegal transfers 
from U.S. military provisions for black market 
trading. 
Secondly, the adjective “decadent (t’oep’ye 
chŏk)” described the disapproval of changing 
sexual mores, appeared from the Korean women 
who fraternized with U.S. soldiers. An article in 
the Chayu Sinmun criticized them as “women who 
bring shame to the nation (kukch’iryang).”  It 49
exhorted, “The citizens of Seoul are outraged by 
 Chayu Sinmun, see especially October 5 issues, from October 5, 1945.  47
 In addition to the two excerpts, also see Figure 1.1 [Hyŏngmaeng’a] by Lim Tong-ŭn, in Chayu Sinmun, 48
December 17, 1945.
 See [Eradication of women who shame our nation (kukch’iryang ŭi ilso) in Chayu Sinmun, October 23, 1945, p.1, 49
The article was published together with the above Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2  Eradication of women who shame 
the nation (kukch’iryang ŭi ilso) in the Chayu 
Sinmun, October 23, 1945
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the bizarre women, with hairdo and make-up, who are appearing under the beautiful pretext of 
welcoming the troops of the United Nations. Did these women confuse ethnic-national liberation 
with the liberation of public mores and took it as a liberation from chastity?”  The women were 50
also associated with the consumption in cabaret, bars and cafes.  
In other words, the Chayu Sinmun obliquely criticized U.S. occupation by criticizing the 
local adaptations of the culture from U.S. military camps. The newspaper transformed the change 
in culture to a political criticism by juxtaposing the contrasting pictures of miserable returnees 
and the shortage of rice with the conspicuous consumption influenced by U.S. occupation and 
culture seeping through the camp towns. Thus, it doubly attacked U.S. occupation not only by 
disapproving U.S. cultural influence, but also by doing it in the way of emphasizing the shortage 
of rice, which was also considered to be a failure by USAMGIK. The Chayu Sinmun published 
the following article on October 27, 1945.  Two months after liberation in October 1945, 51
USAMGIK reported that 141,392 Koreans were repatriated from Japan alone. 
Each day, five thousand compatriots are returning to the homeland from Japan and from 
Manchuria. They had left the homeland with a dream of returning in glory. However, after 
escaping death by a narrow margin, they now set feet in Seoul in miserably shabby clothing 
while leading the old and carrying their young. How are the citizens of Seoul greeting them? … 
A countless number of rice-broth houses and drinking houses under sun screens have sprung up. 
There are people who prodigally spend hundred thousand wŏn (local currency) and a million 
wŏn at dance halls, cabarets, bars, and cafes, which appear like mushrooms in the flood season. 
What would our returning compatriots, which number five thousand on average daily, view these 
sites? It became a phenomenon that facilities like these excite decadent pleasure-seeking, and it 
is a very critical social problem when they cover the center of Seoul. Moreover, a few days ago I 
observed a returnee’s camp in the city that accommodated two thousand returnees a day. The 
returnees were put up in the first floor through to the fifth floor, and they looked utterly 
miserable. However, the largest room on the ground floor was made into a cafe, and people were 
 Ibid.50
 The numbers were provided by U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), Chayu Sinmun. October 51
27, 1945.
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eating and playing there boisterously. The returnees got extremely resentful at this site. Together 
with the problem of unemployment, the problem of returning compatriots has become the focus 
of social instability.   52
The article emphasized that five thousand compatriots were returning from Japan and Manchuria 
each day in a miserable state. It laments that the citizens of Seoul are indifferent to the suffering 
of their compatriots, and at the same time, they unhesitatingly display their “decadence” in front 
of the returnees who needed food and housing for survival.  53
Facing such social tensions, the City Government of Seoul under USAMGIK made a gesture 
to remedy the problem of hunger. In January 1946, the City Government attempted to provide 
general rations for the families holding the City-issued “Rice Accounts (Ssal T’ongjang).” Rice 
Accounts permitted the families to purchase designated amounts of grain at ration stations, where 
grains were sold at much lower prices than in the (black) market. Heads of households without 
Rice Accounts were required to procure them from the Neighborhood Association Chiefs 
(panjang). Neighborhood Association was a structure inherited from the Total Mobilization Drive 
towards the end of the Pacific War (1938-1945) to control and co-opt the civilian population 
under the state.  However, the City’s ration plan was little more than a gesture doomed to failure 54
when USAMGIK had managed to collect less than half of the 1945 rice collection requirements 
from the Korean farmers. The City did not have much grain to offer from the beginning.  
The reason for the failure of rationing was because USAMGIK only managed to collect half 
 Ibid.52
 Chayu Sinmun, October 16, 1945.53
 Chayu Sinmun, January 8, 1946. The government also maintained a registrar of “general needy households” under 54
an income levy cutline, and certain food items, for example, biscuits, were only distributed to these “general needy 
households.” 
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of the grain collection requirement.  Overall, free rice market was not a wise policy call when 55
the government stocks of grain had dissipated during the chaos of the Japanese withdrawal. As 
mentioned early in Carroll Hill’s report, USAMGIK declared a free rice market on October 5, 
1945. Hill  apologizes for the free rice market by saying that USAMGIK did not the 
administrative ability to oversee the rice collection in the fall of 1945. USAMGIK completed the 
occupation in mid-November, and by then, it was too late to control the 1945 rice crop 
collection. In addition, a free rice market seemed reasonable based on the prediction of a rice 
surplus in Korea when Korea no longer had to export rice to Japan. the reason for failure was 
because USAMGIK could only collect half of rice collections of 1945.  In December and 56
January, USAMGIK tried to give farmers incentive goods such as tobacco and rubber shoes in 
exchange for rice, but it was not successful mainly because of the shortage of incentive goods.  57
Even when the price of rice jumped ten times from 38 wŏn to 380 wŏn, the rice stores did not 
have rice to sell.  When rice price went up, the government had to release its grain stocks to 58
balance the market price. the rice price skyrocketed and the rice market was fraught with 
hoarding and speculation. Chayu Sinmun gives a picture of rice shortage, “Go to the Seoul 
Station today and see what is going on. When people see a person who has brought one or two 
sacks of rice to give to his relatives in the city, ten or twenty people surround him and shout to 
 249 Chong 1994 Vol. 1255
 249 Chong 1994 Vol. 1256
 From Headquarters, USAMGIK, National Economic Board, Seoul, Korea, “Food Position Report for South 57
Korea, December 1946- November 1947, dated December 17, 1947, ref. 395; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331
 In particular, see March 1946 issues of the Chayu Sinmun. 58
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sell it whatever the price is.”  59
In the midst of the outcry for rice on 
March 11, 1946, the Chayu Sinmun 
(Freedom Press) expressed its 
interpretation of the current food 
situation in relation to the Cold War 
ideological conflicts. Pertinent to 
having U.S. occupation zone in the 
south and Soviet occupation zone in the 
north, Chayu featured a caricature of a crying boy and two male adults, one each side of the boy. 
The adults try to soothe the boy by offering medicine. The man on the left holds out a bottle 
written with “the communist (medicine) pills” and the man on the right tempts the boy with a 
spoonful from a bottle labeled, “the democratic drug.” However, the boy has had enough of 
medicine until now, and this time he is not appeased by neither of the prescriptions. His stance is 
represented in the caption below, “By now, give (me) meal rather than medicine.”  Ironically, 60
however, while the boy is refusing to participate in the Cold War ideological rivalry, the 
caricature points out that the boy is still dependent on either of the two to receive his meal.  
Thus, through the caricature of twin guardians, Chayu portrays USAMGIK as having 
imperialist motivations and being no less domineering than the communists in the north. It 
captures an unmistakable moment of indistinguishability as the satire in the caricature show them 
 Chayu Sinmun, February 18, 1946. 59
 See Figure 1.3 on this page. [Chayu Manhwa] in the Chayu Sinmun, March 11, 1946.60
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Figure 1.3   [Chayu Manhwa] “Now, give (me) food 
rather than medicine.” Chayu Sinmun, March 11, 1946 
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like twins. The two occupiers demand the Koreans to choose one between a U.S. democracy and 
a communist democracy. Ironically, however, Koreans did not see a difference between the two. 
Both USAMGIK in the south, and the Soviets and Korean communists in the north were playing 
guardians when Korean people desired to be independent. Moreover, in the caricature, neither 
gave food, and therefore, the Koreans represented by Chayu did not a base to make a political 
choice between the two.    
In other words, the Chayu Sinmun was able to turn the question of food into a political issue 
by satirizing both the U.S. and the Soviets looking equally imperial and foreign. Following this 
logic, politicization of the food question was only possible because USAMGIK failed to feed 
Koreans adequately for the period between 1945 and 1947.  
The Chayu Sinmun was particularly creative in using the grain question as a metaphor to 
satirize USAMGIK’s pretense to be 
morally and economically superior 
to the communists both in the north 
and the south.  For example, on 61
February 23, 1946, the newspaper 
presented a caricature showing 
women and children in the south 
queuing up for grain when all the 
grain was stocked up in the north. 
In this caricature, the Chayu 
 See Figure 1.4 on this page. [Sisa Manhwa] Chayu Sinmun, February 23, 1946, p.1.61
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Figure 1.4   [Sisa Manhwa] “Is the fair rice price the 38th 
degree, or 38 wŏn?” Chayu Sinmun, February 23, 1946
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Sinmun was more overtly critical of USAMGIK, intimating that north is doing better than south 
USAMGIK. The caricature showed that if these people wanted grain -presumably rice-, 
USAMGIK in the south was not the right choice to make. People are queuing up for grain on the 
left (below south) while all the rice sacks were stocked over the wall in the north (right). A huge 
wall in the middle blocks their access to the plentiful grain on the other side, but the wall also has 
a dog hole through which people can peep. The message was made clear in the caption, “Is the 
fair rice price on the 38th Degree (North Latitude, which was the national division line), or 38 
wŏn (local currency unit)?”  The local currency unit, 38 wŏn, was a reference to the “fair rice 62
price” USAMGIK set per each sack. In March, the same portion of rice was selling at 380 wŏn in 
the black market and in December, it went up to 760 wŏn.  However, even one had money, the 63
plentiful rice in the north was only as good as a picture and was not available to families in the 
south. As such, these caricatures played on a thin line between politics and the everyday 
concerns. Thus, they brought out politics more prominently by making it into a vital concern in 
the everyday life.   64
Secondly, when the national division was blamed for the poor harvest, U.S. which supported 
national division and occupied half of Korea was blamed for the crop failure. into Soviet 
occupied north and U.S. occupied south cut the supply of chemical fertilizers for the southern 
 See Figure 1.1 on p.30. [Sisa Manhwa] in the Chayu Sinmun, February 23, 1946.62
 See throughout March 1946 issues of Chayu Sinmun. For December figure, see the 23rd Joint Korean-American 63
Conference on 2 December, 1946. 
 Rising rice price was a huge issue not only in Chayu, but in many other newspapers. The everyday concern in 64
Kajŏng Sinmun was the price of rice. Wheat flour was not visibly present neither before July 1946 when USAMGIK 
started shipping over large quantities of U.S. surplus wheat nor afterwards. When the Kajŏng Sinmun mentioned 
wheat in this period, wheat was used for women’s skin care and hair pack, in which case wheat flour mixed with egg 
and cucumber and was applied to skin. See, for example, July 1946 issues of the Kajŏng Sinmun. 
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farmers, which according to an USAMGIK report caused, “almost total lack of chemical 
fertilizers” for 1945 crop.  The developmental blue print of Japan’s Chosŏn-Manchuria vision 65
had more industries concentrated in northern provinces close to the Manchurian border. Thus, 
major fertilizer plants fell under Soviet control in 1945. For example, Hamhŭng had the second 
largest nitrogen fertilizer plant in the world.  The national division made the supply from these 66
plants no longer available for the southern farmers, and this hindered the agricultural 
productivity in 1946. Although USAMGIK addressed the problem by prioritizing the importation 
of agricultural fertilizers over fuel and food for the 1947 harvest, the damage had already been 
done.  67
In intimating USAMGIK’s incompetence, one of the things Chayu showed interest was the 
question of land reform in the north. The Communist Party in the Soviet zone had already carried 
out land reforms in 1945.  The news of swift and thorough Land Reforms in 1945 by the 68
communists north of the 38th parallel seemed to substantiate the communists’ commitment to 
equalitarian and revolution from the ground.  By comparison, the shortage of rice in the south 69
could be politically dangerous. In the south, land reform was still at a preparatory stage when the 
 305; #6429; UD 1733; RG 33165
 The factory was bombarded during the American Christmas operation in 1952, but had since been re-built after 66
the armistice. See Charles Armstrong.“‘Fraternal Socialism’: The International Reconstruction of North Korea, 
1953-62.” Cold War History, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 2006, p.176 
 Rice production increased after 1947 due to American agricultural technology. Control measures such as stem-67
borer and rice blast reduced the loss of crop by plant diseases and insects. Pesticides imported from the U.S. to be 
sprayed on the field and in storage also helped. The education of American agricultural technology had lasting 
impacts. In 1954 after the war, rice harvest was good, and in 1955, per capita consumption of rice reached 143kg. 
52, 1347
 See Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes. 68
1945-1947, Princeton University Press, 1981. pp.414-425
 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. Cornell University Press, 2003. pp.74-8169
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Korean War broke out in June 1950. Two weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War, the 
fledging South Korean state announced the completion of the registration of landlords. The state 
was now ready to negotiate with the landlords about due compensations, and confirmed that the 
landlords have the priorities to invest in the industrial assets left by the Japanese.  70
The first shipment of wheat was shipped from a U.S. port in April and arrived in Korea in 
May 1946. Anticipating the shipments of wheat, the City and USAMGIK advised the citizens to 
be prepared to substitute rice with wheat flour when rice was not available for rationing.  71
However, wheat flour was not readily available before August 1946, either. Until August, non-
cultivating population was receiving 150 grams of rationed grain, estimated to give 525 calories. 
USAMGIK had imported 7,800 tons of wheat in May, and 8,200 tons of wheat in June. However, 
when the grain import requirement per month was calculated at 40,000 tons to be able to provide 
345-375 grams of grain ration a day, 7,800 tons and 8,200 tons per month were not sufficient.  72
Thus, until July 1946 when USAMGIK imported 24,000 tons of wheat, and began rationing it 
throughout U.S. occupation zone in August, very few families actually benefited from City’s 
earlier gesture of general rationing.   73
The shortage of rice reached a peak in February and March 1946. Everyday, national and 
local newspapers deplored about rice stores not having any rice to sell in cities.  A remonstration 74
 Chayu Sinmun, May 3, 1950; June 14, 195070
 Chayu Sinmun, March 14, 1946.71
 2.3 to 2.5 hops were converted to 345-375 grams of grain. 72
 More is discussion in the later section, “U.S. Food Assistance and Changing Meanings of Wheat Four in South 73
Korea,” in this chapter. Headquarters, USAMGIK, “Food Position Reports for South Korea, December 1946-30 
November, 1947,” dated 17 December, 1947, ref.396, #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. 
 See, for example, February and March issues of the Chayu Sinmun.74
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of young factory workers in March 1946 showed that rice was scarce not only for the returnees 
and refugees, but also for urban laborers. On March 28, 1946, three hundred factory workers -
two hundred young male workers and one hundred young female workers- of Song-ha 
Electronics, Aechisa Printing, and Pyŏngsang Apparel conglomerated in front of the USAMGIK 
building in Seoul. They appealed their dire condition to USAMGIK and asked for rice. However, 
the young workers only succeeded in hearing that USAMGIK was not in charge of the food 
policy, but the City Government of Seoul was. The protesters moved their venue to the Seoul 
City Hall and continued their protest.  75
On the other hand, despite the politicization of the food question, in May 1946, USAMGIK 
reported to Washington that while hunger was a noticeable problem especially among specific 
sectors of the population such as the returnees and refugees, the food situation in south Korea did 
not fall below a starvation-level.  The report recognized severe malnutrition and hunger among 76
people, but this was described as “chronic hunger” that Koreans were used to experiencing. 
When the objectives of the civilian feeding program was in preventing social unrests and 
instability, “chronic” hunger was not a likely cause for riots to pose political threats to 
USAMGIK. USAMGIK was not likely to be blamed for a chronic situation that was part of a 
“normal” Korean life. Therefore, the report implied that USAMGIK need not commit to 
ameliorate the chronic hunger in Korea, and that the current food policy adequately provided for 
the population in spring 1946. Whether one judges the main causes of the riots in late 1946 to be 
 Chayu Sinmun, March 28, 1946.75
 303-308, May 1, 1946; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331; also see, Political Advisor Office to State Department, 76
790.00119 Control Korea, Dispatch No. 88, dated 14 May 1945, on Kangwŏn Province; RG 59. The situation of 
chronic hunger in south Korea continued to be a problem well into the 1960s.
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more due to social discontents, such by the shortage of food, or more due to socialist-
instigations, there were a series of riots throughout U.S. occupation zone in Korea, especially in 
November. 
From November 7 to 14, 1946, the situation was critical with the riots in Taegu, Yongsan, 
Masan, and Pusan. Although U.S wheat began to be rationed from August 1946, it was not 
sufficient and food was still scarce. At the 23rd Joint Korean-American Conference at Tŏksu 
Palace on December 2, 1946, Korean representatives argued that the failure of USAMGIK’s food 
policy was the single largest cause of the riots throughout 1946.  The Korean representatives 77
attributed this insight to consulting with the cities’ renowned personalities and with the arrested 
and detained rioters who plotted the stirrings. Whether the riots were caused by, what 
combinations of, the shortage of rice, by the capitalist-communist ideological conflicts, by 
foreign occupation of U.N. Trusteeship, or by national division, the consensus in the Joint U.S. 
and Korean Conference was that the most practical solution they could mill out to prevent further 
riots was to give food. If dire food situation could lead to mass riots, rendering urban dwellers 
especially vulnerable to socialist instigations, giving foods could dissolve political discontents. 
Thus, at the same conference, they moves on to discuss ration programs for 1947.   
The key to the success of rationing of 1947 laid in the success of rice collection from the 
Korean farmers. USAMGIK made an effort to induce farmers to exchange rice with rubber shoes 
and cotton clothes. Also, in December 1946, it offered 338,354 pounds of cookies and 2,500 
boxes of matches in exchange for the rice.  However, farmers could command much higher 78
 Minutes, 23rd meeting of the Joint Korean-American Conference at Tŏksu Palace, December 2, 1946; Control- 77
Korea; G-2 Section, USAFIK; RG 59 
 Nongmin Chubo, December 1, 1946 78
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prices in the black market, and this policy of battering was not effective. 
After two bad winters, the City Government of Seoul tried rationing again in April 1947 by 
issuing a new Rice Account (Ssal T’ongjang) now per each person, and not per family. In order 
to obtain rations, recipient ripped off a voucher from her Rice Account and submitted it to one of 
the 194 ration stations in the city.  The ration was provided every ten days, and it was not only 79
for grains, but also included clothes, laundry soap, rubber shoes and other everyday necessities.  80
An emotional issue in rationing was how much of it was “rice” as versus to wheat and other 
grains. Even after the importation of wheat began in July 1946, at the above conference, the U.S. 
and Korean representatives agreed to keep the percentage of rice to 30-50 percents. The 
percentage of wheat was the highest at over 64 percent in 1947 because the Food Administration 
in USAMGIK was sensitive to prices. The rest was mostly filled with “foreign” rice (oe-mi) and 
barley. Although the office was aware that Koreans preferred rice and barley, wheat and wheat 
flour was more economical cost-wise per calorie than rice and barley.  It was also under 81
pressure from Washington to purchase U.S. farm surpluses before turning to the international 
market for rice and other grains. It was not a coincidence then that wheat was by far the largest 
surplus stock of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  
On the other hand, the Food Administration of USAMGIK tried to accommodate the Korean 
cultural preference for rice by importing “foreign” rice (oe-mi). The office purchased rice from 
Burma, Egypt, Brazil, and Mexico as well as the United States. In December 6, 1945, 
 Tong’a, March 13, 194779
  Tong’a, March 26, 1947.80
 September 13, 1947, ref.382; #6429; UD 1733; RG 33181
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USAMGIK brought in 19,000 tons of white rice from California to Inchŏn.  It also had a small 82
amount of 200 metric tons of rice shipped to Korea from San Francisco and New Orleans.  83
During the particularly severe famine in 1947, the Food Administration of USAMGIK purchased 
6,000 tons of rice from Rangoon, Burma, through the British Ministry of Food.  Again in 1948, 
the US Department of State allocated 22,471 tons of Siamese (Bangkok, Thailand) and Egyptian 
Asian rice to Korea.  The Department of State organized the imports by bartering their “foreign” 84
rice with U.S. agricultural surpluses. Siam was interested in U.S. surplus seeds oil, and Egypt 
asked for U.S. surplus wheat flour. In particular, Egypt offered the trade ratio of 1:1 between 
U.S. wheat flour and Egyptian rice, which was a much more favorable rate than for domestic 
Korean rice.  True, when the grain import requirement was 40,000 tons per month in 1947, such 85
amounts of rice imports were not substantial. However, the trades show that at the early stage in 
1947 and 1948, U.S. agricultural surpluses were not the only source for civilian feeding 
assistance in Korea, which later became the case with U.S. Public Law 480 in 1954. The Food 
Administration did import grains other than wheat from other foreign countries often by 
bartering their produce with U.S. surplus wheat.  
However, “foreign” rice, called “oe-mi” by Koreans, was different from the indigenous rice 
in Korea, and Koreans considered foreign rice to be inferior to the Korean rice. Indigenous rice 
crop in Korea was “short-grain white” with a particular level of glutinous quality. Foreign rice 
was often of long-grain and it was also difficult to find foreign rice with the comparable 
 Chayu Sinmun,  December 6, 1945.82
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 hardcopy no. 274-295; RG 46984
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glutinous quality as the Korean breeds. The new South Korean state displayed sensitivity 
towards the differences among the foreign rices, and even preferred foreign rice from certain 
regions. For example, in 1948, at the suggestion of U.S. Major O’Hara, stationed in Manila, the 
U.S. Department of Defense had devised a plan to increase the volume of rice imports to Korea 
by bartering 8,000 tons of initially planned Siamese rice with 10,000 tons of Mexican rice. 
However, the South Korean state was newly established on August 15, 1948, and by October 4, 
1948, it clearly communicated its refusal of the Mexican rice to the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Forces.   86
When USAMGIK imported foreign rice, it made sure that it was used for meals. In February 
1947, USAMGIK banned importing rice from the International Emergency Food Council (IEFC 
from 1946-1948, and subordinate to FAO in 1948) if rice was to be used in brewing alcohol.  87
USAMGIK explained the ban as part of its efforts to save rice. Thus, Koreans brewed wine with 
wheat flour instead of their traditional rice wine. 
In this section, I explored the story before the rationing of wheat flour became prevalent after 
late 1946 and 1947. In the midst of the rice shortage and political commotion, grain became 
politicized. The initial food policy by USAMGIK failed in 1945-1946. This failure by 
USAMGIK provided a fodder for its political opponents to criticize USAMGIK for its 
participation in the national division and U.N. Trusteeship, which were extremely unpopular 
among many sectors of the Korean society.  For example, the Chayu Sinmun intimated that 88
 Rice: Ryukyu and Korea, 1948; 269, 270, 272, 280, 281; #6429; UD 1733; RG 33186
 February, 1947; 358; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331 87
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the Korean War Vol. 2. pp.   
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when USAMGIK failed its food policy and also at the same time instigated the national division 
and trusteeship, USAMGIK was as imperial as the communists in the north, or that in certain 
aspects such in land reforms, the communists were doing better. Now, before discussing the 
spread of wheat and wheat flour in south Korea, next section goes to the uses and meanings of 
wheat flour during the colonial period. This earlier history of wheat flour will be used in the last 
section to show the ways in which the market and industry of wheat flour that began in the 1920s 
was taken up again and also shifted by a large scale shipments of U.S. surplus wheat after May 
1946.  
SECTION 2. 
MEANINGS OF WHEAT DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD 
: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL  
While occasional use of wheat flour in both festive and indigent food had been recorded 
during the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392-1910), the machine-milling wheat flour industry and flour 
consumption in the market were established in the 1920s and the 1930s. During the colonial era 
(1910-1945), large machine milling factories and their increasing sales figures associated wheat 
flour with new style (sin-sik) cooking, industrialization in the production of consumer 
commodities, and the international trade of Canadian and Australian wheat. The machine milling 
wheat flour industry was hailed as an achievement of colonial Korea’s increasing 
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industrialization along with the coal briquette, rubber, and cotton spinning industries.  89
Furthermore, after 1935, large Japanese wheat milling companies were operating factories in 
northern regions of Korea in order to export to the Manchurian market by taking advantage of 
the regions’ proximity to it.  90
This association was despite the fact that indigenously cultivated wheat was mostly 
consumed within the farm houses. In 1924, the self-supply of 44,400 tons of wheat took up more 
than half of the total wheat consumption in Korea, which was estimated at 81,400 tons a year.  91
Until 1935, industrially processed wheat flour sold in the Korean market was mostly milled from 
wheat imported from Canada, Australia and the U.S. However, Japan’s aggressive war in China 
and the annulment of tax exception on foreign wheat made importing of foreign wheat 
increasingly difficult after 1935. By increasing the local cultivation of wheat and channeling it to 
the market, in 1938, half of the wheat flour consumed in Korea was made from indigenous wheat 
while wheat for the other half was imported from Manchuria and Japan.   92
In the section, I emphasize that the spread of wheat flour during the colonial period was 
through the market economy. The industry did take advantage of the market made accessible by 
Japan’s incursion into Manchuria and North China, and it also experienced constraints under the 
close trade control of the wartime Japanese state. Yet. its supply and demand was overall 
managed within the market. I emphasis distribution channels of the market economy in order to 
contrast them to the later change in the channels of distribution in post-1945 south Korea to 
 See [Kongjang Sullye] 1-24 in Tong’a from August 7, 1939 to September 9, 1939, All on p. 589
 Among others see Tong’a, January 15 and 16, 1935; Tong’a, June 30, 1938. p. 5, and Tong’a, September 7, 1938.90
 Tong’a, January 7, 1925 91
 Tong’a, September 7, 1938. p. 592
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ration and relief programs. These functioned outside the market economy. Wheat flour also 
continued to be sold in the market during the period from 1945 to 1950, but the amount was 
insubstantial compared to the rationed wheat and wheat flour.  
During the colonial period, the market for wheat flour was roughly divided into two socio-
culturally different locations. The two had different supply lines, different cooking recipes, and 
different customer base. Wheat flour from Manchurian (Chinese) and domestic Korean wheat 
was used differently from the flour milled from Australian, Canadian, and U.S. wheat. Firstly, 
when wheat flour was used as relief food, it was substituting for rice for the poor who could not 
afford rice.  Relief wheat flour tended to be Manchurian or domestic wheat flour. Secondly, 93
machine milled flour made with Canadian, Australian and U.S. wheat was associated with new-
style cooking, using the recipes translated through Japan. In addition, the print media often 
identified wheat flour as a staple food of the Chinese people.    94
Firstly, from the early colonial period, wheat flour was used as relief food. In the 1920s, 
refugees in flooded and draught inflicted areas received wheat flour as emergency food aid.  95
When rice was not available, relief recipients and the poor resorted to wheat flour. In their 
recipes, wheat flour was the main ingredient. When they could not afford rice, it was not likely 
that they could use meat (for don katsu), vegetables (for tempura), butter, nor eggs in their 
cooking. These families turned Manchurian wheat flour into wheat flour gruel, which contained 
only wheat flour and salt. Another popular recipe for wheat flour was “sujebi” or “sujŏp’i,” 
 Among many examples, see Tong’a, April 27, 1920; Tong’a, August 18, 1923; Tong’a, February 10, 1925; Tong’a, 93
September 10, 1928; Tong’a, December 14, 1928; Tong’a, January 5, 1935; Tong’a, September 6, 1935 
 For example, see Tong’a, May 25, 1934; Tong’a, March 25, 1939.94
 For example, see August 18, 1923, p.3 and other places. 95
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deriving from “hand (su)” and “folding (jŏp’i)” of wheat flour dough. To make sujebi, you 
kneaded flour with water and salt, and after hand-separating the dough into bitable sizes, you 
boil them in water. You could add available vegetables and potato, if you had them. Because 
sujebi was mostly just boiled dough, eating sujebi was used as a descriptive metaphor for 
extreme poverty.  96
The mainstream newspapers such as Kyŏnghyang and Tong’a construed wheat flour gruel as 
the last resort for the poor. When even wheat flour was beyond their means, the poor had to turn 
to steamed red bean leaves and mugwort, mixed with some buckwheat flour.  The feeling that 97
wheat flour added to the sense of poverty and desperation could be glimpsed in the following 
excerpt. This was a letter submitted to Tong’a Ilbo for a section, “The Famous Attraction of My 
Village.” The letter is titled, “Pongrae Chŏng, the Cave of the Poor,” and was submitted by a 
resident of Pongrae Chŏng by the name of Hong Sŏng-in. In his letter, Hong mentions that wheat 
flour is food that the poor would not miss once they become able to afford rice. They ate wheat 
flour only because they did not have any other food. In his letter, the description of eating wheat 
flour was expected to induce empathy from the readers on the predicament of the people in 
poverty. 
Since you say that you know, and indeed that you do know, across the bridge of Yŏmchŏn, 
there are twenty some houses of the same shape. Their monthly rent is thirty wŏn. The owner 
who built them is a rich man in Kyŏngsŏng, and the people who rent them are mostly poor 
people. Do you know what it is? I know. I do know. It is the cave of the poor people in Pongrae 
Chŏng.  
Do not assume that everyone here is equally poor among themselves just because people 
habitually call it “the cave of the poor people.” The cave of the poor people! There is a man here 
who earns seventy to eighty wŏn each month. Then, thinking about it again, what’s so grand 
 For example, see Tong’a, January 5, p796
 For example, see Tong’a, May 4, 1929. 97
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about earning seventy to eighty wŏn? He is still a poor man. But there are those who barely have 
an income of nine wŏn. Since the title of the poor evolves around this sort of people, it is 
difficult to see the guy who earns seventy eighty wŏn as a poor man in this village.   
Surely you have heard the rumor that a family of three lived on nine wŏn for a month and 
had a little over ten chŏn left. No matter how much you think about it, you won’t be able to 
understand how they survived. When you ask him, he would say that our living is not living. One 
meal of rice is beyond dream, so a couple handful of Chinese wheat flour raises smoke under the 
pot. Actually these people who go through all these hardship are the people who try the hardest.   
Hardship is hardship. Yet, these people would not have shame looking up at heaven, and no 
shame looking down on earth.  98
Hong’s letter emphasizes the flour as “Chinese wheat flour,” which had different meaning from 
the flour made from Canadian and Australian wheat. Wheat as a substitute and as relief food 
meant that “for sure when the price of rice goes down, people who fed on wheat flour will return 
to rice.”   99
Secondly, during the colonial period, the flour made from Canadian and Australian wheat 
was mostly used by large milling companies producing for the commercial market. The market 
share was divided among three to four Japanese companies. Funded by Japanese zaibatsu 
(conglomerate) and equipped with machines ordered in from England and the U.S., the wheat 
flour milling factories imparted an image of a modern industry.  In particular, newspaper 100
reports on the industry presented an imaginary map of suppliers and buyers on the international 
scale. In the 1920s and early 1930s, except a small percentage of wheat from Manchuria, these 
Japanese companies operating in Korea imported most of their source wheat via Japan from 
Canada, Australia and U.S.A.  As a result, the milling industry was also influenced by wheat 101
 This piece was submitted for a section called, [My Village]. Tong’a, July 31, 1923.98
 For example, see Tong’a, October 7, 1930. 99
 Tong’a, January 18, 1935; Tong’a, January 31, 1939100
 Tong’a, September 27, 1923, p. 2. 101
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crop failures in South America in 1925 and the dumping practice of the U.S. wheat companies in 
1932.  Further, as the Japanese army infiltrated and controlled parts of China, the same 102
companies took over old and built new factories in northern regions of Korea to sell in the 
markets in Manchuria and North China. 
After Manchu Chebun, of Japanese capital, established the first wheat milling factory in 
Korea in Chinnamp’o in 1919, the machine milling flour industry expanded at rates exceeding 
10% a year between 1919 and 1925.  The second wheat milling factory in Korea was 103
P’ung’guk Chebun’s factory in Kyŏngjŏng-dong in Yongsan area of Seoul in 1921.  1924 was a 104
particularly good year in terms of market sales. P’ungkuk and Manchu together sold 
approximately 15,540 tons of machine-milled wheat flour in the Korean market.  The Korean 105
market also absorbed 22,200 tons of wheat flour of Ilbon Chebun, located in Japan.  Thus, a 106
total of 37,740 tons of machine-milled wheat flour was sold in 1924.  In addition, local farms 107
produced approximately 44,400 metric tons of wheat and consumed it within farm houses, and 
thus, this sum was not available in the market.   108
 Tong’a, November 28, 1925; Tong’a, March 23, 1932. 102
 Tong’a, December 3, 1925103
 [Sanŏp Inmaek: Chebun Ŏp (1)] in Maeil Kyŏngje, September 24, 1972; Tong’a, November 28, 1921. P’ungkuk, 104
a Japanese firm, Toyokuni, from Kumamoto City (Hyŏn), Japan, Pusan Ilbo, September 30, 1936; November 22, 
1924.
 1 dae was taken as 37 kŭn. 1 kŭn= 0.6kg. 1 dae= 22.2kg.  Thus 3,700,000 dae was approximately 82,140,000kg a 105
year. See Tong’a, February 4, 1927. 700,000 dae is converted to 15,540 tons. Tong’a, January 7, 1925. 
 1,000,000 dae is converted to 22,299 tons. Ibid.106
 1,700,000 dae is converted to 37,740 tons. Ibid.107
 2,000,000 dae (sack) is converted to 44,000 tons. Ibid.108
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During the colonial period, the Korean market was quite integrated with the Japanese 
production. In November 1924, P’ungkuk factory was burnt down in fire. The factory was 
supplying over eighty percent of wheat flour consumed in Kyŏngsŏng, the capital of colonial 
Korea, and its vicinities.  When P’ungkuk stopped was producing, consumers in Kyŏngsŏng 109
purchased wheat flour imported from Japan, which was about ten percent more expensive than 
domestically produced wheat flour. In such a way, Ilbon Chebun, which did not have a factory in 
Korea until August 1935, was selling 44,400 tons of wheat flour in the Korean market in January 
1935.   110
Local bakeries were one of the venues that the machine milled wheat flour was channeled to. 
In 1925, 150 small-scale professional bakeries were operating. 120 of them were Japanese-
owned, and Koreans owned the rest, 30. However, even the Korean-owned shops used shop 
names ending with “tang,” “sil,” or “ok,” reflecting that they learnt and adapted the baking 
industry from Japanese practitioners.  111
In addition, the availability of reasonably priced machine milled wheat flour changed part of 
the home cooking practice in Korea. Magazines and newspapers often introduced wheat flour in 
the recipes of the “new-style” cooking, as was mediated through Japan. In 1931, Tong’a Ilbo ran 
a section, “Boastful Cooking Skills,” which frequently couched the readers to incorporate wheat 
flour in home cooking.  The section informed readers that “It tastes better if you use the new-112
 Tong’a, November 22, 1924.109
 Ilbon Chebun sold 2 million dae (= ) Tong’a, January 16, 1935; Tong’a, August 16, 1935110
 Kim Tong-ho, “Han’guk Chekwa Cheppang Sanŏp ŭi Hyŏnhwang kwa Chŏnmang.” Han’guk Chori Hakhoechi. 111
1995. pp. 128-130
 For example see Tong’a, January 24, 30, and 31; February 21, 22, and 25; March 3 and 13; April 26 and 28, 112
1931.
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style of plastering the rib in wheat flour and panfry it in oil.”  Thus, wheat flour became a key 113
ingredient in “new-style” cooking, and the author considered it a fashionable change to plaster 
red meat and fish in wheat flour, and fry it in “salad” oil.  In 1934, Tong’a also featured a 114
regular section titled, “Housewife (kajŏng puin),” which continued to provide recipes using 
wheat flour and oil frying such for tempura (Japanese-style fried vegetables and sea food) and 
Japanese-style croquette.  Don katsu, which was pork fried with wheat flour plaster was pork 115
schnitzel as adapted in Japan in the early 20th century, and it was one of the recipes that became 
popular in Korea since the colonial period. 
However, while the magazines and newspapers raved over the recipes for baking bread, 
cookies, cakes and donuts, shrouding them with an aura of adeptness to the modern lifestyle, 
most Korean kitchens were not equipped with baking facilities. In order to participate in the new 
style cooking without an oven, Tong’a also shared a tip to make “bread (ppang)” in rice steaming 
pots. The article directed the readers to knead wheat flour with baking powder, and simply steam 
it in the pot for about 20 minutes. The end-product was announced as bread.  116
In addition to recipes, newspapers and magazines also provided scientific knowledge and 
rational explanation about wheat flour. Scientific knowledge helped to facilitate the 
familiarization of wheat flour. For example, in 1933, Tong’a informed its readers to distinguish 
 Tong’a, January 30, 1931.113
 Salad oil referred to vegetable oil or olive oil.114
 See, for example, Tong’a through January to April Issues; Also, Tong’a, March 8, 1930; Tong’a, Mary 25, 1934; 115
and elsewhere. 
 Tong’a, September 6, 1935; Tong’a, March 25, 1940 116
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wheat flour between the ones suitable for baking and the ones suitable for frying tempura.  The 117
article used scientific language, explaining that after being milled, each variety of wheat 
produced different level of glutinousness, and that this determined which wheat flour is suitable 
for which recipes.  
In the mid-1930s, the wheat milling industry accelerated its participation in the imperial 
projects by the Japanese military in China. When the military infiltrated and expanded its control 
over Manchuria and North China (Pukchi), the industry expanded their sales in the regions.  118
The first Shanghai Incidents in January 1932 and again the second Shanghai-Manchurian 
Incident in July 1937 provided opportunities in the markets.  In 1934, Aiming for the 119
Manchurian market, Manchu Chebun made a decision to pipeline all products from its 
Chinnamp’o factory in P’yŏng’an Namdo to Manchuria in 1934. It built a new factory in 
Sariwŏn to supply for the Korean market.  P’ungkuk also expanded its production by building 120
a new factory in Inch’ŏn in 1935.  In 1936, the company went local by establishing a factory in 121
Fengtian, China.  In the mid-1930s, the market in Japan was showing the signs of saturation.  122 123
 Tong’a, August 5, 1933 117
 For the companies’ expansion to Manchuria, see Tong’a, August 1, 1933. 118
 Armed conflict between Chinese and Japanese armies as a response to September 1, 1931 Manchurian Incident. 119
For the 1st Shanghai Incident, see Tong’a, February 5, 1932, p. 1. The 2nd Shanghai Incident refers to armed 
conflicts starting in July 1937 in Fengtian, spreading to Shanghai. Later in August, the conflict spread to Nanjing and 
became the pretext for the Chinese-Japanese War. For the 2nd Shanghai Incident, see Tong’a, August 19, 1938, pp.
1-3. 
 Tong’a, January 16, 1934; Tong’a, February 5, 1935 p.6120
 Tong’a, June 28, 1935, p. 4. 121
 The city was known as Bongch’ŏn to Koreans. Its Manchu name was Mukden and currently it is known as 122
Shenyang of Liaoning Province. Pusan Ilbo, October 4, 1932. 
 Tong’a, January 15, 1935. 123
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Thus, in order to diversify its market to Manchuria, Ilbon Chebun took over a factory from 
Manchu Chebun in Chinnamp’o in addition to building a factory in Inch’ŏn in 1935.  Il-ch’ŏng 124
Chebun -under the name Chosŏn Chebun- built a factory in Chinnamp’o in 1937, in 
Yŏngdŭngp’o in 1938, and in Haeju in 1939.  By 1940, colonial Korea had 15 wheat milling 125
factories in total.  
On the other hand, starting from 1935, the vicissitude of the Japanese empire adversely 
impacted the wheat milling industry by restricting the importation of foreign wheat from Canada 
and Australia. 1935 was also the year that the consumption of machine milled wheat flour peaked 
during colonial Korea with 55,500 tons produced annually.  In 1935, Tong’a explained that the 126
recent restrictions on the importation made foreign wheat scarce, and therefore, foreign wheat 
had to be substituted with domestically produced wheat in Korea. The article further explained 
that the taste of bread was largely decided by the quality of wheat flour. However, flour milled of 
Korean wheat had an obvious advantage compared to flour milled of foreign wheat. Korean 
wheat flour did not make the dough to swell sufficiently. As a result of using domestically 
produced wheat for baking bread, it became difficult to procure quality bread in the city. 
However, the article suggested that instead of being deterred from purchasing bread, the 
 Tong’a, January 16, 1935. 124
 Tong’a, October 7, 1937; Tong’a Feb 17 1938; Tong’a, September 15, 1939. p. 4.125
 2,500,000 dae is converted to 55,500 tons. Tong’a, January 16, 1935; Tong’a, June 28, 1935. p. 4. However, 126
according to one USAMGIK report, from 1932 to 1936, the consumption of wheat (not wheat flour) was 10.4kg per 
capita per year, rice was 55.8kg; barley was 39.5kg; millet was 38.1kg, and other grains were 10.9kg in the average 
calorie intake of 2,077 calories. It is likely that these figures were mis-represented. For example, in my rough 
calculation, 10.4kg x 22 million people (total population) = 228,800 tons per year. Assuming approximately half of 
wheat consumption was machine milled (and the rest as self-supply and consumption within farm houses) gives the 
consumption of wheat flour, 114,400 tons per year, and 9,533 tons monthly. Thus, I find these figures not 
convincing. 394; #6429; UD 1733: RG 331
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consumers should opt for smaller loafs of bread and avoid big loafs that were more affected by 
the swelling of the dough.  At the same time, the colonial state encouraged increasing the local 127
cultivation of wheat in Korea in order to attain self-sufficiency.  
Further in 1938 and 1939, the state strictly banned the importation of wheat from Canada and 
Australia. Part of the reason was to save foreign currency. Thus, the machine-milling factories 
had to resort to either Manchurian or local Korean wheat. Even when their quality was not 
considered as nearly high as Canadian and Australian wheat, their prices doubled from the ones 
of the previous year since foreign wheat was not available.  As the Pacific War (1931-1945) 128
was entering its last phase, Manchukuo also banned the exports of wheat flour in 1939.  129
Therefore, the only choice available for the industry was to use domestically produced wheat, 
and companies experimented to make it suitable for factory production.  130
It is true that starting in 1940, the Governor-General of Korea included wheat flour in the list 
of rationed food.  However, wheat flour only made up a very small part of the rationed food. 131
Throughout the colonial period, Korea exported rice to Japan, and it imported wheat, millet and 
beans from Manchuria and “foreign” rice (oe-mi) from other countries. However, from June 
1940,  under the duress of the war, it was no longer feasible for Korea to import foreign rice. 
Thus, wheat flour was chosen as one of the substitute crops for rice.  However, out of the 132
 Tong’a, December 12, 1935. 127
 Tong’a, May 24, 1938. 128
 Tong’a, June 30, 1939. p.6129
 Ibid.130
 Tong’a, February 22, 1940. 131
 Tong’a, June 12, 1940; Tong’a, July 24, 1940, p. 4.132
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intended 345 grams of rationed grain daily, one third was planned to be rice and the remainder 
was mostly composed of barley, beak cakes, millet, broom corn, buckwheat, corn and sugar.  133
Wheat flour did not play any substantial role in rations. Nevertheless, Wheat flour as a substitute 
for rice had a different meaning from using wheat flour in the new style cooking such as in don 
katsu and tempura. It was not by choice, but by necessity. 
Despite its inclusion in the rationed food, the overall consumption of wheat flour 
considerably decreased in the last years of the Pacific War. The importation of wheat flour from 
Japan to Korea was 23,334 tons of wheat flour in 1941; 21,780 tons in 1942; and 3,434 tons in 
1943.  From 1940, The wheat imports from Manchuria resumed in 1940 after the supply 134
channel had been disrupted.  135
The annual wheat production in Korea south of the 38 degree north latitude that was for 
human consumption was 59,000 tons annually for the period between 1940 and 1944. Total 
wheat production including animal feed was 93,000 tons annually.  In 1945, wheat production 136
for human consumption was 43,000 tons, and in 1946, it was estimated to be approximately 
 2.3 hops are converted to 345 grams. Tong’a, June 12, 1940; Tong’a, July 24, 1940, p. 4. See 394; #6429; UD 133
1733; RG 331 
 From 1941 to 1943, the weight of Japanese exports to Korea, incl. wheat flour, starch, sake, onion, pickles, 134
orange, tea, soy fish, etc. Wheat flour imported to Korea from Japan were 388,902 picul in 1941; 362,997 picul in 
1942; and 57,227 picul in 1943. 1 picul (“tan”) = “a shoulder load of how much a man can carry,” approx. 60kg. 
388,902x60= 23334,120kg= 23,334 metric tons. “Yearly Results of Important Exports from Japan Proper to Korea 
in Different Categories,” 300-302; #6429, Foodstuff Import File; UD 1733, Economic and Scientific Section; SCAP 
1946-51, RG 331 
 Tong’a, May 25, 1940135
 Although total wheat cultivation was 93,000 tons, only 59,000 tons were used for human consumption, 401-2; 136
#6429; UD 1733; RG331
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48,000 tons.  However, it was difficult to trace how much of domestic wheat was channeled to 137
machine milling industry for commercial sales, and how much was consumed by the farmers 
themselves during this period. However, we know that after 1935, the colonial state successfully 
increased the production of domestic wheat in Korea. Thus, it seems likely that whereas in 1924, 
almost all domestic wheat was consumed by the farm families themselves, after 1935, more 
wheat was cultivated in Korea and an increasing percentages of it was being channeled to the 
milling factories like P’ungkuk and Ilbon Chebun.   
After liberation in 1945, four flour milling factories, including P’ungkuk, Ilbon, Chosŏn, 
were left in the U.S. occupation zone of Korea while the large factories in Chinnamp’o and 
Haeju fell to the northern zone. The industrial milling capacity in Korea was further reduced by 
7,770 tons annually when the whole four floors of the P’ungkuk building in Mansŏk-dong got 
burnt down by fire on December 20, 1945.  Noteworthily, Koreans now took over the milling 138
industry from the enemy assets left by the Japanese.  For example, Yun Sŏk-jun was the first 139
Korean floor manager at Chosŏn Chebun during the colonial period, and with liberation in 1945, 
he took over the company.    140
With liberation and U.S. occupation south of the 38th parallel, the association of wheat flour 
radically changed. During the colonial period, it was associated with large-scale modern factories 
 Table No 1. Grain and Pulse Production in Korea South of 38 Degree North Latitude, 306; #6429; UD 1733; RG 137
331. As late as 1956, although Koreans cultivated wheat, not much was released for market consumption. 
USAMGIK reported to Washington that domestically cultivated wheat in Korea ranged from 172,000 to 180,000 
tons annually. February 2, 1956, 1301; #49; UD 422; RG 469 
 350,000 dae x 22.2= 7,770,000kg= 7,770 tons. Inch’ŏn Ilbo, December 20, 2000. 138
 Tong’a, March 1, 1946; Tong’a, March 20, 1946.139
 Maeil Kyŏngje, September 24, 1973, p.4140
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with cutting edge technology, intricate trading networks of international imports and exports, and 
its partnership with the Japanese imperial army in infiltrating the land and market of China. 
However, in the post-1945 period, its association with the market was overwritten by a large-
scale foreign food relief of the U.S. government that hauled over about 300,000 tons of wheat 
and wheat flour to Korea in warships. 
SECTION 3. 
POST-1945 U.S. FOOD ASSISTANCE: SHIFTS IN THE MEANING OF WHEAT 
FLOUR 
The first shipment of USAMGIK’s food import landed at the port of Pusan on May 24, 1946, 
carrying 8,200 tons of U.S. surplus wheat for general rationing in Korea. However, food supply 
was meager until July when the first substantial sum of 24,000 tons of wheat arrived, and this 
began to be rationed in late July and in August.  A large-scale shipments of U.S. surplus wheat 141
for general rationing shifted the association of wheat flour away from the market consumption 
and industrialization of the colonial period. It became more associated with the contexts of 
rationing which was post-liberation poverty and a material policy outcome of U.S. occupation. 
This shift was caused by the change of its main distribution channel from a consumer market to 
ration and relief programs. The reason for the spread through this new main distribution channel 
is significant is because it changes our focus on globalization from a market result to historical 
 396; #6429; UD1733; RG 331141
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and political processes prior to the formation of a market, which had a different and much 
broader consumer base from the earlier colonial market.  
The dramatic increase in the consumption of wheat flour after August 1946 resulted not as a 
function of the commercial market, but through the involuntary consumption of rationing and 
relief programs. Immediately after USAMGIK began overhauling foodstuffs for rationing, the 
consumption of wheat and wheat flour increased 6.5 times in comparison to that of 1934, when 
its sales recorded the peak in the colonial period.  In 1924, the Korean market absorbed 2,031 142
tons of machine milled wheat flour monthly,  and the sales rose to 2,987 tons monthly in 1934, 143
after which the supply of Canadian and Australian wheat was interrupted  by the imposition of a 
new taxation on foreign imports and Japan’s war drive in Asia.  In comparison, from May 1946 144
to October 1947, USAMGIK imported approximately 17,337 tons of wheat and wheat flour 
 In south Korea only, 1934 estimated average was 2,987 tons per month, and 1946-7 average was 19,455 tons per 142
month. Both colonial and USAMGIK consumption figures do not include the self-cultivation and consumption 
within farmhouses, which did not enter the commercial and rationing networks. However, according to USAMGIK 
report, from 1932 to 1936, the years which peaked in wheat consumption during the colonial period, per capita 
consumption of wheat in Korea was 10.4kg per capita per year and rice was 55.8kg in average calorie intake of 
2,077 calories. Barley was 39.5kg; millet 38.1kg, and other grains 10.9kg. 394; #6429; UD 1733: RG 331. I 
discounted the latter USAMGIK figures upon close cross examination. 
 Total wheat flour consumption was 37,740 tons (in south, approximately 24,374 tons). 24,374/12=2,031 Tong’a, 143
January 7, 1925
 In 1934, the sales of industrial machine milled meal in Korea was at max 59,000 tons both domestically produced 144
and imported from Japan (southern zone= 35,844 tons). 35,844/12= 2,987 tons per month (~3,175 tons per month). 
Sales of industrial wheat in Korea in 1935 was 2,500,000 dae x 22.2= 59,940,000kg= 59,940 tons (1 dae= 27 kun, 1 
kun= 0.6kg, therefore 1 dae- 22.2kg) Tong’a, June 28, 1935. p. 4. From 1941 to 1943, Japanese export to Korea, of 
wheat flour, starch, sake, onion, pickles, orange, tea, soy fish, etc. Wheat flour imported to Korea from Japan were 
388,902 picul in 1941; 362,997 picul in 1942; and 57,227 picul in 1943. 1 picul (“tan”) = “a shoulder load of how 
much a man can carry,” approx. 60kg. 388,902x60= 23334,120kg= 23,334 metric tons. “Yearly Results of Important 
Exports from Japan Proper to Korea in Different Categories,” 300-302; #6429; UD1733; RG 331 
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monthly.  From August to October 1947, it imported 28,807 tons monthly.  USAMGIK 145 146
received 34,256 tons of wheat in November and 38,518 tons in December 1947.  After a 147
reduction in their supply in early 1948, the imports of wheat and wheat flour picked up and 
maintained 20,500 tons of monthly average from July to October 1948.  148
Firstly, through rationing, wheat flour became part of everyday food for those who were on 
the ration, which by their number was over a third of the population. Importantly, when most of 
the wheat came from U.S. Department of Agriculture’s surplus stocks and it was given by 
USAMGIK, wheat flour attained a strong association with the United States. More importantly, 
rationing of wheat appeared as USAMGIK’s remedy for its earlier failures in order to tackle the 
suspicion about U.S. imperial motivations, discussed in section 1. The failure of USAMGIK’s 
1945-1946 food policy and the ensuing politicization of the shortage of rice happened before the 
arrival of wheat, and thus they were not caused by wheat. Nevertheless, taking up a major 
portion of food ration, wheat became historically associated with USAMGIK. Koreans took 
wheat flour to be particularly American, singling it out among several other relief grains such as 
barley and cornmeal. Moreover, the expression of unfamiliarity with wheat flour was infused 
with the expressing of their unfamiliarity with U.S. occupiers.  
Kyŏnghyang Sinmun reported USAMGIK importing 227,615 tons of wheat and 83,666 tons of wheat flour to its 145
zone from May 1946 to August 1947. The average monthly imports of wheat and wheat flour was 19,455.1 tons. 
When converted to flour equivalent, calculated at the rate of 0.7 tons of flour out of milling 1 ton of wheat (although 
the rate could be as high as 90%), over the 16 month period from May 1946 to August 1947, average wheat flour 
import per month is calculated at 15,187 tons. Kyŏnghyang, October 18, 1947; Also see 396; #6429; UD1733; RG 
331
 197; #6429; UD1733; RG 331146
 November (380); December (316), dated February 19, 1948, 318-319, 387, and 390; # 6429; UD 1733; RG 331147
 309; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. For April 1947 figures, see 216; for May 1947, see 212; for June 1947, see 202 148
and 386; for September 1947, see 208; for May 1948, see 309.
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Secondly, rationing much established wheat flour as an inferior substitute for rice because 
recipients received rations when they could not obtain rice. That meant that those who ate wheat 
flour would sooner convert to rice when rice became available. Although wheat flour was also 
used as relief food during the colonial period, it had been visible more as an industrial and new 
“modern” food. However, its connection with the market and the “modern” was weakened with 
an influx of unprecedented amount of cheap and free wheat flour from the United States. Since 
its main channel of distribution was rationing, it influenced specific sectors of the population, 
who were ration recipients. Whereas it was only the poorest sector of the population who 
consumed wheat flour as a substitute emergency food during the colonial period, USAMGIK’s 
rationing affected all of non-agricultural people which took up approximately a third of the 
population, especially concentrated in urban areas.  Since July 1946, the number of ration card 149
holders did not fall below 5.6 million, peaking in December 1947 with 8.9 million recipients.  150
Thus, the large numbers of ration recipients not only reflected an exponential increase in the 
number of people who consumed wheat flour, but it also instigated a change in the context of 
their contact with the food from the market consumption of the colonial period to foreign food 
assistance.   
Wheat and wheat flour composed a major portion of USAMGIK’s ration food. In 1946 and 
1947, USAMGIK’s food ration was grain only, with occasional exceptions of U.S. military 
getting rid of its surplus food provisions to Korean civilians. In 1946, wheat and wheat flour took 
up 91.25% of the total food imports. From April to December 1946, USAMGIK imported a total 
 For example, see Tong’a, July 13, 1946, p.2.149
 403; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331150
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of 179,132 metric tons of grain, of which 163,477 tons was wheat and wheat flour. The 
remaining 15,655 tons was corn.  From January 1 to May 20, 1947, USAMGIK imported a 151
total of 154,000 tons of grain, which included 64,585 tons of wheat and 27,987 tons of wheat 
flour. Thus, wheat and wheat flour made up 59.3% of total grain imports.  In February 1947, 152
30,176 tons of wheat was imported, taking up 74.2% of total 40,688 grain imports for 7.1 million 
ration card holders.  In April 1947, out of 36,883 tons of total imported foodstuffs, wheat and 153
wheat flour took up 44.4%.  For November 1947, the amount of wheat scheduled for shipments 154
to Korea was between 36,000 tons and 44,500 tons, making up between 58.8% and 72.6% of the 
total.  In December 1947, wheat was 38,518 tons out of 52,130 tons of grain imports, making 155
up 74% of the total of ration food distributed to 8.9 million ration card holders in Korea.   156
Under much pressure to import U.S. surplus food stocks from the Department of Agriculture, 
of which availability changed depending on U.S. domestic market conditions, in 1948, 
USAMGIK introduced sugar and powdered milk as grain substitutes. The policy guide for 1948 
Korean program suggested 30% rice, 10% barley, 30% wheat flour and 30% wheat in an 
 Headquarters, USAMGIK, “Food Position Report for South Korea, December 1946 - 30 November 1947” dated 151
17 December 1947, 396; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. From May 1946 to August 1947, average wheat flour import per 
month was 15,187 tons, and 64.8% of the imported foodstuffs were wheat and wheat flour. Kyŏnghyang Sinmun 
reported USAMGIK importing 227,615 tons of wheat and 83,666 tons of wheat flour to its zone from May 1946 to 
August 1947. Calculating that 0.7 tons of flour comes out of milling 1 ton of wheat (although the rate could be as 
high as 90%), over the 16 month period from May 1946 to August 1947, average wheat flour import per month is 
calculated to be 15,187 tons. Kyŏnghyang, October 18, 1947.
 201; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331152
 307; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331153
 16,207 tons of barley; 4,311 tons of rice; 8,600 tons of wheat; and 7,765 tons of wheat flour were imported, dated 154
13 May, 1947, 216; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331
 380; #6429; UD1733; RG 331155
 13,612 tons of barley was imported, too. 316, February 19, 1948, 318-319, 387, and 390; # 6429; UD 1733; RG 156
331
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attempted amount of 2.5 hop (355 grams) per person per day, but the composition of ration food 
varied on each food’s availability at U.S. ports.  Scheduled for delivery from July to October 157
1948 for four months were 66,000 tons of wheat flour, 16,000 tons of wheat, and 70,000 tons of 
rice. Thus, wheat and wheat flour made up 50.8% of the total grain imports of 152,000 tons.   158
At a conference hosted by Kyŏnghyang Sinmun in October 1946, O Yu-hŭi, a housewife in 
Seoul, expressed her discontent with the high percentage of wheat, which took up over 91% of 
ration food that year.  
I don’t know how to manage (the household economy) from now. Recently, each person received 
a ration of 120 grams of wheat flour, a half hop (approx. 75 grams) of wheat, and a half hope of 
barley (approx. 75 grams) per day. But wheat flour gets used up fast, and wheat loses half of its 
volume after winnowing. The ration is supposed to last for ten days, but it is only enough for five 
days. So, no matter how hard you figure it, there is no other way than buying food in the black 
market. Besides, when you continue to eat wheat and wheat flour, you can’t avoid having 
stomachache. Medicine costs multiple times more than the cost of wheat. When you feed 
children with wheat, you see that children don’t digest wheat well. Wheat comes out from their 
bottoms without having been broken down. Needless to say, I hope we get rationed 2 hop and 5 
jak of rice like before.    159
To O Yu-hŭi, wheat flour was not a satisfactory substitute for rice, and the amount of ration her 
family was getting was not sufficient.   
For housewives like O Yu-hŭi who disliked wheat and wheat flour, food experts offered 
suggestions on home cooking recipe for wheat. Hong Sŏn-pyo, Director of Chosŏn Food 
Research, published an advice below, titled “Home Cooking: A recipe to use wheat,” in 
Kyŏnghyang in November 1946. 
 For example, 221; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331 157
 309; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. For April 1947 figures, see 216; for May 1947, see 212; for June 1947, see 202 158
and 386; for September 1947, see 208; for May 1948, see 309.
 Kyŏnghyang, October 7, 1946.159
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Families invariably make sujebi, steamed cake (kae ttŏk), and noodles with wheat flour, [. . .] 
(However) If you mix whole wheat with rice, the dish tastes soft, and it tastes better than barley 
dish. Usually, people use wheat in flour form, but that is not the only way to eat wheat. Soak 
whole wheat in water for a while, crush it until wheat takes white color, and then soak it in water 
again. Steam it together with rice. Be careful to let the dish settle in steam longer than you are 
used to with rice.    160
In another effort to making the consumption of rationed wheat flour even easier, the City 
Government of Seoul and foreign charity organizations like the YWCA tried to distribute it as 
noodles instead of flour form. Noodle was easier to cook at home without the need to knead and 
cut the dough for noodle.  161
When much of U.S. relief wheat came in unmilled form to be locally milled in 1946 and 
1947, the milling capacity in Korea ran far short of the amount of wheat that USAMGIK brought 
in. At the time of liberation in 1945, only four milling factories remained and continue their 
operation in south Korea. This and when the P’ungkuk factory was burnt down in fire in 
December in 1945, the commercial wheat milling capacity in U.S. zone in December 1947 was 
limited to 135,000 tons.  This fell far below the amount of wheat that USAMGIK was 162
importing, and thus, USAMGIK recommended Washington that “Korea’s limited wheat milling 
facilities makes it essential that as large a portion as possible of grain imports be rice, flour, and 
barley.”  163
Taking advantage of the need for wheat milling, small entrepreneurs in Korea began to enter 
the industry. During the colonial period, three Japanese companies, located both in Korea and in 
 Kyŏnghyang, November 3, 1946160
 Kyŏnghyang, November 20, 1946. 161
 398; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331162
 CG XXIV Corps to CG 8th Army, SCAP, January 4, 1947, ref. 224; #6429; Foodstuff Import File, UD 1733; 163
SCAP, 1946-1951 Economic and Scientific Section, RG 331 
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Japan, mostly divided the market for themselves for industrially milled wheat flour in Korea. 
Koreans ran small-scale milling shops, but they mostly milled buckwheat, not wheat.  164
However, a year after USAMGIK began rationing wheat, Seoul had 185 wheat milling shops in 
June 1947. The number of wheat milling shops were the most numerous among 908 businesses 
registered in the city for using more than three horsepower engines and employing more than ten 
workers. Rice refining shops followed the rank with 146 workshops.  165
At a Women’s Conference in 1948, Yi Eŭn pointed out the shift in the use of wheat brought 
about by a large-scale supply of wheat as ration food. In the shift from that of market 
consumption to substitute and involuntary consumption, she explained why she did not like 
wheat ration as a tension between the way that she wanted to use wheat flour -cooked with meat 
and vegetables- and how her strained economic situation limited the use of it only as a substitute 
for rice.  
We receive wheat flour rations. To eat wheat flour like the westerners or the Chinese, by baking 
bread, you also need to eat meat and vegetables with it. Meat and vegetables cost multiple times 
more than the cost of wheat flour. So, given our circumstances, we usually end up making 
noodles or sujebi with wheat flour.   166
Yi pointed out that many could not afford to buy meat and vegetables. Wheat as the main in 
dishes such as “sujebi” in which wheat flour was the main and possibly the only ingredient for 
the meal did not give enough nutrition. 
However, USAMGIK perceived and used wheat flour as much more than just a substitute for 
rice, and a different way of familiarizing Koreans with wheat flour was by rationing children 
 Tong’a, October 1, 1938.164
 Tong’a, June 13, 1947.165
 Kyŏnghyang, January 4, 1948. 166
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special treats like biscuits and bread. In 1946, USAMGIK made biscuits available for school 
children at 30 wŏn, which was set much below the market price. It also distributed bread to 
school children made of wheat flour. In 1947, the Economics Division of the Seoul City offered 
children under thirteen to purchase 750 grams (200 monme) of bread at 50 wŏn. Children needed 
to show their “Rice Accounts (Ssal T’ongjang) and personal seals to receive bread at ration 
stations.  Although not of wheat flour, the Seoul city also distributed candies to children 167
between five and seven of age.  Once the City made a special provision for children from 168
lower-income households in low tax categories. Families that paid below the 15th level in 
income tax could obtain certifications from Neighborhood Association Chiefs (T’ongjang) to 
purchase two boxes of biscuit at 80 wŏn at Hwasin and Haesin Trade Companies at Kukyo-dong 
in Seoul.   169
Even more severely affected by ration mostly of wheat and wheat flour were the persons 
under care of welfare institutions. The diet of children in orphanages, for example, heavily relied 
on the free distribution of relief food. On January 21, 1947, Welfare Office of USAMGIK and 
the Kyŏnghyang Sinmun co-hosted a roundtable discussion with administrators of eight 
orphanages in the Welfare Office building. Chang Un-yong of Welfare Institution (Husaeng 
Hakwŏn) expressed a concern about food ration from the City that were composed solely of 
wheat and wheat flour. Chang said that the City provided a ration of approximately 630ml (3 hop 
5 jak) of wheat and wheat flour, but he hoped that the City would re-introduce rice to ration food, 
1 monme as weight = 3.75g; Kyŏnghyang Sinmun, March 12, 1947.167
 Kyŏnghyang, September 2, 1948168
 Kyŏnghyang. November 11, 1946.169
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which used to be available before. Chang beseeched to have sympathy for the orphans who were 
morning and night fed with “sujebi,” which was not conducive to their health.   170
For the partially employed urban laborers and destitute students, the City Government of 
Seoul provided another space where they could cheaply obtain food made with wheat flour. The 
Bureau of Welfare of the Seoul City administered the City-ordained Public Eating House 
(Siryŏng Taejung Siktang) from July 1946.  The City-ordained Public Eating Houses were 171
administered by the City as semi-relief establishments. They initially sold rice and broth at an 
affordable price of 3 wŏn in July 1946, but by January 1947, they increasingly turned to wheat 
flour by selling noodles and bread.  In 1947, City’s Bureau of Welfare ran seven City-ordained 172
Public Eating Houses, and one more was added in 1949.  In March 1949, the Seoul City 173
partially privatized it by allowing private businesses to obtain the license to open Public Eating 
Houses and by giving them ration food at subsidized prices. Therefore, when the City 
experienced a shortage of ration food and temporarily close down seventy eight of its Public 
Eating Houses in June 1949, Kyŏnghyang Sinmun deplored that many of the City’s poor laborers 
and students were deprived of their only access to food. It reported that Public Eating Houses 
 Kyŏnghyang, February 2, 1947.170
 “Taejung” can also be translated as “mass,” but in this case, translating it as “(general) public” is more suitable 171
given the intention of the use of the term. The City-ordained Public Eating House was different from “taejung 
siktang” generically referring to any cheap commercial dining establishment. The term, “taejung,” which can be 
translated either as public or mass, was probably used since dining at these establishments was cheap, and therefore 
they were available to a large number of people. For the beginning of the City-ordered Public Eating House, see 
Tong’a, July 16, 1946. 
 Tong’a, May 15, and July 16, 1946; Kyŏnghyang, January 17, 1947.172
 Kyŏnghyang, January 17, 1947; Kyŏnghyang, March 8, 1949. 173
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catered from 40,000 to 80,000 underemployed urban laborers and destitute students daily, and 
made wheat flour available to those who could not afford food otherwise in Seoul.  174
The distribution channels of wheat flour such as general rationing, relief programs, and cheap 
City-run eating houses established wheat flour as an inferior substitute for rice during the period 
from 1945 to 1950. This meant that wheat flour spread in post-1945 south Korea mainly because 
there was not enough rice and that the consumption of wheat flour would shrink back rice 
became more available. Food Administration of USAMGIK was aware of this, and reported to 
Washington, 
Of all imported cereals, rice is the most desirable. Since the commercial wheat milling capacity 
of South Korea is 135,000 tons per annum, imports of wheat in the grain above that figure do not 
permit the most efficient processing. Most Koreans prefer barley to any other grain except rice, 
and their kitchen facilities are such that they could utilize it effectively, since they cook it as they 
do rice. On the other hand, they are not equipped to utilize large amounts of wheat flour 
effectively, since most Koreans have no baking facilities. For that reason, it is hoped that a 
substantial part of the projected imports can be rice and barley.  175
The Save Rice Campaign (Chŏlmi Undong) by the Rhee Syngman regime, inaugurated on 
August 15, 1948, also marked wheat flour as an inferior substitute for rice. In the Save Rice 
Campaign, eating wheat flour was one of the means to save rice. The South Korean state 
suggested eating “mixed meal,” meaning mixed with non-white rice, in 1950. The campaign 
exhorted citizens to substitute one third of their meals with non-white rice such as barley and 
wheat flour.  It suggested having buckwheat noodle, Japanese u-dong (noodle), and bread for 176
lunch instead of having a rice meal. 
 Kyŏnghyang, June 2, and June 22, 1949; Tong’a, November 23, 1950. 174
 Dated December 17, 1947, 398; #6429; UD 1733 RG 331175
 Tong’a, January 14, 1950.176
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Thus, the campaign attempted to instigate a move from involuntary consumption of general 
rations to voluntary consumption. However, this consumption was understood as a sacrifice that 
citizens would voluntarily make in order to save rice for the nation. Also, it attempted to widen 
the consumption base from ration card holders to all citizens, and to instill the desire for 
consumption as political indoctrination. It is not clear how effectively this campaign was 
practiced at home, but the state was able to give some threats to the businesses that would not 
follow the campaign.  
In order to induce conformity of the foodservice industry, the state introduced legal penalty. 
In January 1950, the joint national committee of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Law, issued a statement 
to support the Save Rice Campaign. The committee banned serving of meals of white rice at 
diners and restaurants, using rice to manufacture cakes and sweets, and clandestinely brewing 
alcohol and selling it.  The City offered by a way of persuasion that wine brewing alone used 177
up approximately 14,235 bushels of rice daily in Seoul.  Food establishments that did not abide 178
by the ban risked having their licenses cancelled. Inns and upscale Korean restaurants (yojŏng) 
were no longer permitted to serve rice meals. While the state did not strictly enforce the ban 
beyond punishing a few unlucky restaurants, the ban clearly showed that the state considered 
wheat flour as a substitute for rice.  
Eating wheat flour to support the Save Rice Campaign becomes important in comparison to 
later developments in the late 1950s and again in the 1970s. In 1950, eating wheat flour was 
 Tong’a, January 14, 1950177
 2,787 sŏk (equiv. to 500,000 liters, or 14,235 bushels) Chayu Sinmun, April 1950178
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encouraged by default. It was in order to save rice. From there, chapter 5 investigates the shift in 
the approach to wheat flour as the South Korean state and nutritional scientists hailed it as 
nutritionally superior food in the late 1950s. In the 1970s, the meaning of wheat flour changed 
again as it was enlisted to feed the urban laborers who participated in the industrialization drive 
under the Park Chung Hee regime.  
In conclusion, while the consumer market and the industry of wheat flour was first 
established in Korea in the 1920s, it was this non-market consumption through rationing and 
relief programs that dramatically increased the use of wheat flour in post-1945 south Korea. The 
scale of 5.8 fold increase in comparison to the peak sales during the colonial era sufficiently 
qualifies it as a rupture. At the same time, the key to understanding a globalization of wheat flour 
as historically happened in Korea is the tension between the cultural unfamiliarity of wheat flour 
and having to eat it despite the unfamiliarity because wheat flour took up major part of general 
rationing and relief programs. The tension fed the politicization of wheat flour, enmeshing it as a 
continuation of USAMGIK’s failed food policy. With a hindsight, involuntary consumption 
through rationing was the beginning of the eventual market formation in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The consumer market of wheat flour, which was linked to Korea’s nation-building via 
industrialization in the 1970s and 1980s, had a much larger scale and with different meanings of 
consumption and history from that of the colonial period.  
My work in this chapter contributes to the field by presenting what happened between the 
industrialization of wheat milling of the colonial period and the appropriation of wheat flour 
under nationalism and industrialization in the 1970s. The chapter explains why developments 
from 1945 to 1950 were crucial. Prior to the formation of a ramyŏn market in the 1970s and 
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1980s, the involuntary consumption via rationing and foreign relief supply set the initial stage. 
This happened outside the market system and was the base of a globalization of wheat flour in 
Korea. Wheat flour was imposed on unwilling population through general rationing, and thus 
recipients were made to become familiar with wheat flour before liking it. This new staple 
substitute would not have survived under market conditions. Thus, when there was very little 
prospect for the formation of a market in 1950 - nor in 1960-, the formation of the market in 
1970s was unforeseeable. The tension around wheat flour was augmented because of the cultural 
unfamiliarity of wheat flour to Koreans. Wheat and wheat flour composed approximately over 
two thirds of ration food. However, the other one their and for some months, barley and foreign 
rice were given out. However, complaints about barley was not so much perhaps because barley 
was not considered foreign. “Foreign rice” (oe-mi) was from Egypt, Burma, Siam, Mexico and 
Brazil, and these origins were not so much associated with the United States.  
The failure of USAMGIK’s initial food policy becomes important through two parallel 
developments. USAMGIK’s food policy was a failure both before and after the rationing of 
wheat flour in August 1946.  Wheat came too late, and its amounts were not sufficient to stage 179
successful general rations to undo the failures of 1945 and 1946. However, it was because this 
initial U.S. food assistance policy between 1945 and 1950 failed to win the goodwill of the 
Koreans towards “democracy” that the policy had to be re-worked into humanitarian food 
assistance in 1955, which will be discussed in chapter 3 and chapter 4. Secondly, despite 
assessing it as a failure, the food policy between 1945 and 1950 also becomes important because 
it set the foundation of the legal and social structure of channeling U.S. surplus food 
 24,000 tons of wheat received in July began to be rationed throughout Korea in August. 179
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commodities after U.S. Public Law 480. For example, the same structure continued for 
Counterpart Fund, for military spending, and one tenth price.  It shaped the structure of 180
interaction between USAMGIK and its occupational zone, which later turned to a new South 
Korean state. The difference between the two periods was that after 1955, Public Law 480 and 
Section 402 only dealt with U.S. agricultural surpluses. In other words, we cannot understand 
post-1955 developments of U.S. surplus foodstuffs in South Korea without examining the 
developments between 1945 and 1950. 
 The continuity is discussed in chapter 5.180
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CHAPTER 2. 
THE KOREAN WAR AND THE INVASION OF AMERICAN FOODSTUFFS, 1950-1953: 
Free milk stations and the diversion of foodstuffs from U.S. military provisions to the black 
market 
Powdered milk became a familiar food to Koreans through U.S. food assistance. Koreans 
encountered U.S. surplus powdered milk through milk-feeding programs, war refugee camps and 
family relief rations. While the domestic market for milk was negligible, relief milk (kuho uyu) 
from the United States was the main source of that encounter. In addition, Koreans accrued 
familiarity with factory-manufactured foodstuffs such as Spam (crushed meat), Hershey's 
chocolate, Wrigley's chewing gum, Chivas Regal whiskey, and tobacco through the black 
market.  Most of these foodstuffs must have been illegal diversions from U.S. military provisions 1
since the South Korean state did not import these American brand commodities. In the spread of 
American food items as both relief goods and black market commodities, the Korean War played 
 The Quartermasters Headquarter of the U.S. military categorized cigarettes under food and agricultural 1
commodity.
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Funded by the U.S. Foreign Operations Administration, the U.S. Army 
distributed 4,000,000 C-rations to Korean civilian population in celebration of 
the armistice in 1953. Around the same time, the U.S. Army also supplied 
7,000,000 C-rations to the Korean military. C-rations were military food for U.S. 
troops. It is canned food of meat with vegetables (beans, or potatoes), and of 
bread and deserts. However, even if it were not for the U.S. Army’s gift in 
celebration of the armistice, U.S. C-ration was well-known to Koreans since 
there were plethora of C-rations on sale in the black market.  
(reference, E.K. Shulte, Chief Foreign Financial Officer to the Foreign 
Operations Administration, Washington, 1066; #4B; UD422; RG 469 
Chapter 2. The Korean War and the Invasion of American Foods
a major role by unleashing two types of massive population movements. First, the war produced 
millions of Korean refugees who needed relief food. Secondly, this internationalized war drew in 
a large number of U.S. troops, among other foreign participants from the United Nations forces – 
and the food sent to feed the U.S. troops was diverted to the black market. These two methods of 
commodity acquisition – through foreign relief programs and black market purchases – 
associated the new foodstuffs with Korea’s condition of poverty and the presence of a large-scale 
foreign armies. By discussing the familiarization of foreign food as a result of the war and the 
massive population dislocations that ensued, I interpret the familiarization of new food practices 
as a dimension of the extension of U.S. hegemony to Korea.  
The overall aim of this chapter within the larger frame of the dissertation is modest. By 
emphasizing the Korean War as an intensifier of the distribution channels that spread new 
foodstuffs, it investigates the early history of powdered milk in Korea, which formed the basis 
for later, postwar schemes run by voluntary agencies (chapter 4) and UNICEF (chapter 3). While 
the establishment of free milk stations (uyu chuk muryo kŭpsikso), serving milk gruel, was a 
short-term measure for war refugees, a number of foreign voluntary agencies concurrently began 
resettlement community-building projects for refugees from the northern communist zone. 
Refugee resettlement programs, called “assimilation programs” by the U.S. military, were a 
medium-to-long term measure. Foreign voluntary agencies used U.S. surplus food as wages-in-
kind in resettlement programs, and this use of food as wages in construction programs became 
the prototype for the U.S. Food for Peace provincial self-help projects of the 1960s, which are 
discussed in chapter 6. Thus, this chapter, which shows how the war accelerated the 
popularization of new food, provides historical context for later chapters.    
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As pointed out in chapter 1, Koreans were not very inclined to buy new food such as U.S. 
surplus wheat-flour in the market. However, having no alternative means to procure food during 
the wartime emergency, relief recipients had to tolerate ration food, mainly composed of wheat-
flour, barley, cornmeal, and powdered milk from U.S. surplus stocks. In addition, millions of 
refugees created the population pull for foreign voluntary agencies to operate feeding programs, 
and thus expand their influence in Korea in rather dramatic ways.  The South Korean state did 2
not possess the resources to provide for their own refugees. War refugees added to an already 
serious problem of dislocated returnees after Japan’s empire collapsed in 1945. Koreans who 
returned to their homeland from the former Japanese empire in Manchuria, South Asia and Japan 
numbered over two million before the Korean War. Now, the Korean War created particularly 
large refugee movements in its first year, during which the frontline of battle fluctuated 
dramatically. First, the North Korean (DPRK) army cornered the South Korean troops in the 
small parameter of the city of Pusan at the southeastern tip of the peninsula. Second, the United 
Nations Commander in the Pacific theater, General Douglas MacArthur, successfully instigated a 
landing in Inch’ŏn in September 1950, pushing the North Korean troops up to the Chinese border 
of the Yalu River. Yet again, in that winter, Mao’s Chinese reinforcements swept the U.N. troops 
back to the 38th parallel. Large number of refugees moved up and down the peninsula, following 
the changing frontline. Where the refugees camped, mobile free milk stations and black markets 
were also set up.  
At the beginning of the War, Seoul, South Korea’s capital, had approximately 1.3 million 
residents. After the evacuation order from the city in 1951, the number of residents decreased to 
 See chapter 4 for the definition of foreign voluntary agencies.2
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450,000, or according to the police survey in June that year, to 310,000. On June 10, 1951, 
200,000 refugees congregated in Yŏngdŭngp’o-gu, waiting to return home after the government 
granted permission to re-enter Seoul. In Inch’ŏn and Suwŏn, likewise, 500,000–600,000 refugees 
were waiting for the government order to return to Seoul. These refugees were the first recipients 
of milk gruel from the free milk stations, which were established in 1951. 
During the Korean War and the early post-Korean War period until the end of 1954, the 
Civilian Relief in Korea (CRIK) program, subordinate to the U.S. Eighth Army, was in charge of 
coordinating all civilian relief materials. The goal of the United Nations Command’s relief 
assistance to Korea was to prevent starvation, disease, and social unrest. During the CRIK period 
(1951-1955), all relief grains were imported through the U.S. government via the CRIK program, 
and the CRIK also processed private donations from foreign voluntary agencies and other U.N. 
member nations in a sub-program called the SUN (Sundry, meaning donations from U.N. 
member nations and foreign voluntary agencies) U.N. Program.    3
Since the relief food was mainly composed of U.S. surplus food, the number of Koreans that 
the CRIK provided for was the number of Koreans who were fed new foods like wheat-flour and 
powdered milk. During its tenure from 1951 to 1955, the CRIK fed from 3.5 million up to 8.9 
million refugees daily. In 1953, the CRIK provided food for 3,350,000 refugees. One million of 
them received a full ration (3 hops of grain, equiv. to 0.8 pounds) daily, and the remaining 
2,350,000 people received a half ration.  For the 1953 civilian relief program, the CRIK 4
imported 368,000 metric tons of grain and approximately 3,500 metric tons of powdered milk 
 1408; #62; HQ; RG 4693
 “Wood Mission to Korea, August 1953: On Food Situation”; 1233; #19; UD 422; RG 4694
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and salt. Importantly, refugee relief did not end with the armistice on July 27, 1953. In 1954, the 
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U.S. Army estimated that 8.9 million Koreans were in need of food relief, a number that 
comprised a full tenth of the refugees in the world.  Whether 3.5 million or 8.9 million, the 5
number of refugees receiving CRIK food made up a significant portion of the South Korean 
population (then 20.5 to 21 million), and these Koreans thus became familiarized with, though 
not accustomed to, U.S. surplus wheat flour and powdered milk. 
Although relief rations were mainly composed of grain and powdered milk, food donations 
from foreign voluntary agencies and other member nations of the United Nations through the 
CRIK SUN Program, at times, could be diverse. These exotic new foodstuffs were also 
introduced to Korean recipients in small quantities. The Church World Service (CWS) from 
Holland donated 60,000 duck eggs through the CRIK SUN Program in April 1955, and the duck 
eggs were delivered to Seoul, Taejon, Taegu and Pusan.   6
Nevertheless, new foodstuffs that were rationed in large-scale and regular supplies were 
powdered milk and wheat flour. Powdered milk, in particular, became a familiar food with 
Koreans as an improvised ration food. When grain became difficult to obtain during the war, 
powdered milk substituted grain in ration food. In other words, the habit of milk eating was able 
to spread in Korea because powdered milk was invented as a substitute for grain ration. During 
the wartime emergency and the food shortage that it caused, refugees were more likely to eat 
unfamiliar powdered milk than when they had a choice. In the beginning of the war, the 
government made an effort to provide 2 to 3 hops of grain ration to each adult in order to provide 
approximately 1300 calories daily. However, when they soon ran out of grain to ration out, the 
 KAVA, The 40 Year History of Korean Association of Voluntary Agencies, P.1135
 Weekly Status Conference Report; Box 10; 1276; RG 469 6
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authorities replaced grain with powdered milk in state rations. Interestingly, since powdered milk 
substituted grain, rationed milk was not drank in liquid form, but milk was made into “milk 
gruel” to serve as a proper meal. To make milk gruel, you dissolved powdered milk in water, and 
boiled it with whatever other foodstuff that you had on hand. Often, other foreign relief grains 
like cornmeal, wheat flour, and long-grained “foreign rice (oe-mi)” were thrown in.  Thus, 7
powdered milk was cooked with grains into gruel. Instead of “drinking” reconstituted liquid 
milk, people used spoons to scoop up milk gruel. 
Powdered milk was consumed in large quantities during the war because free milk stations 
(uyu chuk muryo kŭpsikso) served milk gruel to refugees. The Women’s Bureau of the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and the Korean Civilian Assistance Command (KCAC, a U.N. organization) 
team came up with the idea of operating milk stations for refugees as an improvisation. The 
January 4th Retreat of 1951 was one of the most dramatic moments in the Korean War as the 
Chinese communist reinforcement swept down the peninsula with unexpected speed and scale. 
When the retreat brought about massive movements of refugees, the team of the Women’s 
Bureau and the KCAC began operating free milk stations that were mobile and thus able to move 
with the flow of refugees.  The first three milk stations were set up in Suwŏn, Inch’ŏn and Seoul 8
in April 1951. Each station provided milk gruel to over seven hundred refugees a day.  Milk 9
 In Korean, they were called oe-mi.7
 During the Korean War, the number of citizens in Seoul was 1700,000. After 1.4 1952, only 700,000. Rhee 8
Syngman flee without the evacuation order and bombed the bridge. The United Nations Command retreated to the 
line of Naktong River.
 The Women’s bureau was established in 1946 was an American addition to what was only about Hygiene during 9
the Japanese colonial period, adding welfare and aid. The wartime emergency, combined the women’s bureau with 
civilian women’s organization, - focused on relief work during the war.
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stations gave priority to children, elderly and the sick.  Within a year, the number of milk 10
stations was increased to thirty. The bureau counted that they had provided milk gruel to 6.6 
million refugees.  This is a significant number that a new food could not easily attract under 11
regular market conditions. 
Milk gruel was a neologism that was first used during the Korean War. Moreover, wartime 
rationing was the first means through which powdered milk was provided to a large number of 
healthy adults in Korea. Previously, milk had been used to feed babies and the sick. However, 
during the war, feeding stations tended to limit rice gruel to children and the debilitated as a 
special treatment, and the other refugees had to settle for milk gruel, resulting in the spread of 
powdered milk in Korea.  
Milk gruel (uyu chuk) and Milk Stations (Uyu Kŭpsikso) were curious names. When you 
make milk-gruel, you also throw in other available grains. Thus, powdered milk was not the only 
main ingredient. Wheat flour and cornmeal were added since the Americans made them available 
for relief, and they were also unfamiliar food. U.S. also sent barley, but Koreans were familiar 
with barley that is also grown domestically. Given the presence of other grains, the fact that the 
dish was named after milk, and the feeding station was called “Milk Station” seem very 
curious.  It is probable that milk felt more foreign to Koreans with its particular texture and taste 12
of bovine origin, and of the “smell” that was traumatically unappetizing to Koreans. It is also 
probable that the name, milk-gruel, drew attention to its liquidity. The diluteness resembling un-
 Tong’a, April 7, 195110
 Sahoebu Punyŏkuk ŏpchŏk pogo uyu chuk paekŭp t’ong’gye sucha for 4284 (1951). However, repeated feeding 11
was not accounted for.
 Cornmeal-gruel was given, too. 12
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filling and non-nourishing water emphasized the depravity of the wartime. Milk-gruel was not 
drank. The refugees and children-without-meals scooped the liquid up with spoons like when 
they were eating grains. Milk seemed even feebler substitute for rice and barley than cornmeal-
gruel and wheat-flour buns. After all, the tales of milk gruel by Koreans witness that not all foods 
were substitutable culturally and socially. 
In terms of the continuity of the history of milk in Korea prior to wartime milk stations, milk 
was certainly not unknown to Koreans before U.S. relief assistance. Nevertheless, it was still an 
unfamiliar food to Koreans in 1945. In fact, the history of milk consumption in Korea goes back 
to Christian missionaries in late nineteenth-century Chosŏn. The foreign missionaries brought in 
condensed milk from the United States for their own consumption.  During the Japanese 13
colonial period, foreign missionaries began giving out milk to local children and the sick in their 
charity programs. In 1926, Maren Bording, an American Methodist missionary, opened the first 
milk station in Korea, in the city of Kongju, approximately 120km south of Seoul. Bording’s 
milk station could provide milk to thirty to one hundred children daily. Several foreign 
missionaries in the region followed the example and established their own milk stations. 
However, milk stations operated by missionaries during the colonial period remained local, and 
their impacts did not reach beyond the small number of children and affiliates in missionary-run 
institutions.  14
 There were occasional record of people drinking cow milk during Chosŏn. But these were exceptional cases, and 13
it was certainly not a widespread habit. 
 Hwang Mi-suk, “Sŏnkyosa Maren Bording ŭi Kongju, Taejŏn chiyŏk yuabokchi wa uyukŭpsikso saŏp.” Han’guk 14
Kidok’kyo wa Yŏksa. Vol. 34, 2011. pp.165-190
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During the colonial period (1910-1945), newspapers and magazines like Tong’a construed 
drinking milk as a cultural and economic privilege. However, the commercial market for milk 
was not developed due to a lack of both supply and demand. However, newspapers and 
magazines made efforts to encourage milk consumption by linking it with modern scientific 
nutritional practice. These media wrote to establish modern housewives and mothers as potential 
consumers of milk, and educated their readers about the use of milk. However, the 
recommendations given in the magazines did not seem practicable to most of their readers. For 
example, an article advised potential consumers to arrange daily delivery of milk with their local 
dairy farms. However, since there were less than thirty cow farms registered with the state in the 
country, and since most of the thirty farms were small-scale operations, the advice did not sound 
practical. 
 In any case, cows bred in Korea were not traditionally used for milking.  Thus, some 15
western missionaries argued that producing goat milk was more feasible than expecting Koreans 
to drink cow milk. The market production of milk had to wait until 1963 when the first Korean 
milk factory was opened under the Park Chung Hee regime. Not only milk as beverage but also 
diary products like butter, cheese, ice cream, and biscuits were not widespread during the 
colonial period.  Some products were available as imports from Japan, but the access to these 16
commodities was a privilege. 
 Twenty-six milk farms were registered under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in 1952. Pogŏn Sahoe 15
T’onggye Yŏnbo, 1955-1957, P.219. In 1953, 23; in 1954, 8, in 1955, 18, in 1956 18. See Sahoe for the number of 
farming animals, and the number was also given in RG 469
 Ingredients for biscuits were wheat-flour, Milo starch, sugar, powdered milk, fat (margarine) and salt. Korea 16
imported all these food ingredients from abroad.
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Thus, relief rationing of milk to the poor and to war refugees by the U.S. military brought 
about a radical change in the meaning of milk. From the beginning, the U.S. military distributed 
powdered milk as a relief item. Surplus powdered milk from the United States was first 
distributed in Korea for a school-feeding program in Seoul in March 1946.  Although the 17
amount of milk imports from 1945 to 1950 were not large in comparison to the imports during 
the war powdered milk had already been introduced as a relief food during the period of 
American military rule.  
The reason why the Americans chose powdered milk as a relief food was because the price of 
powdered milk was sharply declining in the United States due to a large surplus. Thus, when 
grains were becoming scarce, the SCAP imported powdered milk to substitute for grains. In 
April 1947, the Joint U.S. State, War and Agriculture Mission alerted the Supreme Command of 
Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo of the declining price of powdered milk and its availability in 
U.S. surplus stocks. Powdered milk that had cost 13-16 cents per pound the year before could be 
obtained at 10.5-12 cents in the spring of 1947.  The Mission also informed the SCAP that the 18
roller processed milk was 1-2 cents cheaper per pound than the spray processed batch. Taking 
account of the price factor, the Joint Mission “recommended the use of skim milk to supplement 
the shortage due to lack of grains” in Japan.  The same advice was extended to the Commander 19
in Chief, Pacific, Representative (CINCREP) in Seoul and the U.S. military base on the Ryukyu 
Islands. The price of powdered milk further fell in 1950. The roller processed milk cost 3 cents 
 November 20, 1947. ref. 195, #6429, UD 1733, RG 331. I could not find records for 1945, but I need to re-check. 17
In 1947, when seventeen metric tons of powdered milk that licensed voluntary agencies received for Relief in Asia 
Program (Asea Kuchehoe).
 869; #6431; UD 1733; RG 33118
 866; #6431 and 397; #6439; UD 1733; RG 33119
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per pound and the spray processed one cost 5 cents at U.S. ports in August 1950.  These prices 20
were less than one fifth of their 1946 prices. 
Taking advantage of the declining price, the Supreme Command of Allied Powers in Tokyo 
replied to Washington, requesting 15,000 tons of powdered milk in addition to the powdered 
milk it had originally programmed for Japan in 1947. For Korea, the SCAP planned to divert 
1,200 tons of powdered milk from Japan in September 1947, but the allocation to Korea was 
cancelled at the last minute for an unspecified reason. The importation of powdered milk to 
Korea in 1947 was limited to the 17 tons that foreign voluntary agencies distributed. In 1958, the 
SCAP sent a new stock of 1,800 metric tons of milk to Korea in January and again 1,200 metric 
tons in February with no further allocation that year beyond these 3,000 tons. The SCAP did not 
allocate any powdered milk for Korea in 1949. The fact that the choice of powdered milk as 
relief food was based on surplus availability and price will be seen again in the period covered 
by chapter 4, when powdered milk was replaced by cornmeal because there was not enough 
surplus powdered milk.   
Powdered milk was adequate as food aid in several aspects. Due to the technological 
innovation in powdered milk making, the production of powdered milk was made simple. Most 
importantly, with respect to the American domestic politics, giving surplus powdered milk as 
foreign assistance was a useful way of getting rid of surplus agricultural produce.  Powdered 21
milk was easier to transport across the Pacific Ocean, which took over 34 days from Texas to a 
Korean port, than other forms of milk. Besides, powder kept better and longer at room 
 August 1950; 873; #6431; UD 1733; RG 33120
 Sarah Phillips 21
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temperature than liquid milk. As with wheat flour, powdered milk could be mixed with other 
substances to bolster nutrition. At times, the SCAP especially requested powdered milk with 
fifteen percent sugar to derive more caloric intake. 
In addition to the Women’s Bureau of the Ministry of Social Affairs and the KCAC, foreign 
voluntary agencies also operated free milk stations. Moreover, they continued to operate free 
milk stations after the armistice. In the postwar era, agencies like CARE (Cooperative for 
American Relief to Europe) and the NCWC (National Catholic World Council) served a wide 
range of recipients such as the poor, the partially-unemployed and refugees from North Korea. In 
1957, there were fifteen milk stations in Seoul alone, each station providing lunch to 17,000 
people a day on average in places like Yongtu-dong, Ch’ôngnyangni and Mia-ri.  By 1958, the 22
NCWC had ninety-three milk stations in South Korea. Each day, 17,940 people ate at stations, 
and stations used 9,170 p’odae of wheat flour and corn-meal and 55,020 can (t’ong) of powdered 
milk each month. 
The Korean War and Foreign Voluntary Agencies 
In fact, the Korean War (1950-1953) in some ways brought the working relationship between 
foreign voluntary agencies in Korea and the U.S government closer. Because the CRIK was in 
charge of channeling all civilian relief materials to Korea between 1951 and 1955, foreign 
voluntary agencies had to go through the CRIK to send any civilian relief supplies. Moreover, 
most of the foreign voluntary agencies had evacuated Korea at the outbreak of war in June 
 Of shipped metric tons as of April 30, 1954, Kyŏnghyang. March 1, 1957; Kyônghyang, March 31, 195822
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1950.  It was not until 1952 when fifteen of the foreign voluntary agencies, including CARE 23
(Cooperative for American Relief to Europe), returned to Korea. Thus, the CRIK was the only 
channel for foreign voluntary agencies to send relief materials, and all of CARE’s donations 
were also channeled through the CRIK. For example, one of the largest voluntary agencies in 
Korea, CARE paused its person-to-person relief program, which was the organization’s signature 
program, when it closed down its Korean office in 1950. Although CARE could not send 
packages to designated individual recipients, it continued to send bulk civilian relief materials 
through the U.S. Army. CARE donated bulk grains through the CRIK, and it once sent 150 cases 
of Gerber’s Pineapple Pudding for Korean civilian relief.  Similarly, other foreign voluntary 24
agencies donated aid materials to the SUN program (sundry donations and UNCACK 
donations).  The U.S. Foreign Administrations Agency, Department of State, was in charge of 25
processing the transactions to the CRIK. 
When CARE made donations to the SUN program, the U.S. Army organized transportation 
to pick up the materials at CARE’s Philadelphia warehouse. The Army then moved these 
materials to ports on the east coast from which they were shipped to Korea. From September 
1950 to June 1953, CARE donated 5 million pounds of relief food through the SUN Program of 
the CRIK/UNCACK. In Korea, it was the South Korean government that distributed CARE-
 Fifteen voluntary agencies, including CARE, came back to Korea in 1952.23
 C.2546; 1276; RG 46924
 The FOA Aid program to Korea, CRIK and UNKRA (United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, 25
1950-1955). In 1955, the separate aid programs were integrated into one program.;; Civilian relief works included 
public health, resettlement and assimilation medical supplies, sanitation supplies, building materials for refugee 
resettlements. Civilian relief works included public health, resettlement and assimilation medical supplies, sanitation 
supplies, building materials for refugee resettlements.
!102
Chapter 2. The Korean War and the Invasion of American Foods
donated foods to the general public.  In other words, neither CARE nor the CRIK was much 26
involved with distribution within Korea. During the wartime period, CARE donated both surplus 
grains and non-surplus food like strained apricots and apple sauce for babies.  CARE was the 27
largest donor of foods among the foreign voluntary agencies in Korea during the war. The 
National Catholic Welfare Council (NCWC) was the second largest, having donated 1 million 
pounds of food to Koreans in the same period. 
In 1952, the U.S. Army permitted fifteen foreign voluntary agencies that had returned to 
Korea to resume providing direct relief to designated consignees in Korea.  Still, the army 28
continued to supervise their activities closely by requiring the agencies to submit the names of 
the consignees and their addresses to the detail of each village (myŏn). What is significant is that 
even when foreign voluntary agencies arranged direct shipments for their designated consignee 
parcels, the U.S. Army and the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA under the U.S. 
Department of State) reimbursed the agencies for the costs of ocean freight.  Ocean freight was 29
a significant contribution since the cost of cross-oceanic shipment to Korea amounted to 
approximately ten percent of the total cost, the remaining ninety being the cost of the relief 
materials. However, despite having direct channels available, CARE and other foreign voluntary 
agencies continued to send most of their relief materials through the CRIK/UNCACK SUN 
 CARE donated 4,913,625 pounds. WRS (NCWC) donated 1,132,239 pounds. 1165, #18, UD 422, RG 469.26
 C.2546; 1276; RG 46927
 In 1952, the U.S. Foreign Operations Administration/army approved voluntary agencies to directly distribute 28
relief materials to designated consignee in Korea. However, individual donor in the United States were not specified. 
SOP 16, supplement to the Public Law 480. 1164, #18, UD 422, RG 469, and other places
 1535; #86; HQ; RG 469, and also see #11. Funds_Programs, 1955; 1276; RG 469, NARA, College Park, 29
Maryland.
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Program for general distribution in Korea, meaning that the South Korean state distributed them 
to the recipients.  
The wartime system of civilian relief continued for another two years after the armistice of 
the Korean War on July 27, 1953. The U.S. Army continued coordinating the civilian relief until 
1955 because the armistice did not technically end the war. An armistice meant that the war 
could be resumed at any time. Thus, for another two years, foreign voluntary agencies continued 
to donate civilian relief supplies through the CRIK’s SUN Program. From August 11, 1953, to 
June 30, 1954, CARE sent 513,700 pounds of surplus powdered milk and 2 million pounds of 
other foodstuffs to Korea.  This volume of relief might seem insignificant in comparison to the 30
55 million pounds of surplus milk that, as well will see in chapters 3 and 4, CARE inherited from 
UNICEF to deliver in 1957. However, it was through donation transactions like these that U.S. 
voluntary agencies like CARE built a close cooperative relationship with the U.S. Army and 
FOA after 1949. This close relationship, in turn, became the basis for the much bigger projects 
that foreign voluntary agencies took on after 1955. 
The Christmas Holiday Food Program of 1954 was one such example of cooperation 
between foreign voluntary agencies in Korea and the U.S. government. In December 1954, the 
Foreign Operations Agency (FOA) decided to implement a Christmas Holiday Food Program to 
celebrate the holiday with Korean civilians. The FOA handed over the food to U.S. voluntary 
agencies. The four participating voluntary agencies carried out the program, choosing whom to 
give the food parcels to and distributing them directly to recipients. The participating agencies 
were CARE, the National Catholic Welfare Council (NCWC), the Mennonite Central 
 1383; #42; HQ; RG 46930
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Committee, and the General Council of the Assemblies of God (Foreign Service Committee).  31
The Christmas food parcel had more varieties than the usual grain ration. Yet, what Mr. Walter in 
the office of the CINCREP (U.N. Chief in Command, Representative in Seoul) reported to the 
FOA about the composition of the food parcel interestingly shows the ways that Koreans reacted 
each new foodstuff differently. 
Most important there should be a re-assessment of the composition of the food packages for 
particular countries. There were some items in the Korean packages which were practically 
useless. For example, although fats and oils are very much desired by the Korean consumer the 
Koreans are not accustomed to shortening and butter and have very little use for it, particularly 
the indigent people to whom the program is addressed. In the same category is cheese- only the 
more wealthy Koreans are even remotely acquainted with cheese as a food and even they have 
little taste for it. Also the beans were of little use to these people. They are unaccustomed to this 
kind of food, and furthermore it takes too much valuable fuel to cook beans properly. It is 
probably for these reasons so much shortening, butter and cheese were to be found on the black 
market.     32
These Christmas food packages received a favorable and adequate amount of press coverage 
in Korea, which the FOA found satisfactory. Interestingly, Walter in Seoul observed that 
“Cooking oil, meat (except pork products and meat with gravy), rice, shortening [were] most 
useful. Butter, cheese, beans [were] not liked and appeared in market at low prices.”  The place 33
where Koreans could easily procure American foodstuffs that were not officially imported was 
the black market. When there was a general shortage of commodities, the black market played a 
major role in keeping the economy going. The next section discusses the ways in which the 
 Projects- Santa Claus; Box 15; Entry 1276; RG 46931
 Report, Mr. Walter (Acting) of CINCREP to the FOA, Washington, June 15, 1955; 1373-5; #42; HQ; RG 469, 32
Shortening= any fat that is solid at room temperature and used to make crumbly pastry. It is different from butter. 
 Voluntary Agencies, 1380, #42; HQ; RG 46933
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large-scale U.S. military presence functioned to maintain the diversion of food to the black 
market. 
U.S. Military Men and the Locals: P.X. (Military Canteen) and the “Black Market Economy” 
In the 1950s, the black market activities that sustained the Korean economy formed what I 
call the Black Market Economy. The Black Market Economy was an effect of the physical 
presence of a large-scale U.S. military contingent and the large number of Korean War refugees. 
The goods in the black market were mostly diverted from U.S. military provisions, which were 
sent to feed and support the U.S. military personnel stationed in Korea. Not only the 
commodities on sale but also the vendors, or black marketeers. Many of the black market 
vendors were returnees from the former Japanese empire and Korean-War refugees who were 
homeless and unemployed.  
The foodstuffs sent for U.S. soldiers trickled out to local Korean markets through the P.X. 
(military canteen) and through personal trading between American soldiers and Koreans. The 
South Korean state could neither endorse nor shut down black market activities since the black 
market was what was running the economy. In Korea, black market food did not mean food from 
the countryside that the rural people hoarded to sell at higher prices instead of surrendering them 
to the government for rationing. In Korea, black market commodities were mostly illegally 
diverted U.S. military provisions. The nature of this illegality imparted meanings to the new 
commodities that were basically only available through U.S. military provisions such as Spam, 
chocolate, chewing gum, coffee, beer, whiskey and tobacco. Korea was not unusual in its 
phenomenon of the black market economy. In fact, black market activities were rampant in many 
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other countries such as Japan, Italy, and France. The black market activity as a “global” 
phenomenon prompts us to consider the context of the globalization of American food in the 
post-1945 with regards to the effects of U.S. military and economic hegemony.  
Local Koreans called the black markets “Yankee markets.” Since Americans were 
pejoratively called “Yankees” by the locals, the term, “Yankee market,” denoted the originating 
place of the commodities in the black market. The black market phenomenon was not only 
limited to the Korean War period. It began with the coming of the U.S. troops in 1945, and by the 
end of U.S. military rule in 1948, Yankee markets in the city of Seoul alone numbered ten. More 
than four thousand people earned their livelihoods in these markets. The Korean War intensified 
the phenomenon of the black market. During the Korean War (1950-1953), the Kukche Sijang 
(International Market) in Pusan became the heart of the South Korean economy with 100,000 
people visiting the market daily. A survey taken by the Kukche Market Cooperative (Kukche 
Sijang Chohap) during the war in 1952 recorded that among the registered members of the 
market cooperative, half were refugees from North Korea, one fifth were refugees from Seoul, 
and the rest were locals of Pusan. At the same time, this survey noted that among the un-
registered sellers without stores operating with movable carts, ninety-five percent were refugees 
from the north.  This survey was taken as a legacy of the Japanese colonial regulation that 34
required each market to be registered as a company. During the war, the black market vendors 
who were returnees from the former empire and northern refugees now had to face stiff 
competition from the market sellers who fled from Seoul and other southern cities and settled in 
the Kukche Sijang.  
 Tonga. February 29, 195234
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The war refugees who crossed the 38th parallel became permanently dislocated after the 
armistice in 1953. In Pusan, war refugees and returnees from the former empire settled down and 
formed an ad hoc village in parts of Sinch’ang-dong and Ch’angsŏn-dong. The Japanese military 
had previously cleared out this large piece of land in front of the port. The original intention was 
to reduce the damages expected from U.S. air raids during the last phase of the Pacific War.  35
However, after liberation, the empty lots were filled with refugee camps and black marketeers. 
Black market activities were vibrantly carried out in the Freedom Market (chayu sijang), later 
the International Market, in that area. Among many other vendors, visitors to the market could 
find an array of rice and soup stalls (kukpab chip) and wheat-flour food stalls, which were said to 
have been noticeably numerous. 
Food products sold in the black market were not officially imported and many of them had 
U.S. military provision marks and U.S. brand names. In 1955, there were over 500 cafes 
(tabang) in Seoul. The proliferation of cafes and bars was a noted social phenomenon after the 
U.S. occupation forces arrived in 1945. Decades later in 1990, Yu T’aejong, a retired professor 
from Korea University, reminisced about the time during the war when he and the poet, Pak 
Yongrae, met in Taegu while on evacuation, and the two ended up running a tea house 
(ch’atchip) in the city. They built a make-shift wooden house using Oregon pine planks from the 
U.S. military camp. What Yu remembers about the black market is that they could buy as much 
coffee, black tea, and hot chocolate powder as they wanted at incredibly cheap prices. Yu claims 
 [6.25 is alive], Kyŏnghyang, June 21, 1975.35
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that these commodities poured out from U.S. P.X. stores “like mountain hills,” emphasizing large 
amounts.   36
The black market was not the only place Koreans could obtain illegally diverted P.X. 
foodstuffs. The locations where foreign foodstuffs were sold ranged from quite-established 
Yankee markets to numerous street-corner stores. Newspapers mention “the Korean P.X. stores” 
selling foreign products.  There were also itinerant peddlers in the streets, and these peddlers 37
could visit their customers’ homes to sell their black market commodities. The U.S. 
Quartermasters office was aware of these activities. One U.S. soldier describes seeing “small 
quantities of US cigarettes, candy and canned goods in numerous stands in all towns and villages 
along routes” Also, the number of corner stores (kumŏng kagye) increased after 6.25 (the June 
25th invasion). In these ways, foodstuffs from Yankee markets trickled down to local retailers and 
to domestic spaces. Black market foodstuffs such as beer and tobacco were associated with 
illegal activities. However, the black market trade itself does not seem to have been considered 
especially dangerous by the South Korean state. In the month of December 1950, 600 Koreans 
were caught in alleged black market activities and was turned over to Korean courts. However, 
only 5 were convicted.  U.S. military provisions could be stolen in transit from ships or from 38
freight trains freight, and also from storage. Another route of acquisition of illegally diverted 
U.S. foodstuffs was trading directly with U.S. military men. 
 Maeil Kyŏngje, January 12, 1990 36
 Taehan Min’guk Sudo Sŏul ŭi Ch’ulbal, 1945-1961, p. 220 37
 [Black market activities] p.9, p.43, and other pages, Section [Journal] January 20, 1951; Office of the Inspector 38
General APO 301; RG 338 
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In many instances, U.S. military personnels acted as agents of illegal transfer from military 
provisions to the local black market. One could guess the large size and the glamor of U.S.-U.N. 
P.X. stores from the fact that the whole of Tong’a Department Store, which was one of the 
prestigious department stores in Seoul, was appropriated and used as a P.X. store during the 
Korean War.  In order to keep U.S. military men out of this illegal activity, Lieutenant Colonel 39
McConnell of the Quartermaster’s office “visited four Post Exchanges (P.X. stores) in Pusan to 
check the compliance with non-sale of 'gift' merchandise and posting of signs to that effect in 
stores.”  Along with tobacco, which seemed to have a different route, both the South Korean 40
state and the U.S. Army noted the abundance of U.S. beer in the local Korean market. To this, 
Colonel Elliot reported to the U.S. Army Inspector General that he believed that the “United 
Seamen’s Service” (Mr. Hauer; owner = Mr. Bartham, a U.S. citizen) to be the largest outlet of 
illegally transferred beer in Korea.  Thus, not only the U.S. military but also service people 41
adjunct to the U.S. military also seem to have been implicated in selling U.S. provisions to local 
Koreans.  
Then, why were the U.S. soldiers illegally diverting P.X. commodities? One motivation could 
be to obtain local currency, Korean hwan. Paik Too Chin, South Korean Prime Minister, made a 
number of complaints to Ty Wood, the Economic Coordinator in Seoul regarding U.S. military 
men who sold P.X. goods to Koreans in order to obtain local currency.  
 Yŏsŏnggye, Vol. 4, April 195539
 Section [Journal] January 20, 1951, p. 18, 0800-63, Office of the Inspector General APT 301; Headquarters 40
Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) RG 338
 Trade- Customs; #18; 1276; RG 469 41
!110
Chapter 2. The Korean War and the Invasion of American Foods
PX goods which possibly are sold by UNC personnel to Korean traders in order to obtain their 
Hwan requirements, to liquor supplies which may be sold from UNC messes and to uncustomed 
goods perhaps brought into Korea by UN personnel when returning from leave.  42
Paik couched his complaint against illegal diversions in terms of the loss of possible tax revenue 
for the South Korean state, military canteen goods were not taxed until 1957. Ty Wood did not 
have a competent solution to offer to Paik regarding this problem.   
One way that U.S. military personnel carried out economic activities with local Koreans was 
by using the MPC (Military Payment Certificate). When a military person arrived at his station in 
Korea, he was required to exchange all his greenbacks into MPCs. MPCs were denominated in 
U.S. dollars, such as $10 MPCs. Military wages were paid in MPCs only, and U.S. military 
personnel could exchange MPCs for hwan at an official rate. However, the problem was that the 
official “fixed exchange rate” was very disadvantageous to the MPC holders in comparison to 
the black market rate. In 1952, the official rate for 1 dollar was 180 hwan, but the unofficial 
exchange rate in the black market valued 1 dollar at 440-570 hwan.   
While in principle MPCs were only to be used by U.S. personnel, it seems that Koreans 
frequently used MPCs in black market activities. South Korean police chiefs resorted to putting 
up posters in Korean saying, “Use of MPCs Strictly Forbidden” (kunp’yo sayong ŏmgŭm). In 
another example, in 1953 the Finance Office of the U.S. military recommended opening an 
official exchange outlet in the center of the city of Ch’unch’ŏn, the site of a huge U.S. camp. The 
Office's report argued that current locations of exchange outlets were inconvenient for the 
military men to use. Both of the official hwan sales outlets were set up on U.S. military premises 
while the circulation of MPCs in the business district of the city was known to be pervasive.   
 A correspondence from Paik to Wood, December 22, 1954; #10; 1276; RG 46942
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Another motivation for U.S. military personnel to use MPCs was based upon the price 
differential of MPCs in the U.S. Pacific Theater. South Korean Prime Minister Park Too Chin’s 
letter to General Hull on May 29, 1954, points this out.  
MPCs and Greenbacks command about the same price in Japan, whereas there is a significant 
differential between the two in Korea… It is profitable to smuggle MPCs into Japan for 
conversion into luxury or non-essential goods currently excluded from the official import list, 
and smuggling these goods into Korea for sale.  43
MPCs were about 30 percent cheaper than greenbacks in 1953 and 1954 in Korea. If a U.S. 
military man took MPCs from Korea to his vacation in Yokohama, Japan, and bought P.X. 
commodities, he could make a 30 percent profit in the transaction.     
The sex trade was one of the well-known ways that local Koreans obtained MPCs and black 
market commodities like foodstuffs through person-to-person contact with U.S. military 
personnel. Again, all of this person-to-person contact and trade between U.S. soldiers and local 
Koreans, including the sex trade, was a result of the large-scale U.S military that was stationed in 
Korea. These girls, whom Koreans pejoratively called “Western princesses” (yang kongju), 
charged 5-10 dollars for one night’s fee, and also accepted any commodity from U.S. military 
provisions.    44
The person-to-person contact between American soldiers and local Koreans increased after 
the armistice as the soldiers were put into civilian rehabilitation work. After the armistice in 
September 1953, American troops stood by in Korea in case of a possible military emergency. 
However, when there was no war, they stayed idle. Prime Minister Paik Too Chin proposed using 
 Paik Too Chin to General Hull, May 29, 1954, #10. Finance- M.P.C. (Military Payment Certificate); Entry 1276; 43
RG 469 
 Kyŏnghyang, November 27, 1955 44
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U.S. military forces and surplus materials in South Korean resettlement programs. This program, 
called the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK), began in late 1953. The program built 
orphanages, schools and refugee housing, and it was “considered vital to U.S.- R.O.K. 
community relations and... [the] morale of troops in Korea.”  This program was similar to the 45
self-help programs that I examine in chapter 6 except that I did not find any evidence that 
Korean laborers were paid in U.S. surplus food. In any case, the large number of U.S. military 
men that this program dispatched into civilian areas increased the chances of their acting as 
agents in the distribution of foreign food by selling or giving away items like chocolate or 
chewing gum.  
In addition, Koreans could acquire American foodstuffs by being employed at U.S. military 
camps. The ROK Office of Supply and the U.N. operated the KESS, standing for “Korean 
Employees Sales Stores.” The KESS was an official channel for the disposal of UNC goods by 
auction or private sales to Korean employees.  It was an officially sanctioned practice to pay 46
Korean employees of the U.S. military facilities in goods or by awarding the privilege to 
purchase foreign goods at the KESS.   47
Unofficially, individual American soldiers would hire a housekeeper or a day laborer and pay 
them with food or cigarettes. An American soldier, Ottoboni, speaks about Korean laborers who 
worked from dawn to sunset for a pack of cigarettes. He also remembers paying a cleaning 
woman with a military C-ration (ham and lima beans can), which she did not seem to be happy 
 1544-1545; 1449-1451; #84; Headquarters, Office of Far Eastern Operations: Subject Files, 1950-1959; RG 469 45
 KESS Stores; Box 15; Entry 1276; RG 46946
 January 18, 1955; Box 10; Entry 1276; RG 469 47
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with. Kim Chŏng-man, who later practiced as a veterinarian, tells of his wartime memories when 
he worked as a house boy at the U.S. military. He particularly remembers taking chocolate and 
canned meats home at the end of his workday.  How Koreans like Kim remembered and 48
recounted the stories about their encounters with American foodstuffs imparted a range of 
enduring images and meanings to them. 
In conclusion, this chapter examined the impact of massive movements of Korean War 
refugees and large-scale U.S. military contingents on the spread of new foodstuffs like powdered 
milk and illegally transferred U.S. military provision. On one hand, it is likely that had it not 
been for the emergency relief needs created by the war, powdered milk and other factory-
manufactured foodstuffs would have had very different histories in Korea. On the other hand, 
because of the context of feeding stations, resettlement villages, and the black market, these 
foodstuffs attained cultural meanings associated with the specific historical situation of 1950s 
Korea. It is true that the foodstuffs were associated with poverty, the presence of U.S. soldiers, 
and the sketchy and precarious activities of the black market. At the same time, pictures of life 
during wartime also show the plethora of goods diverted from U.S. military provisions, the 
crossing of legal and cultural boundaries, the freeing of consumption and the inventive uses 
developed for culturally new products. This was not a picture of wartime recession and 
commodity shortage. Yet again, Koreans did not forget the origin of these commodities that 
despite Korea’s independence from the Japanese empire, Korea was now a divided country and 
had foreign militaries on its land. 
 Kyŏnghyang, November 5, 199648
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In a 1959 newspaper, a recently widowed reader asked the editor how she could make a 
living running a general food store. The editor answered that, for a food store, it is essential to 
trade in Japanese and American canned food products and alcohol. Then the editor assured the 
widow that it was quite easy to obtain these foreign items.  With the presence of American 49
military bases, food wastes from the U.S. military bases were turned into commodities. Until the 
end of the 1960s, food wastes from the U.S. military continued to be collected, bought and sold 
in the market at established prices ranging from 120 to 200 wŏn per kun.  Such memories of 50
American food was transmitted orally through generations and in literary texts and popular 
media. It may have been that only the poorer section of the population received rations and only 
particular sections of the population purchased illegally diverted U.S. foodstuffs. Yet, all sections 
of the population were in one way or another touched by the insertion of U.S. foodstuffs in 1950s 
Korea. However, the meanings given to new food began changing. How the meanings changed 
and what new resonances they accrued will be discussed in the following chapters.          
 Tonga Ilbo. November 15, 1959 49
 Tonga Ilbo. December 22, 1960.; Kyŏnghyang, August 28, 1957; Kyŏnghyang, January 26, 1966. 50
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Chapter 3.  
The Invention of Humanitarian Food Relief in Korea, 1953-1955: 
UNICEF Milk-Feeding Program 
Earlier in chapter 1 and chapter 2, new American foodstuffs such as wheat flour and 
powdered milk spread rapidly in post-1945 Korea through the state’s ration networks and 
wartime feeding stations. While millions of Koreans depended on U.S. aid food, U.S. Army’s 
food policy failed to persuade the Koreans towards the American camp in the Cold War. Not 
only did the Koreans find the taste and smell of wheat flour and powdered milk disagreeable, 
newspapers associated the new foodstuffs with the U.S. imperial motivations in juxtaposition 
to the presence of a large-scale U.S. troops in Korea. The political inefficacy of the earlier 
U.S. food assistance policy makes the different approach to food assistance by the United 
Nation’s Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF) in 1953 all the more significant. Large-scale 
relief needs in Korea drew in international organizations and non-governmental agencies to 
Korea. The UNICEF sponsored a milk-feeding program in Korea beginning in October 1953, 
and this milk program successfully transformed the association that powdered milk had with 
U.S. food assistance and poor relief, to Korea’s social and national development. The U.N. 
Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul, subordinate to the U.S. Department of State, 
observed the advantages of appropriating the rhetoric of humanitarianism and child health in 
the UNICEF milk program. 
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The image of UNICEF delivering milk gruel to children in South Korea made a powerful 
impression about civilian humanitarian assistance. However, what was not known to Koreans 
was that the original donor of powdered milk to the UNICEF was in fact the U.S. 
government. However, the U.S. government did not immediately embrace the principle of 
humanitarian assistance. In 1953, U.S. officials in the Department of State considered a 
UNICEF milk program in Korea unnecessary. However, in just three years, the Department 
of State completely changed its position regarding the Korean milk program by calling it 
essential by 1956. In fact, the U.S. Department of State had political calculations in changing 
its position to humanitarian food assistance in the mid-1950s. U.S. officials in the Office of 
the Economic Coordinator in Seoul acknowledged the political effectiveness of the use of 
humanitarian language through the UNICEF milk-feeding program. This chapter explores 
what the UNICEF milk program was able to achieve in-between this change in American 
food policy between 1953 and 1956. The development during those three years is important 
because it preceded the legislation of Voluntary Agency Program (Title III) of U.S. Public 
Law 480 in 1955. Title III of U.S. Public Law 480, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
The milk program was particularly politically savvy because it addressed the issue of 
“children without meals (kyŏlsik adong).” This term referred to children who could not eat 
three meals a day, and the existence of these children, numbering between four hundred 
thousands and nine hundred thousands according to the agricultural cycle, had been receiving 
much attention in newspapers. However, the South Korean government did not have the 
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wherewithal to take care of children-without-meals when the nation was just coming out of 
the Korean War.  
“UNICEF milk” was familiar to Koreans in the mid-1950s as South Korean state 
bureaucrats and newspapers revealed the identity of the donor only as UNICEF without 
referring to its original donor, which was the U.S. Department of State. On the other hand, 
the U.S. government was present as a shadow to the Korean Civil Assistance Command 
(KCAC), which was officially subordinate to the U.N. Command in Tokyo. The KCAC’s role 
in the milk program was the distribution of the powdered milk. Thus, the short-hand 
appellation, UNICEF milk, understated the package of sponsorship given by the U.S. 
Department of State which provided surplus food for free.  
In 1957, U.S. officials in the Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul assessed that 
powdered milk became rapidly familiarized in South Korea in three years since the 
distribution of UNICEF milk in 1954. In the circular-report to the U.S. International 
Cooperations Agency in 1957, American officers in charge of food distribution at the 
CINCREP in Seoul, Gerrild and Strickland, acknowledged the unfamiliarity of new American 
foodstuffs to Koreans and explained the rapid process of familiarization as a result of the 
food shortage. In other words, the consumption of milk spread rapidly not because Koreans 
liked milk, but because they did not have alternatives to choose from. The subtitle of the 
below excerpt was the “Suitability of foods available for donation in relation to dietary habits 
of persons to be benefited.” 
If Koreans could choose the foods they were to receive they would probably eliminate most 
everything except rice. However, they have learned to eat almost anything. For hungry people 
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any food is better than nothing. Cornmeal was not an item in the Korean diet, yet today many 
Koreans are eating cornmeal. The wheat flour has become a favorite item for those who 
never ate it before. It is used for many dishes. Beans of any kind have always been part of the 
Korean meals. Powdered milk is becoming more popular. Cheese, except in rare instances, is 
still an item that should be brought in very small quantities. Along with butter it would be a 
most helpful addition to the protein-lacking diet of the Koreans... Koreans are gradually 
acquiring a taste for foods previously uncommon in their diets.  1
The UNICEF program was the only large-scale milk program at the time. 
The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) sponsored the 
milk-feeding program in the Republic of Korea from October 1953 to August 1957.  Milk aid 2
had been initially requested by the South Korean government through the office of Sam 
Keeney, Far Eastern Regional Representative for UNICEF. In response, UNICEF sent fifty-
five million pounds of non-fat dried milk and fifteen million pounds of fish liver oil capsules 
for an emergency program in Korea in 1954. However, the original donation by the U.S. 
Department of State was not widely publicized to Koreans.  Aside from the powdered milk, 3
Maurice Pate, Director of UNICEF, allocated $1,348,000 from UNICEF funds to cover the 
cost of inland transportation within the United States and also for ocean freight to Korea.  4
Interestingly, UNICEF and the U.S Department of State initially had different goals 
regarding food assistance to Korea. When the UNICEF Executive Board met in October 1953 
to discuss the milk-feeding program in Korea, U.S. Representatives on the board strongly 
 “Voluntary Agencies Title III- PL 480 Distribution Programs,” airgramed from CINCREP Seoul to ICATO 1
Circular A-240, drafted by Gerrild/Strickland, June 24, 1957. Ref. 1531; #139; UD 422; RG 469
 The official commitment was from October 1953, although the milk was delayed till February 1954. 1340; 2
#50; UD 422; RG 469 SCAP 
 UNICEF, 1201; #19,  Korea Subject Files, 1953-1959; Office of Far Eastern Operations (OFEO), UD 422; 3
U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, Record Group 469; National Archives, College Park, MD (NACP).
 Korea- Relief- C.A.R.E, ref. 1506, no. 69-86; Subject Files, 1950-1959; OFEO; RG 469; NACP.4
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opposed the proposition. The U.S. representatives believed that the Korean milk program was 
incongruent with the mission statement of UNICEF. They reminded the UNICEF Executive 
Board that since 1950, the U.S. funds to UNICEF had been appropriated by Congress for 
“primarily assist(ing) countries in the development of permanent child health and welfare 
services.” In other words, the program had to have a long-term goal. Indeed, there were 
exceptions in which UNICEF could sponsor emergency relief programs. However, its 
commitment had to be a short-term contract, and it was reserved for natural disasters like 
floods, earthquakes, draught and famine. The Korean program did not fit any of the criteria. 
Previously, UNICEF had initiated a similar plan to give 200,000 pounds of powdered milk to 
Korea in March 1950, but it was a small-scale and short-term relief program, compared to 
what the Executive Board was considering in 1953.  5
Moreover, the U.S. Representatives on the UNICEF Board argued that additional food 
program to Korea was unnecessary since the Civilian Relief in Korea (CRIK) was providing 
for all civilian food requirements. In fact, the U.S. Eighth Army and U.N. Far Eastern 
Command in Korea had inherited a different set of goals for civilian relief programs, which 
was on the continuum of the wartime emergency policy. The goal of civilian relief, in which 
food assistance was of part, was “to prevent starvation, disease and unrest among the civilian 
population.” A goal of rehabilitation was added to this list of objectives after the Armistice 
Agreement on July 27, 1953. However, this did not change the purpose of food assistance 
which was militarily motivated. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of State believed that 
 Tong’a. March 28, 19505
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numerous existing relief programs in Korea already had considerable overlaps. The 
Department pointed out that Korea had the Civilian Relief in Korea (CRIK of U.S. Eighth 
Army), U.S. bilateral aid, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), U.N. 
Technical Assistance, programs of U.N. Specialized Agencies, and U.S. voluntary agencies to 
help the civilian population.  Adding UNICEF to the list did not seem to make an efficient 6
use of resources and further hindered the efforts already on the way to organize an integrated 
civilian relief program in Korea. Thus, in 1953 when the priority was still on military 
concerns, investing in long-term development of children’s health seemed to be pre-mature 
for Korea. Thus, the U.S. Foreign Operations Administration, Department of State, assessed 
that Korea already received sufficient milk supply for relief needs for 1954, and thus that 
UNICEF should not stretch its thin resource for a new program in Korean.  
However, the Korean Civilian Assistance Command (KCAC) and the South Korean 
government argued that the proposed UNICEF milk program did not overlap with other milk 
programs, currently managed by the CRIK and foreign voluntary agencies in Korea. It was 
true that CRIK was providing powdered milk to Koreans through foreign voluntary agencies 
in its SUN (sundry, donations from U.N. member nations and foreign voluntary agencies) 
Part Program. However, existing milk programs were limited in area, and the agencies 
showed their favoritism in choosing groups to give the milk to. For 1954, CRIK allocated 
467 tons of powdered milk to Korea monthly. It was planned to feed 220,000 persons 2.5 
 1202; #19; UD 422; RG 4696
!121
Chapter 3. The Invention of Humanitarian Food Relief
ounces of powdered milk daily.  The recipients were mainly orphans and patients in 7
institutions run by foreign voluntary agencies. In comparison to the UNICEF programs, the 
donations of powdered milk made by other voluntary agencies had small scale. The United 
Church of Canada made a commitment to donate 0.45 metric tons of dried milk to Korea 
through CRIK’s SUN Program in 1953, which it received in April 1954. The Cooperative for 
American Relief to Europe (CARE, Inc.) gave 39.63 metric tons of powdered milk in 1953.  8
The Church World Services (C.W.S) and the National Catholic World Council (N.C.W.C) 
programs were the only relatively large milk programs in Korea distributing to hospitals and 
orphanages.  9
In comparison, the UNICEF program instigated a national-scale milk-feeding campaign 
for the first time in Korea. Its milk fed 1.5 million people daily. Since the recipients were 
mainly children in primary schools and nursing mothers, it overlapped little with the existing 
milk feeding programs. In any case, the scale of the UNICEF program was 6.8 times larger 
than the sum of all the existing milk programs. When the U.N. Command Representative on 
the Combined Economic Board, the Commanding General of KCAC, and the South Korean 
Minister of Health and Social Sciences showed support for the UNICEF program, the U.S. 
 2.5 ounces= 0.16 pounds = 71 grams. C.2414; #8; P323; RG 469 7
 The Civilian Relief In Korea Report of Programs Issued and Shipments made as of 30 April 1954. of shipped 8
metric tons, SUN Program, cumulative; 1139-1140; #18; UD 422; RG 469 
 1195; #19; UD 422; RG 4699
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Representatives on the Executive Board of UNICEF reluctantly agreed to go with the 
allocation of powdered milk by UNICEF to Korea.  10
The initial quantity of UNICEF milk was a small load of nine hundred tons, discharged at 
the port of Pusan on December 31, 1953. On February 4, 1954, S.S. Popi delivered five 
thousand tons of non-fat dried milk to the ports of Inchôn and Kunsan. This was the first 
substantial amount of milk delivered by UNICEF. S.S. Popi had been delayed for six weeks, 
but the distribution of milk had not been disrupted since UNICEF was able to borrow 
powdered milk from the U.S. Army in Korea. Lastly, Sven Salen closed the month off with 
the unloading of milk at the port of Pusan. 
Koreans expressed gratitude for the gift of powdered milk and gave credit to UNICEF, 
which provided milk, and the KCAC, which distributed milk, as well as acknowledging the 
role of their own Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. In the monthly report of February 
1954 to UNICEF Headquarters, I. H. Markuson, Country Officer in Japan-Korea for 
UNICEF, described the welcome ceremony during which Koreans greeted S.S. Popi in 
Inchŏn on February 5, 1953. The ceremony was attended by representatives from UNICEF, 
KCAC (Korean Civil Assistance Command, U.N.), the South Korean government, and also 
by students in primary schools. 
In the afternoon of 5 February, a celebration of arrival was held at Inchŏn City Hall with the 
attendance of over five hundred people, including two excellent school bands. The program 
included speeches by the Governor of Kyŏng’gi province, the Vice-Minister of Social Affairs, 
the Mayor of Inchŏn, Colonel Scobey, representing the KCAC. Colonel Murphy, Director of 
Port Operations, and the Country Officer, who presented symbolic packages of milk to Vice 
 CINCREP, Seoul, to Mr. Normal Paul, Office of Program and Planning, FOA, October 14, 1953; 1202; #19; 10
UD 422; RG 469 
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Minister Kim and Mayor Pyo. Two large bouquets were presented to us by school children 
and Colonel Murphy received two for the Captain of the ship. As the program ended the 
children present were served glasses of hot UNICEF milk.  11
The Inchŏn ceremony was not the only occasion for the public display of appreciation for 
the powdered milk given by the foreigners. Another “bless-the-milk ceremony” was held on 
the steps of Seoul City Hall “surrounded by truckloads of UNICEF milk” on February 18. 
The enthusiastic welcome by the Koreans assured the U.N. representative in Seoul to report 
that Korean reaction to the program had been satisfactory. The representative assessed that 
Koreans recognized the program as a joint effort by the KCAC-ROK-UNICEF, and media 
coverage on the UNICEF donation and ceremonies had been adequate.  Markuson’s report 12
above also describes all three parties’ being elevated to the podium and given recognition for 
the delivery of powdered milk.  
Koreans learnt from newspapers and governmental announcements that UNICEF donated 
5.5  million pounds of powdered milk for children-without-meals in schools. The newspapers 
also informed the readers that the milk-feeding program itself was administered as a joint 
project of UNICEF, the South Korean government, and the U.N. Korean Civil Assistance 
Command (KCAC). However, from what is available in newspapers, It is difficult to gauge 
how much the Koreans, in fact, knew about the original donor of milk to UNICEF.  On the 
other hand, the newspaper articles clearly stated the donor only as the UNICEF.  
 UNICEF Pusan office, “Korea-Japan Monthly Report,” February 1954,  ref.1196; UNICEF, no. 19; Korea 11
Subject Files, 1953-1959; OFEO; RG 469; NACP.
 ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, which was the official name for South Korea. 12
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Moreover, although the KCAC was mentioned, the credit given to the government of the 
United States through the KCAC was only referential. It is true that, the KCAC was largely a 
U.S. operation. American personnel in the KCAC belonged to the 8201st army unit assigned 
to Eighth Army, and most of the funding and policies for the KCAC derived from the 
government of the United States. However, it was technically an organization of the United 
Nations. Moreover, receiving the credit for the program indirectly through a U.N. 
organization created different dynamics from crediting the U.S. government directly, nor did 
the phrase like “in cooperation with the KCAC” adequately represent the level of 
involvement by the U.S. government. 
Although UNICEF officially sponsored the program, UNICEF milk was distributed under 
the supervision of the KCAC and the Office of the Economic Coordinator as other U.S. aid 
materials were.  At the ports of discharge, the South Korean Office of Supply took over the 13
freights. The Ministry of Culture and Education allocated milk to Seoul and each of the nine 
provinces, and sent it down through state’s administrative channels. UNICEF and the U.S. 
International Cooperation Agency had initially requested the South Korean government to 
pay for inland transportation within Korea. However, the costs of inland transportation were 
usually defrayed from the Counterparts Fund, which was where the profit earned from selling 
U.S. agricultural surpluses to Korean buyers was deposited.   14
 C. Tyler Wood, UNC Economic Coordinator, to Sam Keeney, Director, Asia Regional Office, UNICEF, 13
March 8, 1956, ref. 1507; Korea Subject Files, 1950-1959, Headquarters; RG 469; NACP.
 For the explanation on Counterparts Fund, see chapter 1. 14
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Surprisingly, UNICEF achieved all these in Korea with only one official, Irvin H. 
Markuson, Country Officer for UNICEF, and his administrative assistant. Moreover, 
Markuson was covering for UNICEF in Japan as well as Korea in 1953. This Markuson went 
around the country making contacts with Korean voluntary organizations and local 
governments, and through those channels, the UNICEF milk reached 1.2 million-1.5 million 
children daily. However, at the same time, it makes one wonder how much actual work 
UNICEF could have done with only one official to carry our the large-scale program.   
UNICEF was only one of the participants in the joint program with the Korean Civilian 
Assistance Command (KCAC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK).  Moreover, looking at it 15
carefully, UNICEF did not play much role beyond arranging ocean freights, and having 
Markuson in Korea to supervise the distribution. Then, why were the Koreans giving so 
much credit to UNICEF for the program? 
In fact, it was difficult to draw a line between UNICEF and the KCAC when it came to 
supervising the program. In addition, UNICEF’s office in Korea was attached to the Social 
Affairs Branch of the KCAC, and later it was transferred to the Community Development 
Division of the UNC Office of the Economic Coordinator.”  Thus, the U.S. government 16
officials were involved in every step of the way from funding to procurement of surplus 
powdered milk, to distribution and to supervision of the program in Korea. Yet, it maintained 
a shadowy presence through the KCAC and UNICEF to the eyes of the public in Korea. 
 KCAC, the Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC) was a major command of the Far East Command, 15
inaugurated on 1 July 1953, as a successor to the United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCACK, 
December, 1950-June 1953).
 Ref. 1340; no. 50; UD 422; RG 469; NACP. 16
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Teamed with the KCAC, the job entrusted to UNICEF was to deliver the commodity 
from the warehouses in the United States to the ports in Korea, and to supervise and give 
technical advice regarding the program. According to the job description, after S.S. Popi 
discharged powdered milk at Inchŏn and Kunsan, Irvin Markuson busied himself with setting 
up the program throughout the country. He visited major cities to inspect the progress made 
in distribution, and to discuss the program with local officials and representatives of civil 
organizations. On February 6, 1954, Markuson proceeded from Inchŏn to Chŏngju in 
Chungchŏng pukto. The feeding station at the Chŏngju City Hall had been serving rice and 
milk-gruel to 1,000 persons daily. Each recipient held a ticket that recorded the number of 
family members eligible for food relief. The station had cooking facilities, but because it did 
not have a dining, people took food home to eat. Below is Markuson’s description of the 
feeding station.  
The kitchen bordered the alley at the rear of City Hall and serving was done through a trap 
door cut in a high board fence. The two-pot cooking stove was well constructed and was 
roofed over only. There was considerable evidence that spillage on the dirt floor had occurred 
over a long period of time, and that flies would be a real problem in warm weather. Storage 
was adequate. Although we were told that the four women in attendance were volunteers, Mr. 
Kroll believed that they received some kind of pay for their work. The addition of a cement 
floor with proper drainage would add considerably to the cleanliness of this station.  17
In the next excerpt, Markuson discusses the school-feeding program with the locals of the 
city of Chŏngju. At the meeting, Markuson persuades local administrators to distribute 
powdered milk as reconstituted liquid skim milk. The school-feeding program was important 
 Citation from UNICEF Pusan office, “Korea-Japan Monthly Report,” February 1954, ref. 1197, no. 19; UD 17
422; RG 469; NACP.  
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to UNICEF as the agency’s main concern was children in primary schools. Between 1954 
and 1956, UNICEF delivered 134 million pounds of powdered milk to Korea. Of this, 
seventy five percent was distributed to students in primary schools, and the remaining twenty 
five percent went to feeding stations in urban areas and through maternal and child health 
programs.  In the excerpt below, Markuson phrases the principle of liquid distribution as a 18
matter of hygiene and health.  
In the afternoon, I met with representatives of the provincial government health, 
education and relief sections; the provincial head of the women’s association, the Chŏngju 
city head of the women’s association, Mr. Kroll, Dr. Lapamarege, and Miss Brandt, Public 
Health Nurse from the Team… When the meeting was opened for question and discussion the 
principle of liquid distribution was immediately under fire. The Catholic Church, it 
developed, had also issued milk to the Chŏngju primary school- one drum for each 
classroom- and the teachers were sending it home in dry form with the students. The head of 
the women’s association pointed out that this was very satisfactory in her own case and that 
she believed this to be the best system. I pointed out to her that such was probably true in 
many cases, but that she was undoubtedly more intelligent and a better housekeeper and 
mother than the average. I again pointed out the certain waste inherent in the practice and the 
danger involved in the sanitation aspect when children ate the milk dry from dirty hands, as 
they often do. I also pointed out that the national government and the national president of 
the women’s association endorsed the UNICEF requirement for liquid distribution.   
I left Chungchŏng pukto that night with confidence that the visit had engendered 
enthusiastic support. As I entrained later for Pusan, I was informed by the stationmaster that 
the first carloads of milk had arrived at railheads that afternoon.  19
As cited in Markuson’s report, the National Catholic World Council (NCWC) already had 
school-feeding programs in Chŏngju as well as in other cities. However, the NCWC milk 
 Over 75% of the supply went to primary schools, Yearbook of Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (Seoul, 18
1955-7); Warne, Oct. 11, 1956, ref. 1340-1, no. 50; UD 422; RG 469; NACP. 
 Citation from UNICEF Pusan office, “Korea-Japan Monthly Report,” February 1954. ref. 1197; #19; UD  19
422; RG 469
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programs in Chŏngju gave out raw powdered milk for children to take home. The 
administrators did not seem to have cared about the form of distribution as much when the 
NCWC school-feeding programs were sporadic and small in scale. The program supplied 
powdered milk to twelve primary schools in several Catholic dioceses in the city when it had 
a supply of milk to distribute. Markuson’s KCAC-UNICEF team informed him that fuel was 
expensive, and without fuel, it was difficult to carry out liquid distribution in most schools. 
Regardless, Markuson reiterated the principle of liquid distribution and finished the meeting. 
 In comparison to small foreign voluntary agency milk programs, the UNICEF program 
was much larger, and it was committed for a long period of two years. For the program, the 
UNICEF distributed powdered milk to over 4,200 primary schools throughout the nation, 
which included the rural areas. Moreover, UNICEF made a contract with the South Korean 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs for a year - to be renewed for one more year afterwards 
-, which made UNICEF responsible for ensuring constant supply of milk during that twelve 
month period. 
On the day, Markuson left the city of Chŏngju and traveled to the southeastern city of 
Pusan in Kyŏngsangdo. As he expected, the UNICEF milk-feeding program was successfully 
expanded throughout the country.  By February 23, 1954, UNICEF distributed powdered 20
milk to 577,278 recipients in Korea daily. By April, the number of recipients exceeded 1.5 
million, which was the number that had been contracted by UNICEF. In the same month, 
UNICEF provided a pint of reconstituted skim milk a day to 1,100,239 children in primary 
 The survey counted Seoul as one province.20
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schools (ages 6 to 11), 209,816 pre-school children (ages 1 to 5), 76,606 pregnant and 
nursing mothers, and 225,927 adults in institutions and hospitals.   21
As the figures show, UNICEF focused on helping students in primary schools. The 
UNICEF school-feeding program was not designed to provide for all students enrolled in 
schools, as it was the case in Japan at the time. It only provided for students who were 
registered as “children-without-meals (Kyôlsik adong)” with the Ministry of Culture and 
Education. “Children-without-meals” was a term used since the Japanese colonial period to 
refer to children who could not eat all three meals a day. 
 Pogŏn Sahoe T’onggye Yŏnbo,  1955-1957 (Seoul, 1957), p. 352; 469 422 19, 1195 UNICEF’s contract with 21
the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs was to feed 1.5 million Koreans in the contract 
However, the agency also had a more ambitious plan of reaching 2 million recipients in Korea. In the latter plan, 
UNICEF planned to provide a pint of reconstituted skim milk a day to 656,000 children in primary schools 
(ages 6 to 11), 450,000 children not in school (ages 6 to 11), 500,000 pre-school children (ages 1 to 5), 200,000 
pregnant and nursing mothers, 100,000 children in institutions and hospitals 100,000 and 105,000 reserved for 
expansion where most needed, ref. 1195, no. 19; UD 422; RG 469; NACP.
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The phenomenon of children coming to school without lunch-boxes began drawing 
renewed attention from the public in 1952. The issue stayed in high visibility throughout the 
1950s and the 1960s. The reason for the sudden rise in the issue could be attributed to the 
increase in the number of students. Since the American Military Government (1945-1948) 
implemented compulsory education for primary school in 1946, the number of students in 
primary schools, which was 1,460,000 students in 1945 after the Liberation, increased to 
3,188,000 by 1958.  That was more than a two fold increase. The number of students, 22
including middle school, high schools and college students, was 4 million, comprising one 
fifth of the total population of South Korea, which was 21-21.5 million people at the time. 
Feeding the new food, milk, to 1.5 million people in the nation of 21 million was a 
substantial number.  
As primary school education was normalized, children from less economically privileged 
families began entering school, and the number of children-without-meals also increased. In 
1950, the Ministry of Culture and Education, based on the survey conducted by the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, estimated the number of children-without-meals at 350,000 nationally.  23
The national average was higher when students from poor farming families (ch’ŏlnyang 
nong’ga, literally meaning agricultural household without food) in the countryside were 
counted. During the war in 1952, the number of children-without-meals increased to 617,000 
children, which was forty four percent of the total 1,390,000 children (adong) both in school 
 Chayu Sinmun, December 24, 1945; Kyônghyang Sinmun, August 7, 1958.22
 Kyŏnghyang Sinmun, June 16, 1950.23
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and not in schooling.  In 1955, 900,000 children were skipping one or two meals a day when 24
the total number of primary school student was three million.  The number of children-25
without-meals fluctuated according to the agricultural cycle. The spring season had the most 
acute food shortage before the fall harvest. May and June period was called “Barley Hill.” 
Before “Barley Hill,” South Kyŏngsang-do ran a survey on 480,000 children in primary 
schools. Children who skipped meals totaled 170,000. Ten percent of children skipped two 
meals daily, and one in four children responded that they skipped a meal a day.  Nationally, 26
the percentage of children-without-meals did not go below thirty-five percent until the late 
1960s. 
Before the UNICEF school-feeding program, the UNCACK, ROK and foreign voluntary 
agencies at times arranged impromptu and localized efforts to feed children in primary 
schools.  These were short-term improvisations for emergencies. When the situation was 27
dire, especially during the spring season, children were given rice, sorghums, bread, and 
powdered milk. The organizations had to incorporate powdered milk in school-feeding 
because there was a shortage of both rice and bread. In 1946, one thousand students in 
primary schools in Seoul each received 1 hop of free powdered milk.  In the same year, the 28
city government of Seoul sold bread and rice meal to primary school students at subsidized 
 Children in Korean is adong. Tong’a Ilbo, November 23, 195224
 Kyŏnghyang, May 10, 1955.25
 Pusan Ilbo, May 2, 1957.26
 UNCACK was re-named to KCAC in 1953.27
 Tong’a, March 15, 1946.28
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prices. Bread made of wheat-flour cost 2 wŏn 20 chŏn per 100 grams, and a hop (equiv. to 
0.25 pounds) of rice-mixed meal cost 3 wŏn.  
In 1953, Seoul City opted for milk feeding in schools because there was a shortage of 
bread. The city had 9,240 kyŏlsik’adong (children without meals) which counted for 30 
percent of the students in primary schools.  During the Korean War, in 1952 and in 1953, the 29
ROK Ministry of Culture and Education had applied to the UNCACK (United Nations Civil 
Assistance Command in Korea) for barley and rice for children without meals. UNCACK 
had neither barley nor rice, but promised to allocate powdered milk as a substitute in 1953. In 
January 1953, the Unitarian Church of Canada donated powdered milk to Seoul City through 
UNCACK.  With this milk from the Unitarian Church of Canada, all children in primary 30
schools in Seoul from aged 6 to 12 received 50 grams of milk per day for two months.  The 31
Unitarian Church again donated 0.45 tons of milk in 1954 (UNICEF provided 2000 tons a 
year).   32
When newspapers criticized the South Korean government for not developing an 
independent plan, and merely depending on UNICEF milk for children-without-meals, both 
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, and the Ministry of Culture and Education balked 
at taking on the responsibility. The Ministry of Culture and Education shoved the 
responsibility to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs by saying that procurement of food 
 Kyŏnghyang, July 11,  1953.29
 See Introduction in Hakkyo Kŭpsik Paeksŏ, (Seoul, 1978); UNICEF planned to give 200,000 pounds of 30
powdered milk in 1950, Tong’a, March 28, 1950. 
 Kyŏnghyang, January 24, 1953. 31
 Unitarian Church of Canada, Kyŏnghyang, January 24, 1953. 32
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was not its duty. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs announced that it did not need to 
provide milk for these children because they were already provided food in the family-
feeding program. Thus, the Ministry considered allocating food for children-without-meals as 
double counting in two separate categories. In any case, both ministries had to manage with 
severely limited funding and it would have been difficult for them to come up with funds for 
children-without-meals. Thus, school-feeding continued to depend on UNICEF and other 
voluntary agencies. 
The program was successful, feeding 1.5 million children a day. However, this does not 
mean that those who received milk liked it or found it familiar. The foreign nature of milk 
created resistance. UNICEF channeled seventy-five percent of its milk to primary schools; it 
received frequent complaints from students suffering from diarrhea and enteritis after eating 
powdered milk. The relevant South Korean Ministries and newspapers alleged that ailments 
were caused from eating raw powdered milk.  The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs had 33
instructed primary schools in the feeding program to make milk-gruel in school and feed 
students on site. The powder had to be dissolved in water and boiled in order to kill the germs 
before being served. However, the ministries also had to acknowledge that few schools were 
equipped with cooking facilities and large pots. In addition, obtaining fuel was an obvious 
challenge. Thus, most schools gave out raw powdered milk for children to take home. 
The difficulty of affording fuel was discussed at a round-table discussion in 1955 between 
representatives from schools and the Ministry of Culture and Education. They discussed ways 
 For example, see Kyŏnghyang, February 28, 1957.33
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to abolish miscellaneous fees in schools. Miscellaneous fees were supposed to be voluntarily 
collected from parents, but that it was not very voluntary and put financial pressure on 
students from poorer families. Sŏ Hyŏng-ho, Headmaster of Sosŏng Primary School, pleaded 
that he could not manage his school with meager government subsidy and tuition fees.  He 34
said he used the fund from miscellaneous fees to pay for water, telephone, electricity bills and 
even to pay teachers’ salaries. Sŏ emphasized that preparing milk gruel was especially costly 
because fuel was expensive. He sarcastically informed his co-discussants that “when we 
asked for fuel, the Ministry heaped us with more powdered milk.” Instead of providing fuel 
or funds to buy fuel, the Ministry of Education gave extra powdered milk, expecting the 
schools to gather their wits to transform the milk into fuel. Thus, his school ended up having 
more powdered milk without fuel.  At the same time at a different place, an official from the 35
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs was censuring primary schools for selling powdered-
milk to the commercial market.  36
Although the UNICEF program alleviated the situation, it alone could not solve the 
problem of children-without-meals in postwar Korea. It also had limitations. The distribution 
of powdered milk varied widely month to month. There were often three to four months that 
went by without distribution. In addition, 40 to 50 grams of powdered milk was not enough 
to relieve a child’s hunger as it provided less than 300 calories.  Sometimes powdered milk 37
 Miscellaneous fees (chappu kŭm) was fee that parents voluntarily contributed. This fee was separate from the 34
tuition fee and the subsidies from the government. 
 Round Table Discussion [2], Tong’a, August 6, 1955.35
 Kyŏnghyang, May 10, 1955.36
 Ibid.  37
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was caught in storage for as long as three years and were spoilt. Also, milk supply had to 
compete for inland transportation with those of relief grain, clothing, lumber, cement, and 
fertilizer, the last of which had top priority. Lastly, powdered milk was only given to children 
who were registered in primary schools when one million children did not attend school for 
financial reasons. It was likely that these children needed more help than students who could 
attend school. 
On November 15, 1956, Sam Keeney, Far Eastern Regional Representative for UNICEF, 
and his associate Bowls informed Edward Warne at the Office of the Economic Coordinator, 
Seoul, of the UNICEF’s plan to terminate the milk feeding program in Korea by August 
1957.  They explained that “UNICEF was under pressure to divert the $800,000 it now pays 38
annually for freight on U.S. powdered milk deliveries to the ROK to the world-wide 
mosquito eradication program.” Thus far, UNICEF had paid in total approximately $5 million 
on ocean freights for the Korean program. Keeney added that his organization was willing to 
continue administering the program if it did not have to pay the ocean freight bill. Otherwise, 
UNICEF requested the Office of the Economic Coordinator to take over the program with 
Title II, PL 480,  which was a provision for emergency relief. 39
In a little over three years, the U.S. officials in CINCREP, Seoul, changed their position 
regarding the milk-feeding program from unnecessary to essential. Before the program 
started, the U.S. side had objections, but in 1957 the U.S. officials were convinced of the 
effectiveness and needs of milk distribution in Korea. American officials, Whitman and 
 November 16, 1956, ref. 1340, no. 50; UD 422; RG 469; NACP. 38
 Ref. 1196, ref. 1340; #50; UD 422; RG 469; NACP. 39
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William E. Warne in Seoul recommended the Office of the Economic Coordinator, Seoul, 
continue funding the milk program in Korea through other voluntary agencies for two years. 
Although using Title II for this was inappropriate, the program could be continued through 
the provision of Title III, PL 480, which was to divert foods to international organizations and 
voluntary agencies. Below are two excerpts. The first excerpt was sent by Warne sent on 
October 11, 1956 to the International Cooperations Agency.  
The Koreans now accept the advantages of the program and ask for its continuation. This 
is a real accomplishment in itself since milk was a strange food to most Koreans and at the 
beginning of the program we met with much resistance. The children themselves were the 
basis of the acceptance. Once the children began to drink the milk they quickly learned to 
like it and thus overcame the resistance of the adults.  40
A U.S. official, Whitman, CINCREP, Seoul reported to the International Cooperations 
Agency,  
It is recommended that the (milk feeding) program be continued. The program is directly 
furthering the U.S. Objectives in Korea. It is a program that assists daily one and half million 
people throughout all parts of the ROK. It is helping to build a healthy nation by reaching 
children whose diet is nutritionally insufficient. Almost every community in Korea knows the 
program and is aware that the milk is supplied through foreign aid. Much progress has been 
made through the past three years the program has been in operation. There has been steady 
improvement in administration of the feeding program through schools, clinics, and feeding 
stations. The nutritional supplement has been of value in maintaining health among children 
and pregnant and nursing women among poorer groups of the population. The Koreans have 
learned to know and like milk as well as understand the value of milk as highly nutritious 
food which has contributed much toward combating malnutrition and under nutrition.  41
 Warne, Economic Coordinator, to ICA/W, October 11, 1956, ref. 1340-1341, no. 50; UD 422; RG469; NACP. 40
 Whitman, CINCREP Seoul, Cablegram to ICA/W, January 5, 1957, ref. 1484-5; Headquarters, Office of Far 41
Eastern Operations; RG 469; NACP.
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In these reports to the International Cooperation Agency, the U.S. officials like Whitman 
and Warne in the Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul were convinced that by 1957 
Koreans recognized milk as a healthful and necessary food, which had particular relevance to 
the physical development of children.  They concurred amongst themselves that the joint 42
milk-feeding program brought about positive changes in Korea, and that it was a progress 
achieved by the Koreans who learnt the value of milk in preventing and combating 
malnutrition and under-nutrition. Milk was also cited as a preventative measure to curb active 
tuberculosis, which was pervasive in Korea at the time. Children were especially vulnerable 
to the onset of tuberculosis and its major cause was known as malnutrition.   43
The American supply of powdered milk was slow to take root in Korea. In 1956, the 
commercial import of powdered milk to Korea was only 250,000 pounds.  Warne in OEC 44
concluded that the market for milk did not exist in Korea and its potential in the future 
negligible.  Thus, in order to continue the supply of powdered milk to Korean children, the 45
Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul searched for a way to continue the milk 
program. 
Whitman and Warne presumed that Koreans had acknowledged the incompleteness of 
their conventional diet. Grains composed over eighty-five percent of the everyday diet of 
Koreans. These food officials emphasized the value of milk in supplementing protein, fat and 
 Ref. 1484-5; ref. 1514, #84-86; UD 422; RG 469; NACP. 42
 Pogŏn Sahoe T’onggye Yŏnbo, 1955-7 (Seoul, 1957).43
 From Warne, CINCREP, Seoul, to ICA, Title I import, November 4, 1957, no.1514; #86; HQ; RG 46944
 Ibid.45
!139
Chapter 3. The Invention of Humanitarian Food Relief
vitamin B to balance this overwhelmingly carbohydrate-concentrated eating practice.  At the 46
same time, the U.S. officials paid less attention to the complaints against milk, or assumed 
that Koreans had seemingly overcome the bodily discomfort and personal dislike of milk in a 
matter of three years. The Americans observed the milk-feeding program as an objective 
transaction between the availability of surplus foods and the need of the hungry people, and 
they interpreted eating milk as a sign of acceptance of the food. 
On the other hand, when Korean newspapers and state officials referred to eating 
powdered milk or milk gruel, the food was usually accompanied by descriptions like “not 
quite to our palate” and by words like diarrhea and stomachache. This unfamiliarity 
continued to be expressed into the mid-1960s.    47
In the next chapter, we will see the ways in which this decentralized and personalized 
connection was engineered by the U.S. Department of State through the case of the American 
Korean Foundation in 1954. However, even when the images of humanitarian goodwill and 
decentralized agencies were established, using them to the American political advantage in 
the Cold War was a wholly different matter. For example, how do you induce Koreans to 
agree that the sum of individual donors was better than a state, however arbitrarily it may be, 
giving the same help? What made one better than the other when you received the same 
material gifts whether from the state or from the people?  
A value judgment as such to tell people that humanitarian, religious, and relatively non-
political “civilian” assistance was better than the imperial-state sponsorship of foreign aid 
 Ref. 1484-5; #84-86; UD 422; RG 469; NACP.46
 For example, see Tong’a, July 20, 1963.  47
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had to be established as an imposition by the power of repetition and indoctrination. One 
obvious appeal of the relative non-politicality was that it was less threatening to the national 
autonomy of the Koreans. However, this point alone did not suffice. The rest of the belief 
system had to be corroborated with the feelings. 
The jump from the acceptance of the constructed image of American food-giving to the 
self-decision for democracy had only one process to rely on, which was to naturalize the 
preference for democracy, but this did not happen. However, the pre-conceived image of 
Koreans’ choosing democracy was uncannily similar to the image of American citizens’ 
voluntarily donating money to feed children in Korea. The imitative spin-off of this shift 
worked by giving extra meaning to the image of American humanitarian assistance, and thus, 
it was supposed to be replicated by the Koreans in their choice for democracy, as if on an 
imperial scale. In this, Americans existed in the same imaginary space as a future possibility 
for Koreans, thus drawing affinity. 
The following chapter 4 will reveal Cold War political considerations, and explore the 
partnership between the U.S. International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and U.S. 
voluntary agencies. The next chapter discusses the Voluntary Agency Program (Title III) of 
U.S. Public Law 480 of 1954, which authorized the U.S. Department of State to donate 
surplus food obtained by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to U.S. voluntary agencies and 
international organizations. Thus, U.S. voluntary agencies and international organizations 
were able to superimpose the image of humanitarian assistance on food relief programs 
because the U.S. government donated surplus food to them for free.
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CHAPTER 4. C.A.R.E. AND THE NEW COLD WAR POLICY, 1955-1962:  1
When the U.S. voluntary agencies donated, when the U.S. citizens donated,. . . 
  
Previously in chapter 3, the Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul, subordinate to 
the U.S. Department of State, observed that the UNICEF milk-feeding program having a 
number of political advantages: through the donation of powdered milk to school children, 
UNICEF mobilized the Koreans in public ceremonies of the program’s inauguration, 
educated them on nutritional science and hygiene at local community levels, and garnered 
 CARE stood for the Cooperative for American Relief to Europe. It was one of the largest U.S. voluntary 1
agencies in Korea. It changed its name to the Cooperative for American Relief to Everywhere in 1955. 
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(On May 22, 1954, the government in the east-zone of Germany sent a a 
sixty-car freight train full of material assistance to North Korea as a present) 
. . . it (East German train freights to North Korea) is not a people making a 
free offering, as is being done by the American people, but the Communist 
Government of East Germany, acting officially and with all of its governmental 
powers. 
But, however the Communists may go about it, we must surpass them. The 
60 cars spoken of in the dispatch are a mere bagatelle to what the American 
people are willing to give (to South Koreans). 
Remember, the Communists are trying to keep their hold on the reluctant 
people of North Korea. Remember, we American people are trying to show our 
sympathy to the people of South Korea, who fought voluntarily at our side, who 
are as one with us in their opposition to Communism, and who deserve every 
ounce of help that we can give them for the reconstruction of their country. 
LOOK AT WHAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE DOING AND THEN SEE 
THAT WE DO MANY TIMES AS MUCH! 
- a telegraph from Henry C. Alexander, National Campaign Director of the 
American Korean Foundation, received by the Office of the Economic 
Coordinator in Seoul on 30 June 1954 (unknown number of recipients in the 
U.S. Department of State)
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much publicity that fostered a friendly attitude towards UNICEF and the Korean Civilian 
Assistance Command (KCAC). Beginning in 1955, according to Title III of U.S. Public Law 
480, the U.S. government donated ten times more surplus grains to U.S. voluntary agencies 
in Korea in order to de-emphasize the government’s role and make the agencies appear to be 
the original donors. While I do not suggest that the reports from the Office of the Economic 
Coordinator in Seoul on the UNICEF milk program had any direct effect on the legislation of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (PL 480), because of this 
U.S. Congressional legislation, U.S. voluntary agencies were able to channel much more U.S. 
government-donated surplus grains to Korea, resulting in humanitarian food relief. This 
chapter focuses on Title III of PL 480, which co-opted international organizations and U.S. 
voluntary agencies in the U.S. government’s foreign food assistance programs.   2
 The image of foreign voluntary agencies and international organizations delivering milk 
gruel to children in South Korea was fed into the production of metaphors of the American 
cold war in the mid-1950s.  U.S. state officials, political personages and the media that were 3
invested in constructing an artificial dichotomy between the United States and the Soviet 
Union used invoked image to visualize a difference between the humanitarian assistance of 
individual American citizens and, according to the U.S. rhetoric, political manipulation by the 
unfeeling Communist state that used food as a tool for compliance. The interested U.S. state 
“Foreign Voluntary Agencies in Korea” was the name that the non-governmental charitable agencies had given 2
to themselves; In Korean, Oekuk Minkan Wŏnjo Tanch’e; for definition, see p. -. KAVA Directory of Foreign 
Voluntary Agencies in Korea, 1955; Pogŏn Sahoe Paeksŏ, Pogŏn Sahoe Pu, 1965.
 Koreans translated, Foreign Voluntary Agencies as Foreign Civilian Aid Organizations (Oekuk Minkan Wŏnjo 3
Tanche). The appellation used U.S. official documents, foreign voluntary agencies, does not have the equivalent 
of “minkan,” which meant “civilian.”
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officials, political personages and the media began putting an emphasis on the voluntary 
nature of donations made by U.S. citizens, and on the imagined individual connection 
between American donors and Korean recipients. This imagined person to person connection 
was possible because the Koreans were told that voluntary agencies donations were from 
individual citizen’s donations. If fact, using the fund appropriated in U.S. Congress, the U.S. 
Department of State donated surplus food to international organizations and voluntary 
agencies for free. Importantly, by not emphasizing its own role as the original donor, U.S. 
government made it possible for international organizations and voluntary agencies to invent 
and superimpose an image of humanitarian food relief on U.S. food assistance.  
This voluntary agency program, Title III of PL 480, was a parallel addition to the 
continued state-to-state supply of surplus food, which was re-instated as Title I of the same 
legislation. The U.S. Department of State’s donation of surplus food to voluntary agencies 
only counted for ten percent of the amount that the U.S. Department of Agriculture sold and 
the Department of State donated directly to the South Korean state under Title I. However, 
despite its small amount, the voluntary agency program (Title III) of PL 480 played a 
disproportionately important role in promoting an image of humanitarian food assistance. 
This chapter explains the two-step mechanism of the humanitarian image that was politically 
useful in U.S. cold war strategy. Firstly, Title III program of PL 480 made it appear as if the 
donors were multiple, and  decentralized. Secondly, publicity campaign for voluntary agency 
donations further broke down the donors into individual American citizens, voluntarily 
contributing their fifty cents and one dollars to help the Koreans.  
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Politically, the civilian humanitarian approach produced a necessary difference to 
differentiate American aid from the communist ones. It differed from the militarily motivated 
food assistance by the US military covered in chapters 1 and 2 (1945-1955). In chapter 1 and 
chapter 2, despite the large-scale aid of new food such as wheat-flour and powdered milk, 
Koreans did not take food aid as a valid reason to choose democracy over communism. One 
of the reasons why food did not make Koreans more amenable to democracy was that it was 
not effective in comparison with North Korea. The visual satires in newspapers had 
capitalized on an image in which the Americans and the Communists were wooing Koreans 
to choose one side over the other. The irony was set in as the Koreans did not see a difference 
between the Americans and the Russians, neither in their foods nor in their politics. However, 
when the Americans could take advantage of the humanitarian image, it provided the content 
with which the recipients could easily favor. The U.S. government hoped that this goodwill 
created by the universal appeal of humanitarianism would lead the Koreans to choosing 
democracy. 
The current chapter establishes the year 1955 as a turning point in which the U.S. put the 
voluntary agency programs in operation, as amended in Title III of Public Law 480. In 1955 
American foreign food relief policy went from military (postwar) command to civilian 
(longer-term) strategy. 1955, as will be shown, was also the year that U.S. foreign relief 
turned its direction in a major way from Europe to Asia. The U.S. Department of the Army 
gave the control to the International Cooperations Administration. One of the change was 
using voluntary agencies to distribute food to relief recipients in foreign nations.   
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Food assistance was personalized and humanized in South Korea as it was propagandized 
as given by individual American citizens. Decentralizing and multiplying the distributing 
agents was a strategy played by the officials in the U.S. Department of State who had learned 
through trial and error that giving food alone did not convince Koreans to turn to democracy. 
Receiving food was one thing, but voting politics was another. On the other hand, the concept 
of humanitarian food relief opened up new ways of promoting politics for the United States 
by building the bridge between food and politics. 
In fact, the process went a stage further, as we see from the quotation in the beginning of 
the chapter. Beyond the institutional representations of the agencies, foreign food aid in 
South Korea simulated the image of private citizens of the “Free World” making small 
contributions, say, five cents a day, to feed a child in Korea. The image delineated an 
imaginary people-to-people connection between American donors and Korean recipients. 
Thus, the image played its part in producing the difference by humanizing and personalizing 
American food aid. Thereby, the humanitarian assistance of the United States opened a means 
of promoting politics by penetrating everyday life.  
When the U.S. government adapted the Voluntary Agency Program (Title III) of PL 480, 
it had significant impacts on food relief organizations in Korea as U.S. organizations 
comprised the majority of foreign voluntary agencies operating. According to the registration 
record at the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social affairs in 1955, thirty-two agencies 
out of forth foreign voluntary agencies were from the United States. In 1965, U.S. voluntary 
agencies accounted for sixty-four agencies out of ninety-three foreign agencies agencies. The 
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rest of the agencies were based in West Germany, Italy, Britain, Australia, France, Swiss, 
Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan, and Norway. The national origin of three agencies 
were unaccounted.      4
However, before jumping into the Voluntary Agency Program (Title III) of PL 480, let us 
first investigate the relationship between the U.S. Department of State and a voluntary 
organization, called American Korean Foundation.  
AMERICAN KOREAN FOUNDATION AND HELP KOREA TRAIN  5
The American Korean Foundation (AKF) showed a deeper involvement of the 
Department of State in the business of foreign voluntary agencies, and the AKF can been 
seen as a precursor to the changing agenda of many voluntary agencies in the mid-1950s. The 
American Korean Foundation was established in New York in 1952 in order to raise money 
and materials to help rehabilitate the war-devastated Korea. Thus, the agency was late-born, 
compared to other major voluntary agencies like the Cooperative for American Remittances 
to Europe (CARE) and the NCWC (National Catholic World Council (NCWC) which were 
established during the Second World War. Although the AKF sent more surplus industrial 
items than surplus foods, the American Korean Foundation is relevant to our discussion 
because its relationship with the Department of State was gradually  followed by other 
 KAVA Directory of Foreign Voluntary Agencies in Korea (Seoul, 1955); Pogŏn Sahoebu,  Pogŏn Sahoe Paeksŏ 4
(Seoul, 1965); Foreign Voluntary Agencies in Korea, or KAVA, was the name that the non-governmental 
voluntary agencies had given to themselves.
 American Korean Foundation in Korean was Hanmi Chaedan. 5
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voluntary agencies, especially by CARE after 1955. Therefore, the story of the foundation 
shows the changing role assumed by voluntary agencies in the mid-1950s. 
From its inception, the American Korean Foundation was the product of the American 
Cold War. The Cold War machinery-quality of the foundation could be seen from the letter 
circulated to the USOMs (U.S. Operations Missions) by Henry C. Alexander, National 
Campaign Director of the American Korean Foundation. Alexander’s letter concerns the Help 
Korea Trains, which were AKF’s most ambitious program of raising 500 carloads of relief 
materials from the American public to help Koreans. However, the American effort was pre-
empted by the East Germans who sent sixty car-loads of relief train to North Korea before the 
Americans implemented the project. Alexander accuses the East Berliners of imitating the 
AKF project. In his letter reacting to the article in the Associated Press published on May 21, 
1954, he gives detailed comparison of the two rival projects.  In his emotionally charged 6
language, the National Campaign Director of the AKF advocates the superiority of the 
American trains to the Communist ones.  
Look at what the Communists are doing! 
       
 Apparently word got quickly to Moscow because there has now appeared in American      
newspapers the following dispatch from the Associated Press 
  [AP Article] Berlin-Korea Train Off: BERLIN, May 22, AP- A sixty car freight train left 
East Berlin last night for North Korea. “Tägliche Rundschau,” official newspaper organ of 
the Soviet military administration, reported today. The train, a present from the Communist 
East Zone government to the North Korean Reds, was loaded with tractors, furniture and 
textiles.” (End article) 
 Associated Press; The Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul had kept the letter, receive stamped on 6
June 30, 1954. C.2586; #16; 1276; RG 469
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But in this dispatch it is not a people making a free offering, as is being done by the 
American people, but the Communist Government of East Germany, acting officially and 
with all of its governmental powers. 
But, however the Communists may go about it, we must surpass them. The 60 cars 
spoken of in the dispatch are a mere bagatelle to what the American people are willing to 
give. 
Remember, the Communists are trying to keep their hold on the reluctant people of North 
Korea. Remember, we American people are trying to show our sympathy to the people of 
South Korea, who fought voluntarily at our side, who are as one with us in their opposition to 
Communism, and who deserve every ounce of help that we can give them for the 
reconstruction of their country. 
LOOK AT WHAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE DOING AND THEN SEE THAT WE DO 
MANY TIMES AS MUCH!  (capital letters in the original) 7
From what we can gather in the AP article and Alexander’s letter, the Americans and the 
Soviets were essentially doing the same thing, of sending relief materials to their respective 
friendly nations. However, Alexander argues that the two trains were vastly different in their 
intentions and methods. First of all, the American “people” were sending much more than the 
East Germans. More importantly, he argues that the American trains were made more 
meaningful because individual U.S. citizens spontaneously donated to help Koreans. In other 
words, Alexander is imposing an extra meaning to the sum of voluntary contributions as 
something better than a project carried out by a government. Thus, the East Berlin train was 
denigrated for having been sent, supposedly, by the state at the expense of its people. While 
Alexander does not explain why one is worthier than the other, the decision was obviously a 
value judgment driven to the point by the sheer power of repetition and propaganda. In his 
own propaganda, he made use of the dichotomy between “the American people” and “the 
Communist Government of East Germany.” 
 C.2586; #16; 1276; RG 4697
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The Help Korea Train, which Alexander discusses in the excerpt, was the American 
Korean Foundation’s most publicized program. With the campaign slogan, ““Help Koreans 
Help themselves,” the foundation introduced a freight called “The Freedom Express” to the 
public in New York on April, 20. This first Help Korea Train departed the city on the next day 
to cross the nation from the East Coast to the West Coast.  After a six week  journey, the train 8
arrived in San Francisco Bay Port, loaded with relief materials for Korea. The foundation had 
five such Help Korea Trains, and together, they had toured around seventy-five cities of the 
United States by early June.  The U.S. manufacturers and citizens donated a locomotive, used 9
buses, pencils, farm animals among many other material supplies. The Help Korea Train 
campaign put surpluses to use as an official at the Department of State commended, “During 
the Help Korea Train campaign, we found a reservoir of used capital goods on the surplus 
inventory lists of large corporations…”  The campaign was successful. The foundation had 10
initially called for raising five hundred carloads, but it outperformed the goal and ended up 
with six hundred carloads of donations instead. 
Another part of the Help Korea Train campaign was to raise $10 million in cash for 
Korean rehabilitation. The pamphlet exhorted Americans citizens that “50 cents will provide 
[a] child a full day’s care.”  Thus, the readers of the pamphlet in the United States received 11
the image that linked them directly to the nameless face of a child in Korea.   
 1192; #18; UD 422; RG 469 8
 1169; #18; UD 422; RG 4699
 1180; #18; UD 422; RG 46910
 1188, 1372; #18; UD 422; RG 46911
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Moreover, the process of personalization of the charity attains significance because it was 
seamlessly linked to politics. While giving the image of humanitarian assistance, the 
campaign at no point dropped its desired political effect. On the contrary, it clearly stated that 
voluntary donations were meant for far more than the physical sustenance of Koreans. The 
campaign transplanted the idea to potential donors in the United States that their donations 
fed Koreans so that they could gain strength “to foster democracy” in Korea by themselves. 
At the same time, it hinted that Communism and the Korean War had caused misery for 
Koreans. This causal relationship completed the circular argument in which politics was the 
fundamental way to be humanitarian, for example, by saving the unfortunate children. The 
pamphlet says that 50 cents from an American would in the end bring about the political 
change, which was revealing because of the assumption that went into establishing it. Food 
was put before politics because it was believed that the naturalization of humanitarian aid 
inspired Koreans to move to the naturalization of democracy. 
However, to put it clearly, the private donations of the campaign were designed and 
heavily promoted by the U.S. Department of State. The whole idea of the American Korean 
Foundation had been conceived by the Department of State. Moreover, the Department of 
State suggested the program to President Eisenhower, who was only happy to agree and gave 
his full support. However, Alexander all these politics out.  
The political engineering could also be seen in the timing of the Help Korea Train. The 
United States Information Agency “intentionally” timed the American Korean Foundation’s 
Help Korea Train campaign to peak right before the Korean Political Conference at the 
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International Conference on Far Eastern Problems in Geneva in 1954. On April 5 1954, 
Stassen at the U.S. Information Agency sent the message in the excerpt below, 
“Trains” project and Foundation’s campaign provide ample material for sustained major 
emphasis, particularly during opening Geneva Conference, in Korea and other countries 
where usefulness and receptivity permit, to dramatize sincere efforts American people, 
business and industry to aid in Korean reconstruction by supplementing U.S. Government 
grants with personal money and material gifts to “help Koreans help themselves,” and to 
demonstrate extensive response American people in aiding other freedom-loving peoples in 
time of need and recognition Korean sacrifices in cause of freedom. Media will provide 
stateside coverage.   12
At the end of the airgram, Stassen advised the officials not to “comment on [the] timing 
of [the] start of [the] fund drive with opening Geneva Conference.” Thus, the political 
intention was not to be spoken out in public. At the same time, the Train program in the 
United States was timed also to assure the Koreans that they had their strong allies in the 
United States at Geneva Conference. 
The active propaganda in the media also encouraged much of the private voluntary 
contributions. The “informational services” such as the national TV-broadcasting systems and 
movie theaters were mobilized. Stassen continued, 
This campaign will be promoted by informational programs using all information media. 
Expected for example that Walter Winchell will be master of ceremonies on 3-hour TV 
program covering all aspects of American-Korean relations.  13
The Walter Winchell program was played extensively on national TV networks. Not only 
that, but President Eisenhower himself made an appeal to some 80 million movie-goers in a 
film on Help Korea Train. With the sponsorship of the Council of Motion Picture 
 1151; #18; UD 422; RG 46912
 1153; #18; UD 422; RG 46913
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Organizations (COMPO), the promotion film was screened in movie houses throughout the 
United States on October 4, 1954.   14
The “private citizens” who led the American Korean Foundation came from unusually 
strong political backgrounds.  President Eisenhower made use of his political, media and 15
military contacts to recruit the leading names of the Foundation.  The National Campaign 16
Director, Henry Alexander, was President of J.P. Morgan and Company. Dr. Milton S. 
Eisenhower, President of Pennsylvania State University and brother of President Eisenhower, 
was the honorary chairman. Dr. Howard A. Rusk, Associate Editor of the New York Times 
and a specialist in the rehabilitation of veterans as well as of war-torn countries, was the 
President of the foundation. General James A. Van Fleet, the former Commander of the 
United Nations Forces in Korea, was the foundation’s Chairman. Other figures included Mrs. 
Wendell Wilkie to lead campaign for women and Howard Brooks.  
When President Eisenhower himself made a request for free transportation of 500 
carloads, 138 American railroad companies responded to the President’s call and over 600 
carloads of gifts were raised during the two months campaign. The freights were shipped to 
South Korea from the ports of San Francisco, Oakland, Stockton and other West Coast ports. 
The first ship, Mercy, carrying the Help Korea Train donations, was received with speeches, 
parties and much fanfare with it arrived in Pusan, Korea, in June, 1954. The short-term event 
 1399; #42; Headquarters of Fast Eastern Operations; RG 469 14
 All information on the American Korean Foundation is from ref. 1150-1152, 1169-1193; #18; UD 422; ref. 15
1371-1372, 1399; #42, Subject Files, Headquarters Office of Far Eastern Operations; C.2563-C.2587; #16; 
1267; RG 469
 1153 and other places 16
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of the “Help Korea Train” continued its shipments until January, 1955. 
Now, the U.S. Department of State was anticipated several advantages in channelling 
surplus food donations through foreign voluntary agencies, or what seemed to appear as a 
civilian agency like the American Korea Foundation. Firstly, the U.S. government could 
reduce its level of commitment to provide a set amount of surplus food regularly. This seems 
to be one of the reasons why when UNICEF discontinued the milk-feeding program in Korea 
in August 1957, the Office of Economic Coordinator did not consider taking over the 
program by itself. Instead, the Office looked for voluntary agencies that could take up the 
job.  
Secondly, as mentioned earlier, voluntary agencies could be used to propagate the concept 
of humanitarian relief food as the UNICEF milk-program did. By diverting attention to 
civilian parallels, both the U.S. and the South Korean states could avoid political baggages 
with American imperial motivations and the absence of South Korean autonomy respectively. 
Furthermore, civilian relief programs had impacts disproportionally large to the size of their 
programs as they fostered the powerful image of direct contacts between the Americans and 
the Koreans. Compared to the number of foreign personnel stationed in Korea, which did not 
go over a few dozens all together, the memory of receiving foods from foreign voluntary 
agencies stayed extremely strong in many oral and written accounts of ordinary Koreans 
experience of poverty and hardship in the 1950s.  
Thirdly, the voluntary agency programs (Title III) of PL 480 provided channels to bypass 
giving surplus food directly to the South Korean state. When the South Korean state 
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controlled the U.S. donated grains, it became the cause of much political corruption. In fact, 
in direct state-to-state supply (Title I), the U.S. did not have any control over surplus food 
over the Korean ports. By handing the foods over to the South Korean Office of Supply at the 
Korean ports, the U.S. officially gave the possession of foods to the ROK state. The South 
Korean MHSA also distributed foods within Korea. The South Korean government used it as 
a way of boasting its own competence in newspapers, while deemphasizing that the food was 
actually given by the U.S. Thus, given the visible roles played by the South Korean state, the 
U.S. was in an awkward position to complain when the South Korean state claimed credit for 
securing foods from the United States as the result of its own work. After providing foods for 
free and also delivering them across the ocean for free, it was not a satisfactory return for the 
United States. 
These advantages of opening up parallel civilian routes through voluntary agencies 
seemed to have been enough for the Office of Economic Coordinator in Seoul, Department of 
State, to tolerate the inconvenience of double paper work and indirect negotiations. When 
international organizations and voluntary agencies received powdered milk from the US 
Department of Agriculture and delivered it to the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs, they handled double the amount of administrative paper work. The agencies were 
required to draw a separate contract with the South Korean government, and again, a 
different one with the same content with the U.S. International Cooperation Agency. 
Moreover, the volume of surplus foods that went through international agencies and 
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voluntary agencies was about one tenth of the volume of grains that the U.S. government 
channeled through Title I of PL 480 and Section 402.  
In general, the U.S. government maintained loose supervision over the activities of 
foreign voluntary agencies in Korea. Upon approving the programs proposed by voluntary 
agencies, the government generally did not intervene, and helped where it could to provide 
funding and surplus foods. Thus, American voluntary agencies had quite a latitude to use the 
wealth of the U.S. government to further their religious and secular humanitarianism. While 
there seemed to have a level of convergence in the directions of these voluntary agencies and 
the U.S. government, which changed the dynamics of the Cold War politics since the 
mid-1950s, the activities of foreign voluntary agencies in Korea also helped produce an 
image of decentralized, democratic and humanitarian hegemony. (how do you explain the 
disgust on eating milk?) 
Moreover, U.S. food aid could benefit from the expertise and networks that foreign 
voluntary agencies had built in Korea since the Nineteenth Century, and appropriate the 
reputation that had been built by them. The most active agencies like the Maryknolls and the 
Methodist missions had religious foundation. The western missionaries in Korea also had a 
reputation as practitioners of modern medical care and education for women and children. 
When foreign voluntary agencies gave out U.S. government-donated surplus foods, the 
project was taken as an extension of their larger projects. 
As the story of the American Korea Foundation relates to the changes that other voluntary 
agencies had in 1955, CARE was one of the largest foreign voluntary agencies in Korea that 
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made active use of supports given by the government of the United States through the 
Voluntary Agency Program (Title III) of PL 480. CARE was not like the American Korea 
Foundation that was designed by the Department of State, and led by key politicians in 
Washington. Nevertheless, the organization, Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere 
(CARE, Inc.), shows a set of changes in 1955 that are significant.   17
CARE was incorporated in 1945 under the law of the District of Columbia with 
headquarters at 660 First Avenue, New York, NY. Twenty-five religious charity agencies had 
gathered to organize voluntary people-to-people contributions of Americans and Canadians. 
CARE had been known as a voluntary agency that specialized in sending relief packages to 
designated recipients anywhere in the world. In its first decade, CARE’s acronym stood for 
the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe, or alternatively, as the Cooperative for 
Assistance and Relief to Europe. Both expressed the agency’s initial focus on relief works in 
Europe. By 1950, CARE was sending person-to-person packages to twenty-eight countries in 
the world. Korea was one of them as CARE had operated person-to-person gift parcels 
program in Korea since the agency entered the country in 1949. 
However, Title III of PL 480 of 1954 brought the relationship between foreign voluntary 
agencies and the U.S. Department of State much closer CARE began forming a closer 
relationship with the USOMS in 1955. In fact, 1955 was not a mere return to the pre-Korean 
War order in which voluntary agencies had to go through the CRIK because of the emergency 
status and military monopoly of the sea and shipping. The cold war rivalry was intensifying 
 Until 1955, CARE stood for Cooperative of Assistance and Relief to Europe. C245117
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in the post-Postwar period of the mid-1950s in many places of the world. CARE, more than 
other American voluntary agencies abroad, embraced the newly inaugurated role of American 
relief works in the American cold war. The change corresponded with the addition of Title III 
to the Public Law 480 of 1956, which provided for free provisions of surplus agricultural 
commodities to U.S. voluntary agencies abroad. 
CARE’s major program in 1955 was “$1 Package Fall Food Crusades.” The program’s 
relationship with the ICA was reminiscent of the Help Korea Train Program of 1954 by the 
American Korean Foundation. The ICA authorized the minimum of $1 million for the 
program, and the Department of Agriculture had the foods ready. The program also had the 
support from the Advertising Council for the nation-wide promotion campaign in which 
CARE called upon the “American public” to contribute $1 for a surplus food package of 
approximately 20 pounds. Each dollar donated by a citizen was matched in dollar by the ICA. 
CARE prepared 1 to 1.5 million packages to be distributed in eight to ten economically needy 
countries, and the list of the countries was under discussion with ICA missions and local 
governments.  18
This change in CARE’s direction should be considered in conjunction with the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, a.k.a. Public Law 480, 
authorizing the U.S. government to use surplus agricultural commodities in its foreign 
policy.  Thus, Public Law 480 could be summed up as a surplus food program. PL 480 fund 19
 C2547-C2550; #16; 1276; RG 46918




could only be used on surplus agricultural commodities from the United States  Among the 20
three initial Titles of PL 480, Title III allowed the U.S. government to donate surplus foods to 
international organizations and U.S. voluntary agencies to distribute in their relief programs 
abroad. 
The Agricultural Trade Act of 1954, Title III of U.S. Public Law 480  
From 1955, U.S. Department of State donated free food to U.S. voluntary agencies in 
Korea according to Title III of Public Law 480. The program continued till the South Korean 
government integrated all voluntary agency programs to its national development program in 
1966. Thus, the U.S. government decided to enlist the voluntary agencies in its endeavor for 
foster the image of humanitarian relief. This chapter begins with 1955, when PL 480 Title III 
was put into effect and when the U.S. cold war rhetoric of American vs. Soviet dichotomy 
was established. The direct state-to-state transfer of surplus food continued as before in Title I 
of Public Law 480 while Title III was newly instituted in 1955. Each title had a parallel role 
to play. Title I, direct state-to-state supply continued to serve the Cold War military purpose, 
and this will be discussed in chapter 5. Although the surplus grain supply through voluntary 
agencies was only about 10 percent of the direct state-to-state supply in Title I, the enlistment 
of the voluntary agencies had significance beyond the number of tons of grains they 
transported. 
 1288; #29; UD 422; RG 46920
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PL 480 reflected an institutional reconfiguration in the United States from the Army to 
the Department of State with regards to foreign policy. From 1955, Koreans started receiving 
bags of aid goods, printed with the emblem of the U.S. International Cooperation Agency 
(ICA). The ICA was the agency that replaced the former Foreign Operations Administration 
(FOA) in the Department of State. Section 305 of Public Law 480 required the statement, 
“Furnished by the people of the United States of America,” to be written on the bag both in 
English and in Korean. Until the end of 1954, the U.S. War Department had been in charge of 
the civilian affairs in Korea, making it the source of administrative and military power for a 
decade after the end of the Pacific War (1930-1945). The military control continued for two 
years after the Armistice Agreement till 31 March 1955 with the new Korean Relief, 
Rehabilitation and Defense support Program, 1953-1955.  In November 1954, a year after 21
the armistice of the Korean War in 1953, U.S. civilian officials took over the control of 
civilian affairs in Korea from the War Department. In March 1955, the Department of Army 
cut funding for the non-military agencies in the process of hand-over, terminating CRIK’s 
SUN and SKO programs.  22
The Public Law 480 was the legislation for the International Cooperations Agency under 
the U.S. Department of State to continue the food relief programs that the U.S. military had 
carried out during the wartime emergency. While many of the major features of the 
legislation were continuations of the Army’s civilian relief programs in Korean, the most 
 1954; #12; 1276; RG 469. Also, see 1068; 4B; UD 422; RG 46921
 469 1276 A few exceptions may have been possible, but I could not find an example; The Department of the 22
Army was formed as one of the three military departments within the U.S. Department of Defense in 1947.
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noteworthy change was in expanding the role played by international organizations and U.S. 
voluntary agencies abroad, Title III of PL 480. Thus, by forming a close relationship with 
voluntary agencies, PL 480 provided the legal and administrative structure for humanitarian 
food relief programs. In order to make the transition from military to civilian control smooth,  
the Office of Economic Coordinator in Seoul had been established in 1953. The office was 
strengthened in 1955 with the responsibility over civilian relief programs. C. Tyler Woods, 
known as Ty Woods, was appointed as the Economic Coordinator in 1955. 
Most importantly, U.S. Public Law 480 was a surplus food program. That Public Law 480 
only pertained to U.S. surplus agricultural commodities was a change from the pre-1955 
relief program. Previously, foreign voluntary agencies and international organizations like the 
UNICEF distributed non-surplus food items, as well as surplus food, and non-surplus medical 
and educational materials, funded through private donations. However, Public Law 480 only 
pertained to U.S. agricultural surpluses, and it only donated surplus food and subsidized 
ocean freight costs only on transporting U.S. surplus food. 
However, voluntary agency program (Title III) was, in key aspects, a continuation of the 
prior system supervised the U.S. Army. Even before the inauguration of Title III of PL 480, 
U.S. voluntary agencies had already been donating significant amounts of surplus foods to 
Korea and other countries in the world. This surplus food had been donated by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. U.S. donated surplus food included dry skim milk, butter and 
cheese. From July 1953 to June 1954, twenty-seven U.S. voluntary agencies received surplus 
food from the Department of Agriculture to send to sixteen different nations worldwide. The 
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recipient-countries were Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Trieste, Yugoslavia, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Iran, Lebanon, India, Pakistan, Formosa (Taiwan), Hong Kong, and Korea. 
According to the reports submitted to the Foreign Operations Agency, together the voluntary 
agencies donated 145,395,132 pounds of surplus foods, and 76,087,673 pounds of the sum of 
non-surplus foods, clothing, medical and other supplies for the duration in the same period 
from July 1953 to June 1954. Thus, the U.S. Department of Agriculture-donated surplus 
foods comprised 65.6 percent of the total volume of voluntary agency donations. In dollar 
value, free donation of U.S. surplus took up 63 percent of the total. Thus, even before the 
inauguration of Title III of PK 480, U.S. Department of Agriculture donated surplus food was 
already a significant percentage, and channeling it was the major project of the voluntary 
agencies not only in Korea but in many other nations.   23
The U.S. Department of Agriculture had been authorized to donate surplus agricultural 
commodities to voluntary agencies under the Section 416b of the Agricultural Act of 1949.  24
The volume of foods that foreign voluntary agencies imported for the aid programs in Korea 
was only a fraction of what the government of the United States donated.  Powdered milk 25
was one of the food items that voluntary agencies shipped, but the volume was never very 
substantial. However, the legal structure for American voluntary agencies sending U.S. 
government-donated surplus foods abroad had been there since 1949, and the practice was 
 FOA documents. cc.2506- 2511; 1276; RG 46923
 81-439. 7 USC. 1431, enacted on October 31, 1949. ICA, “Voluntary Foreign Aid Division of the Office of 24
the Assistant Director for Refugees, Migration and Voluntary Assistance,”
 “Authorized Importation of Relief Supplies into Korea by Voluntary Agencies Under HQS. KCAC 25
Memorandum #2,” c.2530-2544; #16; 1276; RG 469 
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resumed in 1955, two years after the Armistice of the Korean War, but this time, the volume 
was ten folds of what it had been in pre-Korean War period. The Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, also known as Public Law 480, Section 302 was 
based on the Agricultural Act of 1949 with amendments.  26
In addition, CARE was one of the voluntary agencies that were eligible for subsidies on 
the costs of ocean freight. The U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Department of 
State subsidized the costs of ocean freight incurred by voluntary agencies since 1949. By 
signing the Voluntary Relief Agreement on May 5, 1949, the Republic of Korea was included 
in the list of the countries to which voluntary agencies could use the U.S. government 
subsidies on shipping costs.    27
The cost of ocean freight was prohibitively expensive. Thus, the subsidy played a crucial 
role in promoting American voluntary agencies to ship aid materials overseas. From the U.S. 
ports to Korean ports, the voyage took thirty to thirty four days across the Pacific Ocean. 
Ocean freight cost approximately one tenth of the dollar value of the materials in transit.  28
From August 1953 to June 1954, the U.S. Foreign Operations Agency disbursed $830,000 for 
the costs of ocean freight to sixteen nations when the total dollar value of aid materials were 
 Relief-Voluntary Ocean Freigh ; #16; 1276; RG 46926
 Essentially, the same agreement was made with Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Trieste, Yugoslavia, 27
Morocco, Tunisia, Iran, Lebanon, India, Pakistan, Formosa, Hong Kong, and Korea. ref. 1389; #42, Subject 
Files, 1950-1959; HQ; RG 469




$9 million.  In Korea, the subsidy was given on the condition that at least half of the tonnage 29
be carried on U.S. ships. While this subsidy applied to all aid materials, including clothing, 
medical supplies, and machineries, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistant Act of 
1954 (Public Law 480), and the Agricultural Act of 1956 (Public Law 540) only applied to 
surplus agricultural commodities.  The main amendment in the mid-1950s was that the 30
subsidy was drawn from the Mutual Security Fund, and no longer from the integrated Korean 
Program fund. The ROK government gave duty free entry of aid materials. It also agreed to 
pay the costs of inland transportation within Korea, but usually fund was defrayed from the 
Counterparts Fund.  
Thus, the novelty of Title III was not in the structure of cooperation between voluntary 
agencies and U.S. government, but on the increased quantity and intensity of their 
relationship. Foreign voluntary agencies began handling U.S. surplus foods, increased ten 
times when the U.S. Eighth Army dissolved the CRIK (Civilian Relief in Korea) in 1955.  31
In addition, although it was not specified, after Title III in 1955, the turn to Asia from 
Europe in U.S. foreign assistance policy became clear. This, in turn, influenced the activities 
of foreign voluntary agencies. In Financial Year, 1953-4, voluntary agencies had focused 
more on programs in Europe, Lebanon, and India than in East Asia. As we will see later, it 
began to change around 1955 and voluntary agencies turn their attention towards East Asia. 
 “from August 11, 1953 through the balance of the fiscal year, ... valued at $9 million with amount reimbursed 29
for ocean freight totaling $830,000.” ref. 1389; #42; HQ; RG 469
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In 1955, CARE decided to discontinue several programs in Europe and Latin America, 
and to strengthen its Asian and Middle Eastern programs. William McCahon of the ICA 
attributed the new veering to CARE’s new leadership. Richard W. Reuter had succeeded Paul 
Comly French as Executive Director on July 14, 1955.  In the report, McCahon noted 32
Reuter’s plan “to encourage the closest possible liaison and cooperation between the CARE 
Mission Chiefs and the embassies and USOMs.”  
Reuter was not merely paying a lip service. The changes CARE made converged closely 
with the view of the U.S. Department of State which considered the post-Postwar 
reconstruction winding down in Europe and in Japan, and a new cold war structure 
consolidating in Asia. In an unofficial memorandum on August 15, 1955, he informed the 
USOMs that CARE was closing offices in Japan, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, and Costa Rica. In addition, CARE was also closing down “Sales offices” in 
Benelux, England, France, Austria and Australia, and the post of regional director was 
abolished. Further, regional offices in Singapore, the Island of Cyprus, Bonn, Panama and 
Peru were being closed. On the other hand, CARE maintained full-scale package and self-
help programs in Finland, Berlin, West Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Israel, Korea, 
Vietnam, Laos, India, Haiti, Panama, and Bolivia. The programs in Columbia, Honduras, 
Egypt, Philippines, and Mexico were downsized. Reuter announced that in 1955, the 
emphasis would be on programs in Korea, Vietnam and Laos. 
 cc.2547-2550; #16; 1276; RG 46932
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Before the 1955 amendment of Title III, free dispersal of surplus agricultural products to 
voluntary agencies had been limited to short-term emergency programs under the provision 
of Title II of the same law promulgated in 1954. CARE found Title III amendment directly 
relevant to its surplus agricultural commodities programs. CARE already sponsored bulk 
surplus agricultural products programs in Finland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Panama, Bolivia, 
Columbia, Honduras, and Egypt in 1955. In addition, the agency was looking to expand the 
program by negotiating with El Salvador, Libya, Malta, Indonesia and Peru (1956).  33
Interestingly, just as Title III gave American voluntary agencies the access to the 
Department of Agriculture’s warehouse of surpluses stocks, CARE introduced a 35 percent 
cut in its annual funding for 1955. At the same time, Reuter announced that CARE planned to 
maintain, or exceed the previous year’s performance, that was, despite the reduction of 
$1,035,000 in its funding.  In the previous year, 1954, CARE had moved $43 million worth 34
of commodities overseas. CARE, with Reuter as new Director, terminated a number of 
projects in several regions in order to cut operational expenses. Instead, its new strategy was 
to concentrate on fewer number of countries where CARE could make noticeable differences. 
Although Reuter did not cite Title III of Public Law 480 as the agency’s new sponsor, Title 
III funding was a reliable and substantial resource for its overseas programs.  
 Unofficial memorandum by Richard W. Reuter, CARE, to William McCahon, ICA. cc.2547-2550; #16; 1276; 33
RG 469 
 CARE’s 55-56 budget was 1,945,000 dollars was reduced by thirty five percent from its 54-55 budget. 34




In 1955, foreign voluntary agency had to register with the U.S. International 
Cooperations Agency and the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in order to 
receive material and administrative support from the U.S. government. Sixteen foreign 
voluntary agencies registered with the governments by August 1955. They were American 
Friends Service Committee, American Korean Foundation, Assemblies of God-Foreign 
Service Committee, Church World Service, Inc., CARE, Inc., Foster Parents’ Plan for War 
Children, Lutheran World Relief, Mennonite Central Committee, Pestalozzi Foundation of 
America, Ind., Salvation Army, National Headquarters, Save the Children Federation, 
Unitarian Service Committee, War Relief Services- NCWC (National Catholic Welfare 
Council), World University Services, YWCA World Emergency Fund. In December 1955, 
fifty four percent of the total that sixty-one foreign voluntary agencies processed in dollar 
value was food. By May 1957, the number of registered foreign voluntary agencies increased 
to sixty seven.   35
The International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and the South Korean state defined 
“foreign voluntary agencies” as organizations that were registered with the South Korean 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and the International Cooperation Administration, 
Washington, D.C.  The term, foreign voluntary agencies, was also used to call the members 36
 1535; #86; HQ; RG 46935
 List of Voluntary Agencies approved by ROK MHS and the ICA Aug 23 1955 were American Friends Service 36
Committee, American Korean Foundation, Assemblies of God-Foreign Service Committee, Church World 
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Committee, Pestalozzi Foundation of America, Ind., Salvation Army, National Headquarters, Save the Children 
Federation, Unitarian Service Committee, War Relief Services - NCWC (National Catholic Welfare Council), 
World University Services, YWCA World Emergency Fund. In total, there were fifteen agencies. By May 1957, 




of the Korean Association of Voluntary Agencies, which was non-governmental foreign 
charity organizations.  The voluntary agencies and the ICA-MHSA formed and maintained 37
close relationships. In turn, the voluntary agencies were required to submit regular reports of 
their activities every six months. Sixty-one voluntary agencies were registered in 1955, and 
the number increased to sixty-seven in 1957.  38
Especially, CARE’s taking up the milk-feeding program in 1957 could not be fully 
explained as a continuation of the prior division of labor between voluntary agencies and the 
U.S. government. First of all, the milk-feeding program differed from CARE’s more typical 
overseas programs in crucial aspects. The milk program, inherited by UNICEF, was an 
annual contract with the South Korean government on the national scale. A contract for 40 
million pounds of surplus milk per annum was different from donating whatever was 
available at hand, which in any case was hardly ever over a couple of million pounds of foods 
a year. While CARE milk program served 1.2-1.5 million people, the total sum of people that 
all other foreign voluntary agencies in Title III programs were 400,000. An ICA report 
showed that for 1960, Title III were given to seven agencies- National Catholic Welfare 
Council (NCWC), Church World Services (CWS), Lutheran World Relief (LWR), 
Cooperative for American Remittances Everywhere (CARE), World Relief Commission 
(WRC), ACC and Mennonite Central Committee (MCC). The report also noted that these 
seven agencies served the total of 400,000 recipients in the family category for 1960. In 
1960, the monthly ration of wheat-flour was reduced from 4 pounds to 3 pounds. The 
 KAVA 1952-199537
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cornmeal ration was reduced from 6 pounds to 3 pounds per month.  Family projects were 39
one of many projects that the voluntary agencies carried out.  
In a way, by taking up this milk program, CARE was giving up an important right for a 
voluntary agency, which was choosing the relief recipients. For the milk program, the South 
Korean Ministry of Education did the supply. Moreover, the program particularly excluded 
the aspect of direct personal connection between donors and recipients that CARE had been 
emphasizing. The milk was single-handedly funded by the ICA under the provisions of Title 
III of Public Law 480. In addition, the ROK Ministry of Education of South Korea was in 
charge of distributing the milk to schools in Korea. Overall, CARE’s presence in the program 
did not go much beyond rending its name, “CARE milk”, and the agency had a very limited 
chance of establishing contacts with the end-users, the children. Yet, CARE decided that 
someone should take on the responsibility, and the organization volunteered for the milk 
program.  
CARE’s Milk-Feeding and School-Lunch Programs 
When UNICEF terminated its milk-feeding program in August 1957, the Office of the 
Economic Coordinator in Seoul did not take over from UNICEF directly, but searched for 
candidates among voluntary agencies to take over the program. Thus, USG was able to 
maintain the civilian humanitarian assistance. 
 Exact figures for each voluntary agency for milk, cheese, flour, rice, cornmeal, see 1590-1591. 1585-158939
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Given the benefits of milk-feeding programs mentioned in chapter 3, the ICA mission to 
Korea recommended the Office of Economic Coordinator in Seoul to continue funding the 
milk feeding program in Korea. The minimum requirement of powdered milk in Korea was 
estimated at 18,000 metric tons annually, thus maintaining the amount UNICEF had been 
supplying.  When ICA was searching for candidates to take on this large-scale program, Paul 40
Gordon, CARE Headquarters Representative in Asia, expressed his interests in the program. 
On April 5, 1957, Gordon cabled his agency, CARE, recommending it to assume the 
responsibility, now currently managed by UNICEF.   41
CARE was in a good position to take over the milk-feeding program. The agency already 
had the standard country relief supply agreement with the Republic of Korea. Thus, Gordon 
argued that his agency could use the existing distribution channels to get the milk quickly en 
route. As far as the ICA was concerned, CARE had sufficiently proven competency in similar 
programs in other places in the world, and in FOA’s Christmas Holiday Food Program in 
Korea in the winter of 1954-1955.  Lastly, the remaining partner in the three institutions’ 42
joint program, the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, concurred and 
requested CARE to take over the program from UNICEF.  43
 18,000 tons= 40 million pounds. 1340; #50; UD 422; RG 46940
 1430; #67; Headquarters of Far Eastern Operations; RG 46941
 The Christmas parcel operation of 1954 was delayed because of transportation difficulties, and parcels were 42
distributed around the Chinese New Year in January, 1955. 1373; #42; HQ OFF FE OPNS; RG 469
 The Office of Economic Coordinator (1953-) was firsts headed by Edward Ty Wood and then by Warne since 43
1955. Despite the UNC in the title in, the OEC belonged to ICA, which in turn belonged to the Department of 
State. 1430; #67; HQ; RG 469
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Thus, CARE’s taking up the milk-feeding program in 1957 should be understood as a 
cooperative contribution by the agency as the CARE and the ICA converged on their 
understanding of the world situation in the mid-1950s. On June 1, 1957, CARE signed a two-
year contract with the ROK Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to distribute 80 million 
pounds of U.S. surplus powdered milk to one and half million recipients through primary 
schools, hospitals, feeding stations and welfare institutions. The annual requirement was 
divided at 40 million pounds each. CARE’s national milk-feeding program was contracted to 
provide a glass of milk per day per child, giving daily “40 grammes of the commodity as 
reconstituted liquid skim milk or in its powdered form.”  In addition, CARE offered to 44
provide cooking equipments such as stoves and pots when they were not available in primary 
schools. CARE planned to distribute milk to 4,273 primary schools in the country, but only 
few had cooking facilities. As pointed out during the UNICEF program, children’s eating raw 
powder posed several hygienic problems.  The ROK Ministry of Education also made a 45
gesture to put efforts in obtaining cooking facilities and fuel so that teachers could boil and 
give milk to children in schools.  46
The only major difference from the UNICEF program was that the ICA, through the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture and Department of State, provided the costs of ocean freight for 
the CARE program. UNICEF had paid for its own ocean freights. The cost of ocean freight 
 Unit converted to 22,679.6 metric ton of milk and 13,607.8 metric ton of cornmeal. 1883; #169; UD422; RG 44
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 Tong’a. June 17, 196446
!171
Chapter 4. C.A.R.E.
from the United States to Korea was prohibitively expensive, taking up one tenth of the total 
dollar value of the shipments, including the commodity. UNICEF disbursed approximately 
$800,000 a year on ocean freights to Korea. The willingness by the ICA to step in and cover 
the costs of ocean freight indicated the considerable change in thinking on the side of the 
U.S. Department of State regarding the milk distribution in Korea. When searching for an 
appropriate agency to take over the UNICEF program, the Office of Economic Coordinator, 
Seoul, recognized that no foreign voluntary agency in Korea was capable of running the 
program of this size without financial assistance. The Combined Economic Board of the 
Americans and Koreans authorized the ICA to expend $200,000 from U.S. funding and 
$101,000 from Counterparts fund to provide ocean freight charges for the first three months 
of 1958 in order for the milk distribution to continue without interruption.  In addition, 47
Warne, who was the Economic Coordinator in Seoul, requested separate $111,000 for CARE 
to hire three US staff to supervise the program in Korea and to purchase office equipment, 
and $84,000 in counterpart funds to hire Korean staff for 1958.  Below excerpt is from 48
Warne’s cablegram to the ICA/W on April 5, 1957. 
[The ICA] Mission cannot overemphasize the importance of this program from a total 
health, welfare and economic stand point, and believes its abandonment at this time would 
greatly aggravate an already serious nutrition situation.  
Mission can suggest no feasible alternative to proposed CARE operation and believes 
situation justified an exception to ICA/W normal policy in respect to voluntary agency 
participation.  49
 1431; #67; HQ; RG 46947
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However, despite promising preparatory work, the program immediately fell behind the 
schedule. When CARE took over the program from UNICEF in September, 1957, it was 
expected to continue the program without interruption after UNICEF’s withdrawal. However, 
CARE was not able to deliver powdered milk to Korea until July, 1958. The milk feeding 
program was thus re-introduced only in July, 1958 after a hold of ten months. Through the 
end of the year, CARE delivered 9 million pounds of powdered milk, which was less than a 
quarter of annual 40 million pounds under contract.  Milk was delayed again in 1959 until 50
May of that year. Supply improved in the next months, but CARE could only procure 20 
million pounds of powdered milk for Korea in 1959, which was a half of what had been 
agreed in 1957.   51
When Sohn, ROK Minister of Health and Social Affairs, enquired about the prolonged 
and repeated delay in the delivery of powdered milk since 1958, the answer came from 
CARE Headquarters in New York that the U.S. Department of Agriculture was not releasing 
surplus powdered milk to CARE. George D. Taylor, CARE Representative in Korea, relayed 
the message that the shortage of surplus powdered milk in the United States made it difficult 
for the Department of Agriculture to obtain the large amount of powdered milk at one place. 
The Department had to assemble available surplus powdered milk from multiple places 
scattered in the United States. Thus, powdered milk had to be shipped from multiple ports, 
which made it necessary to “make shipments in a manner which will provide for six 
 Pogŏn Sahoe T’onggye Yŏnbo, 1958, P. 212 50
 1574; #130; HQ; RG 469; Also see Pogŏn Sahoe T’onggye Yŏnbo, 1959. P. 27851
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unloadings at Korean Ports.”  For reasons unspecified, the Department of Agriculture 52
refused to perform the feat. Nevertheless, Taylor maintained an optimistic view by 
commenting,  
In short, the Milk Powder was not available... The delay might not be as harmful as 
envisioned. Due to the closing of schools during January and February the Milk allocated for 
this period should be sufficient enough to carry over until early May. The majority of our 
Institutional distributions are also supplied by C.W.S. (Christian World Services) and 
N.C.W.C. (National Catholic World Council) so there shouldn’t be any drastic shortages.  53
In order to continue the school-feeding program in Korea, CARE and the ICA agreed to 
amend the original contract of 1957 on December 11, 1959, with the expiration of the 
contract at the end of the month. They replaced 30 million pounds of surplus milk that was 
now unavailable with 30 million pounds of surplus cornmeal.  For two years, CARE had 54
been able to supply only 30 million pounds of surplus powdered milk instead of the planned 
80 million pounds. The amended contract replaced 30 million pounds of surplus milk that 
was now unavailable with 30 million pounds of surplus cornmeal, and it was given ext ran 
six months to fulfill the obligation.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture was inclined to 55
cancel the remaining commitment of 20 million pounds of powdered milk or cornmeal. 
However, the ICA and CARE persuaded the Department to carry the 20 million pounds to 
1960, further extending the contract to December 1960. The ICA reported that the remaining 
 March 19, 1959. 1573; #130; HQ; RG 469. 52
 March 19, 1959, 1573; #130; HQ; RG 469; The statistics collected by the South Korean Ministry of Health 53
and Social Affairs only show data on UNICEF and CARE. I could not find out how much CWS and NCWC 
imported each year.  
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delivery of 20 million pounds of powdered milk had been fulfilled by early 1961. However, 
the ROK Ministry of Health and Social Affairs published receiving less than 1 million 
pounds of powdered milk for relief use for two years of 1960 and 1961.  56
Another ICA record showed authorizing the delivery of 9 million pounds of powdered 
milk for CARE’s “school-lunch” program for twelve months’ supply in July 1960, but the 
allocation was canceled in toto later that year. Already, the program was called the “school-
lunch” program, and no longer the milk-feeding program. Instead of powdered milk, the 
supply of surplus cornmeal increased from the original 15 million pounds to 21 million 
pounds. Thus, 1.2 million children in primary schools, which was one third of approximately 
3.5 million students enrolled in primary schools each year, received cornmeal lunches twice a 
week for the ten months of school year. CARE’s other program for 90,000 refugees did not 
receive any milk since the ICA prioritized children in milk distribution.  Despite the effort, 57
the delivery to primary schools was also highly irregular. Sometimes, three or four months 
went by without any distribution of milk to students. In 1960, all aid milk supply, which was 
mere 67,800 pounds, went to feed students in primary schools in Chŏlla pukto. As if taking 
turns, in 1961, all of 1.4 million pounds of powdered milk went to primary school students in 
Chŏlla namdo.  The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs records that for the two years, 58
Seoul and the other 9 provinces did not receive any relief milk. 
 In 1960= 67,800 pounds of powdered milk, In 1961= 1,420,600 pounds of powdered milk56
 Another contract with the MHSA, 5 million pounds of milk and 14,846,000 pounds of cornmeal for the 57
school lunch program. milk receipt not confirmed on October 29, 1960, ref. 1899-1902; #169-170; HQ; RG 469; 
2257; #1; P319; RG 469.
 Pogŏn Sahoe T’onggye Yŏnbo, 1960; 1961.58
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In order to continue the school-feeding program without powdered milk, CARE 
experimented with cornmeal and set up a pilot project in Taegu in 1959 and in 1960. It was a 
hot lunch program for 18,505 students in 43 primary schools in Taegu. Children-without-
meals each received two caps of cornmeal twice a week.  There were some concerns about 59
the replacement since the milk-feeding program had promoted the nutritional value of milk 
for child’s health. In comparison, cornmeal could not be praised on the same scientific terms. 
However, despite the worries, Korean educators showed more enthusiasm for cornmeal than 
for powdered milk, thinking cornmeal was more suitable for feeding children in Korea. 
Heartened by the success of the pilot program in Taegu, the ROK Ministry of Education 
and Ministry of Health and Social Affairs requested CARE to continue and expand the 
cornmeal lunch program to 4,200 primary schools in Korea. The contract between MHSA-
CARE was signed on 13 March, 1961 and stayed in effect through 1961.  Based on the 60
MHSA-CARE contract, ICA allocated CARE 38,323,000 pounds, mostly, of cornmeal on 
July 11, 1961. CARE’s new feeding program provided for 1.2 million primary school 
children for school lunch three times a week and 80,000 individuals in assimilation and 
refugee projects.   61
In the meantime, the milk feeding program was de-facto dropped, quite unnoticeably in 
the Korean press. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs recorded receiving 1.4 million 
 ref. 1564; #130; HQ; RG 469. 59
 ref. 1883; #169; HQ; RG 469.60
 In 1961, the US Department of Agriculture donated 560,000,000 pounds (254,012 metric ton) of non fat dried 61
milk to the world, an increase of 110,000.000 (49,895 metric tons) from last year. New York Times, April 21, 
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pounds of relief powdered milk in 1961, 284,840 pounds in 1962, and 4.5 million pounds in 
1963. The supply of relief milk was better in 1964 at 30 million pounds.  For 1965, CARE-62
MHSA contract agreed on 24 pounds of cornmeal, 5 million pounds of powdered milk 
through PL 480, and 7.75 million pounds of other foods.  However, the MHSA dropped the 63
relief milk section in the Yearbook from 1955, and I could not confirm the receipt elsewhere. 
When the U.S. Department of Agriculture did not hand out surplus powdered milk, the 
scope of action for CARE was slim. CARE administratively had a limited role. After making 
a formal request to the Department of Agriculture for the commodity, the agency could only 
begin work when the department released the milk. It “handled” surplus milk only to the 
extent of arranging the ocean freights to the ports of discharge in Korea. The milk was 
handed over to the ROK Office of Supply (Chodal Ch’ŏng) at the ports, from which points, 
the milk was officially the possession of the South Korean government.   64
On the other hand, CARE had the capacity to provide technical advice and assistance to 
the program, and its field team made inspections of port and railroad warehouses.  When 65
milk was not available for the school-feeding program in 1959, CARE sent around 
 See table 1. and figures from Pogŏn Sahoe T’onggye Yŏnbo, 1957-1962. in 1958=45,369d/m (x 200 lbs)= 62
9,073,800 lbs= 4,050 tons; in 1959= 104,549d/m (x 200 lbs)= 20,909,800 pounds=9,334.7 tons; in 1960=In 
1960, 339dm x200=67,800 lb. In 1961, 7,103X200= 1,420,600 lb. In 1962, 14,242 dm (284,840 pounds). In 
1963, 22,449dm (=4,489,800 pounds), in 1964, 155,100X 200= 31,020,000 pounds.   Much discrepancy with 
ICA record. which was in 1960, 5 million pounds of milk and 1962= 9 million pounds of milk powder. MHSA 
shows that most of it were not delivered. 
 Twenty-four million pounds (10,886 metric tons) of cornmeal, five million pounds (2,268 metric tons) of 63
powdered milk through PL 480. In total of corn, milk and other foods, 30,000,000– 36,750,000 pounds of foods, 
corn + milk), Tonga, June 17, 1964; March 17, 1965. 
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educational officers to visit primary schools and distribution centers to provide education on 
the need to continue the feeding program with cornmeal.  Yet, it is questionable if CARE’s 66
presence had much impact with the three American employees and a dozen of Korean 
employees it had to supervise the nations-scale feeding program. Nevertheless, CARE was 
able to continue the school-feeding program by replacing milk with cornmeal, and it 
remained the largest school-feeding program in Korea until 1966. By July 1, 1966, foreign 
voluntary agencies in Korea terminated their school-feeding programs as the ROK 
government took over the responsibility.  67
The milk-feeding programs with UNICEF and CARE were as much an ICA program as 
any other civilian relief programs in Korea. Congress of the United States financed the 
programs throughout the 1953-1966 period. The ICA gave even more support for the CARE 
program than for the UNICEF program. The Office of Economic Coordinator in Seoul was 
the official sponsor of the CARE program and it brought the funding under the provisions of 
Title III, Public Law 480.  
Congress of the United States again stepped in when the South Korean state failed to 
provide the resources for school lunch program after taking it over from foreign voluntary 
agencies in 1966. In the end, the U.S. Congress ended up funding the South Korean state to 
continue the children-feeding program in 1957. Except this time, the funding was given 
under Title II, which was the emergency relief program, of the Public Law 480, and not under 
Title III as voluntary agencies had been eligible for. The South Korean government was able 
 1436; #67; HQ; RG 469. 66
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to feed 2.8 million primary school students and 53,000 recipients under maternal and Child 
health program with the Title II funding.  Or, rather, the US Congress/ICA fed these 68
children. 
Regardless, the transition of the program from foreign voluntary agencies like CARE to 
the South Korean state was significant in the process of constructing the story of national 
development via children and their education. For example, a short story by Ha Kŭnch’an, 
“Warm-Blooded,” published in Segye (the World) in April, 1960, explores a possible venue to 
move powdered milk from foreign donations to national development. In other words, Ha’s 
story gives a glimpse of appropriation. The child in the story enjoys the taste of powdered 
milk, but it is still the last resort for survival before turning to eating “grasshopper-gruel 
(mettugi chuk).” With the tendency towards nationalization, in order to appropriate surplus 
powdered milk from the United States as a wholly Korean experience, Ha omits the origin of 
powdered milk. Powdered milk is still an artificial insertion from outside coming into school. 
However, this milk has now been nationalized at a school in the remote rural area of Korea.  69
 USOM/Korea April 1967 Status Reports: Food for Peace PL 480. c.6 RG 59/89. 68
 Ha’s narrator, Hŏ Sŭng, is a newly appointed teacher in primary school in remote countryside. Hŏ follows the 69
days of a meal-skipping child, Sŏ Kisu, with compassionate eyes, and in the end, he decides to take care of the 
child with his meager teacher’s salary. While the story has a simplistic and didactic plot, it manages to avoid 
objectifying the meal-skipping child. The boy’s status as a recipient of milk aid does not define who the boy is 
nor his depravity degrade him. Instead, powdered milk is used as a tool to open up the “humane” side of the boy 
and the teacher. Although powdered milk is meant to relieve the boy from hunger, it keeps slipping out of his 
possession until a new bundle is given to him only to repeat the process again. It causes more trouble for the boy 
than helping him. Ha Kŭnch’an, “Onhyŏl chŏk,” Segye, April 1960, pp.347-355, 245. A contemporary literary 
critic, Paek Ch’ŏl, appreciated Ha’s story for magnifying the “everydayness (ilsangsŏng)” and for directly 




Thus, “hyumaeniti” is attained not by the state nor by the science of producing and 
transporting surplus powdered milk across the world. Without mentioning foreign voluntary 
agencies in Korea or the U.S. government, powdered milk is only traced back to the teacher 
who has access to powdered milk, and his unreliable employer, the ROK Ministry of Culture 
and Education.  
Ha’s omission of the place of milk’s origin were initially made possible because the 
identity of the original donor of milk stayed behind the scenes. When the Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare distributed surplus powdered milk 
to children, milk was already sufficiently nationalized.  Thus, Ha’s story on powdered milk 70
and the boy moves the issue to the question of national development. 
The transition to national development was possible because milk had the potential to 
represent something beyond humanitarian aid and physical survival. It retained the reference 
to health and development. Although powdered milk was eaten the same way grains were 
eaten to fill empty stomachs, milk still retained more meaning from feeding that grains could 
not have, and this retained meaning had been fostered by UNICEF and CARE, which 
prioritized children by allocating over three quarters of their donated milk to them. As a 
supplementary food, milk feeding was meant to bolster the health of the vulnerable sectors 
such as children and breast feeding mothers, which did not directly translate to military 
 Perhaps when Koreans already recognized milk as foreign aid, there may have been little reason to identify 70
donors in the texts. Contemporary readers of Son and Ha likely knew powdered milk as “aid milk (wŏnjo uyu).” 
The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs published its Annual National Statistical Book from 1955. From 1955 
to 1965, the book had an entry, titled “Aid Milk.” It seems that domestic production of milk was too 
insignificant to deserve mentioning. There was no other section for milk than “aid milk.” The aid milk section 
was deleted from the statistical book from 1965.
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capacity nor to social unrest. “A glass of milk per day per child” captured the organic 
“growth” metaphor of developmentalism. Feeding children milk was to contribute to raising 
healthy national bodies for the development in the Third World.
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CHAPTER 5.  
FEEDING CORRUPTION: 
Failed naturalization of wheat flour and the April Revolution of 1960 
Earlier in chapter 1 and chapter 2, wheat flour was associated with the situation of post 
poverty and U.S. military occupation as recipients received wheat flour as relief rations and 
as wheat flour was most entirely donated by the US government. If you could afford rice, you 
ate rice, and turning to wheat flour given as relief ration was the last resort. However, in the 
late 1950s, the South Korean state made an attempt to remove this stigma against wheat flour 
and to substitute rice with wheat flour by coopting nutritional scientists. Through the use of 
scientific language, nutritional scientists re-established wheat flour as a rational and healthy 
practice. In other words, the state tried to naturalize the consumption of wheat flour by 
making it politically neutral, but a scientifically proven source of nutrition. If successful, 
wheat flour would no longer carry the connotation of postwar poverty and the dependency on 
foreign charities. However, the joint effort by the state and the nutritional scientists did not 
succeed. Not only did it fail to erase the memory of receiving wheat flour from the United 
States as relief donations, the state-sponsored effort to neutralize its consumption backfired 
by gleaning yet another unceremonious association. Given the large scale availability of 
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That is to say that there may be a “knowledge” of the body which is not 
exactly the science of its functioning. […] This knowledge and this mastery 
constitute what one may call the political technology of the body” 
Foucault, Introduction to Discipline and Punishment, p. 31 
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wheat flour to the government, wheat flour was regularly used in electoral bribery. Various 
forms of electoral and political corruption tainted the experience of democracy and the 
general franchise, and shaped the meaning of democracy as was experienced by the people 
on the ground in Korea. In this, wheat flour was associated with political and business 
corruption. Further, the United States which was widely known as the supplier of wheat flour  
to the corrupt South Korean state was not free from the new association that wheat flour had 
obtained. 
The state-sponsored campaign to make the consumption of wheat flour more desirable 
was a political indoctrination. The campaign was further a form of corruption since the South 
Korean state was strongly motivated to import more wheat and wheat flour from the United 
States because their sales incurred huge profits according to the structure of Title I of US 
Public Law 480 (PL 480). PL 480 was important because the United States was practically 
the sole supplier of wheat and wheat flour that was commercially used in South Korea during 
the 1950s and 1960s, and all the wheat imports were initiated under PL 480 and also the 
Mutual Security Act.   1
Teaching Nutritional Wheat in the New South Korean State, 1955-1962 
South Korean state established and funded research institutions as a way of coopting 
 Industrial and commercial wheat was 95% to 99% U.S. imported until the early 1970s. “Uri nara cheppang 1
kongŏp e taehan hyŏnhwang: kŭ munchejŏm, chwadam hoe, 1974  (Newspaper); In Soo Ryu and Nam Whan 
Oh, “Bread Baking Characteristics of Korean Wheat Varieties seen from their Amino Acid Composition.” 
Korean Journal of Food Science and Technology. Vol 12, No. 3, 1980  
ICA calculated domestic production of wheat in Korea at 172,000 tons, and that all of it was consumed by the 
cultivators, February 1956; i.n.1261; RG 
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nutritional scientists. The nutritional scientists made efforts to establish eating consumption 
into science in order to sanitized wheat of politics. If they made wheat as a superior source of 
nutrition, and part of rational way of life, people could put aside their cultural objection to 
wheat.  
In looking ahead in time and asking whether the naturalization of wheat was successful, it 
gives varied answers. After five years, assessing wheat imports to Korea, Mr. Green, acting 
U.S. Economic Coordinator in Seoul, supports ROK request to increase under wheat import 
under Public Law 480, which we will examine later in the chapter, from $17 million to $22 
million for the 1961 program. Green reports to the U.S. Secretary of State that by 1960, 
wheat had “strong market for flour, reflecting relatively high rice prices and to some extent 
growing acceptability by low-income groups.”  Green does not go into detail explaining 2
where he based his observation, but any way had a sanguine outlook on the prospect of wheat 
in Korea. Maybe we could assume that the food propaganda was successful, but let’s see. In 
any case, the South Korean state policy was not just the lower income groups, but everyone 
above that would consider wheat as a superior food source, that people with income would 
make a choice to buy wheat-flour in the market. In making such endeavors towards science, 
the knowledge from the United States was essential as we will see.  
It would not be possible to account for the ascendancy of wheat flour as the substitute for 
rice in post-1948 South Korean state vision without referring to the political and economic 
benefits that the state garnered by importing massive amounts of PL 480 wheat. Among 
 Mr. Green, Seoul, to the Secretary of State, Washington, No. 406, September 30, 1960; 1692, Agricultural 2
Surplus; #139; HQ, Subject Files, 1950-1959; RG 469
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starch food, Koreans were culturally more familiar with potatoes, barley, buckwheat, and 
millet than they were with wheat flour. They could steam potatoes and barley like they did 
with rice. In fact, immediately after the Liberation, potato seemed to a promising solution 
against the shortage of grain. In 1946, USAMGIK in fact imported potato seeds from 
Fukuoka, Japan, and Ireland specifically to substitute potato for rice.  
However, state-sponsored nutritional scientists interrupted to keep potato as the priority 
substitute for rice by laboring to turn wheat flour into a healthful food. The U.S. government 
also assisted in the nutritional scientists endeavor to make wheat flour into a popular food.  
Under the pretext of the scientific management of militaries, the U.S. Department of 
Defense sent a team of nutritional specialists to its allied nations, including Iran, Turkey, the 
Philippines, Libya, Pakistan, Spain and South Korea. Although this committee, which 
assessed the health of their national militaries was funded by the U.S. Department of 
Defense, the committee was, in fact, an interdepartmental committee which had its 
Secretariat in the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH). The U.S. Department of State 
participated in it together with the Department of Agriculture, HEW, AID and AEC.  Of 3
course, the U.S. could only pull off such a feat around the globe only when it had a solution 
to solve the problems they found in the health tests. From 1956 to 1958, the U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of Defense in Washington sent around a Committee on Nutrition for National 
Defense to Iran, Turkey, the Philippines, Libya, Pakistan, Spain and South Korea. Taking care 
of the bodies, especially the military bodies, was part of an extensive U.S. management of its 
 From Washington to AIDTO CIRCULAR, February 8, 1963. 2983; #5. Voluntary Agency Programs; P 583; 3
RG 286
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allies during the Cold War. The Committee prepared reports on the nutritional conditions of 
these national militaries, and the U.S. Department of State was ready to give the scientific 
and material help to supplement the lacking nutritions thus found, contributing to their 
nation-building endeavors.  
The U.S. Committee on Nutrition for National Defense conducted its assessment of the 
South Korean troops in 1957, and found that South Korean young military men lacked 
vitamin B in their blood tests samples and health checks. To this finding, the U.S. Nutrition 
Committee was ready to make its contribution. The committee recommended the U.S. 
Department of Defense to increase the dose of riboflavin, a form of Vitamin B,in wheat flour 
they send to Korean military, from 1.2 mg to 3 mg per pound..  Supplementary substances 4
like riboflavin could be added in the process of milling the wheat. However, the U.S. 
Department of Defense was not practicing something unusual and radical in giving reinforced 
wheat flour to the Koreans. Riboflavin wheat was quite common from earlier times. For 
example, CARE (Cooperative for American Relief to Europe), a U.S. voluntary agency, had 
precedents in sending “enriched” white flour to Korea since 1953 from its Philadelphia 
warehouses. 
With the suggestion of the U.S. Nutrition Committee to consume wheat-flour for vitamin 
B, South Korean nutritional experts easily agreed. The domestic experts cited scientific 
knowledge on diseases to encourage wheat-eating by warning against rheumatic neuralgia 
and beriberi, allegedly caused by vitamin B deficiency. In July 1958, a newspaper article 
 Interdepartmental Committee on Nutrition for National Defense, U.D. Department of Defense, Nutrition 4
Survey of the Armed Forces and Civilians on South Korea,1957; Other national reports on Iran, 1956; Turkey; 
the Philippines, November 1957; Libya, December 1957; Pakistan, September 1956; Spain, November 1958.
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suggested reducing the amount of rice eating and replacing it with wheat-flour, that was, in 
order to prevent rheumatic neuralgia. 
Vitamin B1 and vitamin B2 are effective in preventing the deterioration of rheumatic 
neuralgia. We should reduce the amount of rice eating and consume more wheat-flour, such 
as noodle and bread. Beans, vegetables, eggs, muscles, and seaweed also has much vitamin 
B. 
In fact, beriberi had been a perennial concern in Korean health since the colonial period, 
and vitamin B was well-known as a preventative. However, what was new in the late 1950s 
was that quite suddenly nutritional experts began recommending wheat as a food with 
vitamin B that people should eat. Attention to vitamin B continued in 1959, and this time the 
information pointed out that the lack of vitamin B adversely affected the mind, and warns 
that it was especially damaging to brain activities.  
The lack of vitamin B slows down the brain, brings down mental facilities and memory, and 
makes eyelids feel heavy. As a result, productive will for life disappears. This is what beriberi 
in the brain does. We mainly eat rice in our country, and thus we easily lack vitamin B. When 
the temperature goes up in spring and summer, the lack of vitamin B causes serious damages. 
It not only causes beriberi in the brain, but also causes sleepiness. One method to prevent the 
lack of vitamin B is to mix brown rice or barley to fill up three tenth of your rice, or mix rice 
with wheat-flour. It is also effective to take vitamin pills. You need to find out what’s right for 
you. Families with children who are preparing for school entrance examinations should pay 
attention not to cause the lack of vitamin B in children.  5
The last sentence of the article warns the mothers of school-aged children about the danger of 
vitamin B deficiency. It would have been a serious concern if the mother’s hope for her 
child’s upward social mobility would be obstructed by vitamin B deficiency. The adverse 
effects of vitamin B, which are sleepiness and slowing-down of brain activities, could prevent 
 Tong’a. May 10, 19595
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her child from entering a prestigious schools. This was a very persuasive reason to feed your 
children U.S. surplus wheat-flour.  
While it made sense for the U.S. Department of Defense to donate surplus wheat-flour 
that the nation’s Department of Agriculture was holding in large quantities, the specialist-
authors of the U.S. report suggests something beyond military advising. The report 
emphasized, in more than a couple of places, that exporting rice was the only method for 
South Korea to acquire foreign currency and to industrialize. In other words, the report was 
recommending that Koreans export their rice, and import wheat-flour to substitute rice.  
The U.S. report on Korean troops did not stay within the military circles, but it was 
widely publicized to the general public. South Korean nutritional scientists cited this U.S. 
military tour in an attempt to persuade Koreans to eat wheat-flour. This was part of education 
campaign in the media called, Improvement on Eating Life (siksaenghwal kaesŏn). In the 
campaign, nutritionists argued for eating more bread and less rice for health reasons.  
When the U.S. nutritional survey team visited in April, in 1957, the team examined both the 
civilians and the troops. The report indicated that Koreans had insufficient amount of protein, 
Vitamin A and B, and carotene. Protein can be obtained from wheat-flour. While white rice 
has six percent of protein, wheat-flour has twelve percent of protein, which is a double of 
what rice has. Wheat also has better quality of vitamin B1. It is true that brown rice also has 
much vitamin. However, brown rice is difficult to digest. Despite the vitamin content in 
brown rice, people avoid eating it if they can afford white rice. Thus, we need to change our 
main meal to wheat-flour meals (punsik). However, when you eat wheat-flour, try to avoid 
cooking it in the traditional way such as noodles or sujebi. It is difficult to digest wheat-flour 
cooked like those. If you can bake bread with yeast or baking powder, it is idea. [. . .] By 
eating wheat-flour, we can obtain protein and vitamin that lack in our diet, and life will 
become simplified and the average life span will extend (author’s name not given, translation 
mine).  6
 Kyŏnghyang, January 30, 1959. 6
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This nutritional expert recommends wheat-flour meals (punsik) instead of rice meals, and 
argues that superior nutrition in wheat flour will make people healthier, and thus they will 
live longer. It also sounds as if he is imparting a new piece of information when he tells the 
high protein make-up of wheat flour.  
This expert seems well-coopted to the logic of U.S. Committee on Nutrition in choosing 
wheat flour as a dietary solution for protein insufficiency. When an obvious source of protein 
would have been meat, the U.S. nutritional report and the South Korean article suggest 
wheat-flour as a source of protein.  
It is true that meat would not have made a feasible solution at the time in Korea. Meat 
was expensive, and cattle was scarce. Thus, recommending people to intake animal protein 
would not have helped many people. Previously before 1945, the Japanese colonial state had 
operated a cow farm in Kangwŏn-do. However, in the debacle after the liberation, the farm’s 
cows were butchered and the farm disappeared. The U.S. Military Government in Korea had 
made efforts to increase the number of cattle in Korea by importing samples of Berkshire 
hogs, boars, cows and eggs from the United States. It also run 4-H farms on Cheju Island as 
model cattle farms. Thus, the author of the article may have made a savvy choice of avoiding 
recommending meat.  
Nevertheless, the author emphasized the relatively high-level of protein in wheat-flour 
particularly in comparison to white rice. Brown rice was as excellent a source of protein as 
wheat-flour, but he facilely dismisses it as a solution,  and anticipates people’s digestive 
problems after eating brown rice. The collaboration between the U.S. nutrition committee and 
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South Korean nutritional scientists makes the choice of wheat flour as a food solution 
suspicious of politics. One gets surprised by how much the U.S. domestic politics of the Farm 
Bill, agricultural surpluses and rural votes influenced the consumption of wheat-flour in 
Korea. 
However, in the article, the author also advises the readers against preparing wheat-flour 
as noodles or as sujebi, which was boiled dough balls in clear soup. These were traditionally 
used recipes, and as we saw in chapter 1, were associated with the poor. At the same time, 
noodles (kuksu) and sujebi were how most Koreans ate wheat-flour. The newspapers and 
magazines did not hesitate to impart information on how to eat wheat-flour scientifically.  
In the late 1950s, newspapers and women’s magazines often featured nutritionally 
beneficial cooking  recipes involving not only wheat-flour, but also fat. Vegetable oil seems 
to refer to either corn oil or soy oil, both of which the U.S. offered in its list of surplus 
commodities available for PL 480 imports. U.S. surplus margarine and butter were also 
available as a source of fat from the list of the Public Law 480 surplus agricultural 
commodities. Kyŏnghyang Sinmun had a regular cooking recipe section, titled “Menu for 
Today’s Dinner.” The recipes in this section propagated numerous recipes using both wheat-
flour and vegetable oil. Whether it was the result of this cookery propaganda in the print 
media, soy oil and margarine, which were unfamiliar to Koreans, became quickly popular in 
Korea. Incidentally, however, butter did not share that popularity, showing that Koreans also 
had preferences amongst the new foodstuffs. 
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Both continuities and discontinuities co-existed in the arena of wheat-flour cooking since 
the upsurge of U.S. surplus wheat-flour. The recipes for food like croquette and tempura had 
been popular in the print media during the colonial period, and their popularity continued into 
the post-1945 period. However, donuts and “hotdog,” which Americans call “corndog,” 
referring to fried wheat or corn dough over hotdog sausage, were new additions to Korean 
diet in the post-1945 period. In Japan, which had received more U.S. surplus wheat-flour than 
Korea in the immediate post-1945 period, this “hotdog” was called “American dog,” noting 
the cultural and perhaps material origin of the food. Also, during the colonial period, the 
word, “hurai,” adapted pronunciation of the English word, “fry,” was commonly used in 
cooking recipes. While both continuations and changes existed since the colonial era, in the 
1950s, these cooking methods, using wheat-flour and fat, were emphasized as examples of 
“rational meal,” making it into a universal science.  7
Technologies innovations followed to tame wheat-flour to local uses. Not many Korean 
kitchens were equipped with ovens to bake bread. Here, some ingenuities of local adaptation 
were seen in cooking wheat-flour foods. Korean kitchens traditionally had stoves to steam 
grains like rice. During the wartime, convenience in cooking was one of the reasons why the 
recipients of ration preferred barley and corn flour to wheat-flour. However, in the mid-
fifties, a new machine was advertised in newspapers. This machine was invented in Japan 
and it could make bread without baking the dough in the oven. The finished product out of 
this new machine was similar to American-style white bread of the square shape.  This 8
 Central Commerce and Industry Committee, Korean Home Study Conference (Transcription). November 19607
 Tong’a, May 26, 19558
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American-style bread, different from European darker bread loafs, was called meal-bread 
(sik-ppang) both in Japan and in Korea. The machine to make meal-bread was advertised for 
having several advantages. The machine made life more convenient since the meal-bread 
(sik-ppang) could be kept for several days in room temperature whereas women had to cook 
rice at each meal. The advertisement for the machine also pointed out that an ingredient like 
wheat-flour was cheap, and wheat-flour could be stored at home for a several months if you 
did not plan to use it right away. However, baking soda was expensive and hard to procure. 
For cheaper remedy, another recipe tipped the readers on substituting baking soda with 
Korean rice wine (makkŏlli) to induce the dough to rise. Thus, making wheat-flour bread was 
placed within the accessible distance of home cooking.  
In all, the nutritionalists, in cooperation of the print media, selected these recipes of 
wheat-eating (not the traditional recipes) and drew them to the realm of “rational life” that 
could display an adeptness with modern nutritional science, health management, and home 
economics education. However, despite the aura of science, which sanitized and 
universalized the habit of wheat flour eating, Koreans were not willing to eat wheat-flour 
instead of rice in the 1950s. Moreover, wheat attracted yet another political and cultural 
meanings in addition to the image as a relief food. Wheat-flour attained media attention as a 
popular election bribe, and became the food of corruption in Korean politicians’ collusion 
with foreign agencies. Several foreign voluntary agencies allegedly diverted U.S. 
government-donated wheat-flour to third party politicians in Korea. These will be discussed 
in the latter part of this chapter, but let us first examine Title I of U.S. Public Law 480 that 
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structured the distribution lines from the United States to Korea.  
The artificial intervention with nutritional make-over of wheat was necessary because by 
the mid-1950s, the South Korean state was importing more wheat than the amount that its 
domestic market could absorb. The South Korean state ’s reason given to the public for 
importing excessive amount of wheat was to fund its military spending through the use of 
U.S. Public Law 480 (PL 480). According to Title I of PL 480 and Section 402 of the Mutual 
Security Act, the South Korean state could purchase U.S. agricultural surplus at one tenth of 
its market price. Thus, when the South Korean state sold the imported grains to its domestic 
buyers, the state earned ninety percent profit.  The agreements between the U.S. and South 9
Korean governments made it explicit that the sales proceeds from PL 480 sales must be 
immediately transferred to the account of the Ministry of Defense, or to Counterparts Fund.  10
However, U.S. ICA officials were aware that the South Korean state used few glitches to 
defer the transfer. Either the profit went to military spending or elsewhere to private pockets, 
the more PL 480 grains South Korea imported, the more money flew into the South Korean 
government’s copper. Given the generous term of Title I and Section 402, selling agricultural 
surplus at one tenth of the price, U.S. officials found dishonest practices of the South Korean 
officials “extremely disappointing.” An official complained that U.S. aid was being 
“misplaced” to fund the South Korean government’s deficit instead of going to military 
 Hollister, S/Food, ICA to CINCREP Seoul ICATO, December 14, 1956; 1406-8, Korea-Relief; #62, Subject 9
Files 1950-1959; HQ; RG 469. See also, Agricultural Surplus 1713; #139, Subject Files, 1950-1959; RG 469
 1313-1315; #49; UD 422; RG 469 10
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expenses.  Or, the missing wheat-flour could be channeled to political corruption. First, let 11
us examine the structure of Title I of U.S. Public Law 480 that made the South Korean state 
be enamored with importing more U.S. surplus wheat. 
Structurally Feeding Corruption: the Concessional Sales (Title I) of the Agricultural 
Trade Development and Assistant Act U.S. PL 480)  12
The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistant Act (U.S. Public Law 480) of 1954 
was a surplus food program of the U.S. government, funded by U.S. Congress. Among its 
three Titles in 1954, the voluntary agencies program (Title III) of PL 480 was discussed in 
chapter four. The current chapter examines the concessional sales (Title I) of Public Law 480, 
in which the U.S. Department of Agriculture sold U.S. surplus agricultural commodities to 
the South Korean state at one tenth of their market price values. The concessional sales of 
surpluses funded three activities: Private company trade between U.S. sellers and Korean 
buyers, relief food for general population, and South Korean government stocks of grain for 
emergencies, mainly as a leverage for price control in the market. The negotiation for the size 
and the composition of food imports under Public Law 480 was bilateral between two 
governments, and it was done annually.  Title I was ten times larger in scale than Title III 13
(voluntary agencies program), and they had different goals and processes. Whereas in Title 
III (U.S. voluntary agencies), the U.S. Department of State de-emphasized its role as the 
 1406; #62; HQ; RG 469 11
 3633-3634; #1. FFP; P153; RG 28612
 1610; #139; HQ; RG 469 13
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original donor, in order to promote the image of civilian humanitarian relief by numerous 
decentralized U.S. civilian agencies, Title I officially broadcasted the origin of grains as U.S. 
governmental food assistance. 
Wheat and wheat flour composed a considerable part of Title I imports of U.S. 
agricultural commodities, and wheat’s percentage in total Title I sales generally increased 
year by year until 1960. In the 1956 PL 480 program, wheat accounted for 21 percent of the 
total $42.2 million dollar value of the program. To the value of the commodities, $4.7 million 
was added for ocean freights, bringing the total to $46.9 million for Korean program. Other 
commodities like barley and cotton took up more, or less, large percentage. Barley took up 27 
percent of the total, and cotton made up 18.5 percent.  For which I can only construe as 14
cultural familiarity with barley in Korea, barley imports, which was 30 percent larger than 
wheat imports, hardly received any media or literary attention as foreign imports. Barley, as 
in the colloquial expression, “Barley Hill” during spring shortage period, received much 
attention as a food to override rice shortage. However, as if it did not occur to anyone that 
barley could also have come from U.S. surplus stock, barley was taken very naturally in 
Korea. On the other hand, cotton received as much attention as wheat flour. Cotton was part 
of the “Three White Industries (sambaek saŏp),” which included wheat flour, cotton, and 
sugar, of the 1950s “Aid Economy (Kuho Kyŏngche)” that buttressed the Korean economy. 
After the Mutual Security Act of 1956, much of surplus cotton imports were moved to 
Section 402 of this act for defense spending, and thus, the percentage of wheat in PL 480 
 Drafted by Strom, 1956; 1304; #49; UD 422; RG 469 14
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increased proportionally. For 1959, 77.8 percent of the hwan value of PL 480 was wheat. 
Imported wheat came in three different kinds: red wheat, white wheat, and wheat flour. In the 
same year, cotton and cotton seed took up 20.7 percent, and corn barely showed its presence 
as 1.5 percent of PL 480 imports.  The amount of overall PL 480 imports progressively and 15
continuously increased until the end of the decade. Because PL 480 imports were almost the 
sole supply of industrial and commercial wheat to Korea, the structure of PL 480 played a 
crucial role in Korean politics and economies.  
As introduced in chapter 4, Public Law 480, applied from 1955, introduced two 
differences from the previous practice of concessional sales by the U.N. Government 
Appropriations for Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) and the U.S. Army. First, a civilian 
agency, U.S. International Cooperations Administration (ICA), took over the control from the 
U.S. Army. Secondly, PL 480 only pertained to U.S agricultural surpluses. Before, 
concessional sales were not limited to surplus, but included non-surplus agricultural 
commodities and also non-agricultural and non-surplus materials such as construction, 
medical, and educational supplies. The surplus status of PL 480 commodities has important 
implications by showing the link between U.S. domestic politics and the flow of materials  
going into PL 480 recipient countries, which over time number 80 different countries, 
including Korea. At the earlier stage of the program, John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of 
State, had to emphasize to the USOMs that PL 480 fund, and also Section 402 of the Mutual 
Security Act, only pertained to U.S. agricultural surpluses. In October 1956, Dulles cancelled 
 3992 #10 Counterpart; P583; RG 286 *but in 1961, wheat only 35 percent, and 9 billion hwan (3996)15
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previously allocated $4.5 million of surplus raw sugar to Korea. He explained the 
cancellation as a result of shortage of surplus sugar in the United States.   16
On the other hand, the surplus nature of farm imports fed the tension that Koreans created 
to attain a upper hand in negotiations. In what was interpreted as a deliberate political 
maneuvering by Rhee Syngman, a number of Korean politicians published articles in 
newspapers to stir up the public opinion. They argued that it would have been expensive for 
the U.S. government to store surplus farm products, had they not been defrayed through PL 
480. Thus, they argued, since it would have been cheaper for the United States to dump 
surplus produces in the ocean than pay for the storage, the U.S. should just give the surpluses 
to South Korea for free and also should increase the amount of its donation. According to the 
Korean politicians’ political calculation, paying 10 percent of the market money price for the 
surpluses that was going to be dumped in the ocean was expensive. Fundamentally, their 
argument was based on their  evaluation of the Cold War strategizing. They argued that when 
South Korea was the last bastion of against Communism in Asia, providing buffers for Japan, 
the U.S. should make more concessions regarding surplus grains. By emphasizing the Cold 
War motivations behind U.S. PL 480, Korean statesmen could exploit PL 480 trades. For 
example, in 1955, Koreans refused to pay the premium price for Formosan fertilizer because 
they were certain that the United States was to provide PL 480 grains.  Rhee and his men 17
 Wood OEC to “FY 1956 Section 402 program as submitted ICA W totals $48.5 in DS component and $2.0 16
million in DFS component on February 1, 1956; 1355; #51; UD 422; RG 469 
 Office of the Economic Coordinator, Seoul, Airgram to ICA/Washington (54-56)17
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understood the place that U.S. government was trapped between communism and 
authoritarian regime. 
Basically, Koreans were confident in their demands because they realized that the U.S. 
government could not be flexible in the Cold War global military build-up. Title I of PL 480, 
and Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act, were exclusively used to fund U.S. and South 
Korean military operations in the divided Korea. Formerly, U.S. Army Military Government 
in Korea (USAMGIK, 1945-1948) and the U.S. Department of the Army (1948-1955) had 
sold U.S. products to Koreans at concessional rates of one tenth in order to raise the local 
currency, hwan. The sales proceeds were then deposited in the Counterpart Fund. The Title I 
of PL 480 and Section 402 continued this practice under the civilian supervision of the U.S. 
Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul, a temporary organization for the transition 
from U.S. military control to the U.S. Department of State control of foreign affairs. Whereas 
the Combined Economic Board (CEB) could use Counterpart Fund also in non-military 
projects, sales proceeds from Title I and Section 402 must be spent on military only.   18
Linked to the Cold War military build-up, was the domestic politics of U.S. farm 
surpluses. Title I of PL 480 provided, and often actively created, markets for U.S. farm 
surpluses. This supply-driven globalization of commodities including foodstuffs is one of the 
overriding theme throughout the chapters. The commercial sales of Title I of PL 480 was 
particularly devised to link the private sellers in the United States, looking for markets to sell 
 From CINCUNG TOKYO SDG Lemnitzer to Washington DC “before new PL 480 funds are committed, a 18
firm agreement be entered into with ROK providing that use of proceeds fro budgetary support of ROK military 
forces shall have priority over all other uses. I consider that this same principle should be applied to maximum 
feasible extent in development of counterpart budgets.” in 1955; 1269; #29; UD 422; RG 469 
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their surpluses, to private buyers in South Korea. In order not to discourage foreign buyers 
from purchasing U.S. PL 480 agricultural surplus, the U.S. government placed a device not to 
incur any price disadvantages to foreign private buyers. When the price of U.S. surplus was 
higher than the commodity’s world market price, the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC), U.S. government affiliated organization that procured and priced the commodities, 
provided the differentials to match the world price. For example, the world sugar price was 
largely determined by the Cuban supply. Cuban sugar frequently had lower prices than U.S. 
surplus sugar. When buyers of PL 480 agreement nations purchased U.S. surplus sugar, they 
paid the world price, and the CCC supplemented the differentials to U.S. sellers. Thus, 
foreign buyers of PL goods could confidently choose from the CCC- published list of surplus 
commodities, titled, “Reference Circular.”   19
It is likely that Title I concessional sales of wheat contributed to the increasing number of 
wheat milling factories and shops in South Korea. However, not only did the U.S. 
government create the wheat market in Korea through the supply of wheat, but it also funded 
the construction of large milling factories. During the war, all four major milling factories, 
including P’ungkuk, had been destroyed. To rebuild the industry, the U.S. Office of the 
Economic Coordinator provided loans to build two large-scale milling factories in South 
Korea, which were Daehan Flour Miller’s Association and Chosun Flour Milling Company 
from 1953 to 1955. By 1956, the milling capacity in Korea was above both the supply and 
demand for wheat. In Oct 1956, these local mills could process 35,000 tons of wheat each 
1290-1; #29; UD 422; RG 46919
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month. The capacity was much above 20,000 ton a month which was the estimated demand 
given by the Office of the Economic Coordinator (OEC).  This did not stop there. In 1958, 20
within one year, due to the construction of new milling factory, with U.S. funding, the milling 
facility increased another 30 percent with comparable increase in production.  This 21
overcapacity in wheat-milling forms a contrast to the post-liberation period in 1947 when the 
U.S. Military-Government could not find milling facilities of sufficiently large scale in 
Korea. Due to the lack of milling facilities in Korea in 1947, all wheat import to South Korea 
had to be come in flour form.  The situation was overly reversed by the end of the 1950s. By 22
1958, the wheat-flour industry was overextended with too many milling facilities. However, 
demand for wheat flour did not change much, and the price of wheat flour fell. 
The increase in wheat-milling capacity and U.S. funding to create a wheat industry in 
Korea is significant because U.S. surplus wheat from PL 480 was almost the sole supply of 
wheat and wheat-flour to Korea from 1945 to 1972.  Domestic production was mostly self-23
consumed by the producers. Korean farms produce approximately 172,000 to 180,000 tons of 
 242,000 ton for the financial year 1956, U.S. Embassy, Seoul, to Secretary of State, February 26, 1956; i.n.20
1304, Korea Commodities Agricultural Surplus 1956; #49; UD 422, Korea Subject Files, 1953-1959; RG 469, 
NACP; South Korea joined the membership of the International Wheat Agreement in 1953; i.n.1444
 See 1304; RG 469. Tong’a says that the capacity increased by 3 times, but I take Tong’a’s figure as a mistake. 21
Tong’a. September 7, 1958
 CG XXIV Corps to CG 8th Army, SCAP, January 4, 1947; 224; #6429; UD 1733 Foodstuff Import File; RG 22
331 SCAP, 1946-1951.
 Kim Hyŏng-su, Kang Yong-hui, U Ch’ang-myŏng, and Yi Sŏ-rae, “Kuksan wŏllyo rŭl sayonghan pokhap’pun 23
kaebal e kwanhan yŏn’gu.” Han’guk Sikp’um Kwahak Chi, No. 2, 1973. Also see, the Korea Bank statistics says 
ninety-nine to hundred percent wheat were American until 1970. The wheat imported from the Philippines and 
Canada were negotiated and administered by the United States on behalf of South Korea. Statistics by Korea 
Flour Mills Industrial Association (KOFMIA) and U.S. Wheat Association in Seoul has that in 1986 and 1987, 
of imported wheat, 88.2% was from the United States, 8.0% from Austria, 0.7% from Canada, and 3.1% from 
Argentina.
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wheat a year. However, the U.S. International Cooperations Agency (ICA) reported that most 
of domestically produced wheat was consumed by farming families themselves. Moreover, 
even if there was Korean wheat flour to be circulated in the market, Korean nutritional 
scientists found that the varieties of wheat that was cultivated in Korea was not suitable for 
industrial food-production. The Korean nutritional scientists explained that the protein 
percentage in Korean wheat was less than 10%, which was much less than the make-up in 
U.S. imported wheat, which were western white wheat, hard red winter wheat, and northern 
spring wheat. The lower protein level of Korean wheat varieties made it difficult to make 
dough-pastes such for bread, biscuits and chip-snacks, and thus, Korean varieties were not 
suitable for industrial uses. The absorption of domestic production through self-supplying 
and the unsuitability of Korean domestic varieties for commercial production meant that all 
wheat and wheat flour, for rationing as well as for market commerce, had to be imported. At 
the concessional price of one-tenth, South Korea had all the reason to order all wheat import 
entirely through PL 480 from U.S. surplus stocks. 
Korean sources confirm the monopoly supplier status of PL 480 wheat. In fact, the 
overwhelming dependence on U.S. wheat for commerce and industry was to cause anxiety 
after 1966 when the U.S. government announced that U.S. Public Law 480 assistance to 
Korea was to gradually wind down and to be terminated in 1972. In preparation for the 
termination of the concessional sales, the South Korean state and state-funded research 
institutes invested in finding a substitute for U.S. imported wheat-flour. In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, South Korean nutritional scientists experimented with naked barley flour, 
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defatted soy flour, defatted rice bran flour, defatted soybean flour, cassava, rye, corn, potato, 
yam, sorghum, millet, and sweet potato flours among others, in order to find an industrial 
substitute for wheat. Korea was not the only country trying to cope with the end of PL 480. 
Therefore, Korean nutritional scientists was able to consult India’s Central Food 
Technological Research Institute, among others, that had been trying to find a wheat-
substitute throughout the 1960s. The Koreans also studied the works by western, especially 
Latin American, nutritional scientists like H.G. Core, L.M. Ware, R.L. de la Fuente, and Bol 
Trimester, to reduce wheat dependency.  However, all this was without much result. Thus, 24
from 1972 onwards, South Koreans had to buy U.S. wheat at its full price, and not at other 
previous concessional rate of one-tenth under PL 480. Despite having to pay the full price, 
U.S. monopoly of wheat supply was not challenged in Korea, although the percentage was 
reduced. The statistics by Korea Flour Mills Industrial Association (KOFMIA) and U.S. 
Wheat Association in Seoul published that in 1986 and in 1987, 88.2 % of wheat import to 
Korea was from the United States, 8.0% was from Austria, 0.7% from Canada, and 3.1% 
from Argentina. Thus, in the end, the concessional sales of wheat in the latter half of 1950s 
and 1960s were very effective in fostering the wheat market in Korea in the 1970s and in the 
1980s.  
However, in the meantime, in the late 1950s, fostering of commercial wheat market in 
Korea seemed very implausible. Koreans consumed more wheat flour because if was cheap, 
but the same choice could not be expected under full price market conditions. However, the 
 Kim Hyŏng-su, Kang Yong-hui, U Ch’ang-myŏng, and Yi Sŏ-rae, “Kuksan wŏllyo rŭl sayonghan pokhap’pun 24
kaebal e kwanhan yŏn’gu.” Han’guk Sikp’um Kwahak Chi, No. 2, 1973
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cheap price in the meantime induced the South Korean state to increase the consumption of 
wheat. The amount of wheat imported from the United States provided 16 grams of wheat per 
capita per day in 1956. The U.S. Department of State planned to raise the consumption of 
wheat in Korea to 26 grams per capita per day for the following year, 1957. The department 
predicted that the completion of two large-scale milling factories, which the ICA (U.S. 
International Cooperations Administration) funding, would further raise the amount to 35 
grams of wheat consumption per capita.  However, the ICA blocked the funding, assessing 25
that the milling capacity would surpass demand then. In 1958, wheat consumption per capita 
was 23.7kg. However, it did went down in 1959 to 18.8kg.  In 1958, wheat requirement for 26
import to Korea was calculated at 35,000 tons a month.  In 1960, the annual wheat import 27
requirement was 300,000 metric tons, which was an increase from approximately 250,000 
tons before PL 480, but such increase does not seem as nearly dramatic as how much the 
print media in South Korea exaggerated the inflow of cheap wheat-flour from the United 
States. On the other hand, in comparison to the colonial era, it was an increase by about 20 
times. and this was why wheat flour industry was closely associated with imperial U.S. food 
assistance in Korea.  
Interestingly, print media in South Korea and rumors among Koreans emphasized the the 
excessive profit that the wheat-millers were making because of PL 480 imports. Their profit, 
 CINCREP, Seoul, to ICA, February 3, 1956; 1301, Korea Commodities- Agricultural Surplus 1956; #49, 25
Korea Subject Files, 1953-59; UD 422; RG 469
 Chun Ye Yong, ROK Minister of Reconstruction to Walter D. McConaughy, U.S. Embassy, Seoul, July 13, 26
1960; 1710, Agricultural Surplus; #139, Subject Files 1950-1959; HQ; RG 469
 CINCREP, Seoul, To ICA, August 6, 1957, Korea Commodities- Flour; 1425; #66, Subject Files 1950-1959; 27
HQ; RG 469
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thus,  was considered to be results of corrupt nepotism. Newspapers commented that not only 
big industrial companies, but also a few hundreds entrepreneurs jumped onto the wagon with 
small to medium-scale mills in order to share the huge profit margin in the wheat industry. 
Business corruptions such as Lee Han-Yŏl, the president of Tong’a Trade Company, who 
were arrested for illicit fortune accumulation in the wheat industry in 1961, and the 
connection between the Liberty Party and Tong’lip company suggest that wheat flour fed 
large-scale corruptive practices.   28
Another collusion case between the government officials and businessmen involved a 
company called, Tongrip. The South Korean state had given Tongrip a great deal of 
preference from securing grants to build the factory and to buy machines. In 1960, at the 
Committee on National Defense, an Assembly Member Yi Chŏng-hyu accused the company 
for illicit practices involving “dry bread” rationed to the troops. Dry bread was a sort of 
biscuits made of wheat-flour, and it was issued to troops every three days in 250 gram bags in 
1957.  In 1959, the government had awarded monopoly to Tongrip in supplying dry bread. 29
The government gave the company two billion hwan a year to produce dry bread. The state 
provided wheat-flour and sugar. The deal was widely alleged as an outcome of political 
corruption. Assembly member Yi complained that dry bread went bad in three months. Eighty 
percent of it ended up eaten by moth, so they were mostly given away as animal feed. Yi also 
accused that dry bread that was supposed to be rationed to the troops were found in markets 
 CINCREP, Seoul, to Secretary of State, June 15, 1961; 1843, Korea-C-Wheat; #141; HQ, Subject Files, 28
1959-1961; RG 469
 International Committee on Nutrition, U.S. Department of Defense, Nutritional Survey, p. 17; p. 2129
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on a large-scale. The price of dry bread in the market was at one twelfth of the price of the 
raw material. The Liberty Party was alleged to receive illicit money from Tongrip. 
At first, the ICA concurred that the Korean wheat-millers were making excessive profits. 
However, the report was soon rescinded, and the the same U.S. official then claimed that 
Korean millers were only making reasonable profit at the rate around 0.3 percent. He wrote 
that he was embarrassed by his previous mistake. 
The large-scale wheat imports from PL 480 funding generated another controversy 
among Koreans about the Korean economy. Both Americans and Koreans in the 1950s and 
1960s agreed that wheat imports had the effect of putting the prices of rice and barley down. 
At the time, such policy was commended as making Korean industrial products more 
competitive in the world market. When food price was kept low, workers wages could be 
kept low, and this in turn contributed to lowering the price of Korean products which were to 
be exported. Since the 1990s, the argument has been reversed, and not a few political 
scientists and policy makers have since then criticized U.S. wheat import under PL 480 for 
screwing the structure of Korean economy. While either opinion tells mostly about their 
political orientations, we can see how the visibility of U.S. wheat imports was looming large 
in their minds.  
When the central state was imported PL 480 wheat beyond the market demand and ration 
needs, the South Korean Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had to find a way to distribute 
it. Thus, disposing superfluous wheat proved to be a burdensome business for the ministry. 
The excess wheat had to be sold before the passing of each spring. Otherwise, wheat was was 
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likely to develop molds. In addition, after the summer flood season, stored wheat drew 
insects, which rendered the grain un-marketable.  The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 30
out of other viable channels to willing buyers, chose to pass the excess wheat onto the 
employees of state ministries and local governments. The ministries disposed wheat-flour by 
giving it to public servants as salary-in-kind.   31
Wages-in- wheat flour was enormously unpopular among the public servants. From 1956 
to 1959, in each spring, public servants received vouchers for wheat flour. In 1956 and 1957, 
the government had announced to include rice in the wage packages of public servants. 
However, when the South Korean state succeeded in acquiring wheat beyond the market 
demand in PL 480 agreement with the United States, the government replaced promised rice 
in the wage package to surplus wheat-flour. The government asked for the sacrifice of its 
public servants, and justified it in terms of military requirement. The government argued that 
since the sales proceeds from Title I of PL 480 wheat was channeled to defense funding, the 
government had to imported large amount of wheat for national defense. Difficult to argue 
against it, three hundred and forty thousand public servants across the nation received 25 
kilograms (1 podae) of wheat-flour for a month of 1957 and of 1958. 
Not only the un-negotiated imposition of wheat flour itself, but also the rate of exchange 
for wheat-flour caused resentment among public servants. In 1958, Provincial Government of 
Kyŏngsang-namdo distributed a sack of wheat flour to each of its public servants, instead of 
cash or rice. Moreover, Kyŏngsang-namdo arbitrarily set the price of wheat flour at 2,310 
 Kyŏnghyang, April 15, 1959; Tong’a, April 16, 195930
 Kyŏnghyang, September 13, 1958.31
!206
Chapter 5. Feeding Corruption
hwan when in the market, it cost 2,200 hwan. Thus, public servants received 110 hwan less in 
wage. Again, in the spring of 1959, the government had four million sacks (25kg each) of 
wheat-flour to dispose of before the humid flood season. For the four months of April, May, 
June and July, all nation-wide 35 million public servants received one sack of wheat-flour 
each month. Still, the government could only dispose a million and half sacks (25kg each) of 
wheat-flour. It is not clear what the government did to the remaining 2.5 million sacks 
(62,500 tons) that year. 
In order to appease the public servants in 1959 wheat wages, the government priced 
public servants’ wheat-flour at 1,994 hwan, and this was 200 hwan cheaper than the market 
price. Thus, public servants had 200 hwan extra in terms of wheat flour’s money exchange 
value. Despite the price advantage, many public servants sold their wheat-flour vouchers to 
market sellers at even cheaper prices than the government price. When a journalist requested 
a response to the sales of wage wheat-flour, apparently a government official responded that 
the state left this matter to their personal decision, and it did not plan to interfere between the 
public servants and merchants. In fact, wage payment in wheat flour was so vocally 
unpopular that the National Assembly advised the government to stop paying public servants 
with wheat flour. The government complied with the National Assembly’s demand on 16 
June 1959.  
Not only was the state using surplus wheat flour as a currency in its transactions of 
wages, the state also allocated relief food for welfare institutions all in wheat-flour on several 
occasions. Recipients on government rations did not have much choice, but to incorporate 
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wheat flour in their daily diet. For April and May 1958, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs composed food ration packages almost 
entirely of wheat and wheat flour. 148 social welfare institutions in Kyŏngsang-namdo made 
a formal protest to the ministries. The institutions declared it inhumane to feed 10,000 war-
orphans and 13,000 war-widows in addition to invalid children and the elderly with only 
wheat-flour for two whole months. They pleaded for barley and whole barley in relief ration. 
The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs showed sympathy to their grievances. However, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was immovable, explaining that all allocated wheat-
flour had to be consumed before summer. Otherwise, all that wheat-flour would expire.  In 32
1948, ration food, composed of only wheat-flour, affected all other groups on government 
welfare rosters. Residents in the make-shift tent village of Yong’am dong had to make 
themselves familiar with a porridge made with wheat-flour. Relief food for the dislocated 
(refugees) and the destitute families was also composed of wheat-flour only.  
While the state could easily force public servants and relief recipients to accept wheat-
flour, wheat-flour was not accepted when the state tried to pay other expenditures with it. 
Thus, the state produced numerous episodes in trying to dispose wheat flour, and these were 
broadcasted in newspapers half humorously and half sarcastically. In 1959, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry argued to pay the water fee for water transportation, drinking water, 
irrigation, and industrial water with PL 480 grains. Unfortunately for the ministry, the 
government-contractor refused to take wheat-flour. Not learning the lesson in the same year, 
 Kyŏnghyang, June 15, 1958. 32
!208
Chapter 5. Feeding Corruption
the desperate Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry offered the rice farmers to trade wheat-
flour with their rice. Predictably, no farmer responded. For twenty days, not a grain of rice 
was exchanged on the term set by the ministry.  
When it was difficult to dispose of the imported wheat-flour, the South Korean state also 
found storing the unsold grain difficult. The state was responsible for leaving one tenth of the 
imported grain to go spoiled in storage in 1959. In order to prevent stored wheat from rotting, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry spent hundreds of millions of hwan in importing 
pesticides such as DDT, mercron, methyl bromide, and PGP chloropicrin in addition to vinyl 
to cover the grains from insects. When grain was stored, it had to be regularly sprayed with 
insecticides because the chemicals evaporated within several months. The state could have 
saved the expenses for pesticide and the cost of wasted grain, had kept it kept PL 480 imports 
to the domestic demand. In fact, in 1959, the United States advised the South Korean 
government to cut the request for surplus grains to half for the 1960 PL 480 program, capping 
it at twenty five million dollars. The U.S. warned the South Koreans that it was requesting 
more wheat than the nation could consume. The warning also came in domestic politics. 
Newspapers published articles that complained about superfluous wheat, which was imposed 
on unwilling consumers. An article in Kyŏnghyang criticized the state for importing 
needlessly large amount of wheat-flour from the United States to use it for military 
purposes.  However, the South Korean state’s reference to Communist North Korea and the 33
unfinished war seems to have won the day. 
 An article in Kyŏnghyang criticized the state for importing needlessly large amount of wheat-flour from the 33
United States to use it for military purposes. Kyŏnghyang. September 13, 1958.
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Thus, the state was unsuccessful at making wheat-flour a substitute for rice, and to induce 
market consumption of wheat flour. However, there were two points. First, despite the 
unwillingness of consumers to take wheat flour, the state found various channels to impose 
wheat-flour on them. Even when consumers did not like wheat flour, they nevertheless 
became familiar with the food. Secondly, the post-colonial mark on wheat flour shifted from 
poverty and U.S. imperial motivations, to the repression and corruption of the South Korean 
state.   
Wheat-Flour Channels Political Corruption towards the April Revolution  34
In the late 1950s, the post-colonial association of wheat was with Syngman Rhee’s 
authoritarian state. On the other hand, what continued throughout the post-1945 period 
regarding postcoloniality was the awareness that Korea’s liberation from the Japanese Empire 
in 1945, and the new “democratic” system in 1948 were “given” by the United States. These 
were presented to Koreans like the wheat-flour presents. Koreans in the south practices their 
rights to vote for the first time in 1948. By investigating the use of U.S. surplus wheat-flour 
in electoral corruption, we can glimpse at experiences of minjujuŭi (“democracy”) on the 
ground level as the Korean people experienced it in their daily lives.  
In the late 1950s, U.S. surplus wheat gained publicity for being used as bribe in election 
campaigns. Newspaper articles not only criticized the politicians who distributed wheat flour 
to wheedle the votes, but it also criticized the agricultural people (nongmin) who formed a 
 Syngman Rhee’s authoritarian regime was toppled as a result of the April Revolution of 1960.34
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psychological dependency on aid wheat. Election officials were quoted for complaining that 
election campaigns could not be managed without using wheat-flour bribes since the destitute 
agricultural people took receiving wheat flour for granted in electoral campaigns. 
Wheat-flour was one of the popular items that candidates illegally gave out to entice 
voters. In the election of January 1958, other items chosen by candidates for illegal gifting 
were calendars, towels, and blankets. Some candidates were seen knocking on doors and 
purchasing national bonds from the housewives who were only glad to be ridden of the 
national bonds that they bought from the state involuntarily. Some campaign teams rode 
around on trucks in their electoral jurisdictions with things to give out to voters.  
Newspaper articles ridiculed the candidates’ using wheat-flour and cash presents to buy 
votes. It was criticized as “immature” practices. For example, in May 1958, one campaign 
staff of Yi Su-u, with no party affiliation, was seen purchasing vote-slips at 1000 hwan each 
on the open streets of Chinkap-ku in Pusan. In Yŏngdo-ŭl-ku of Taegu, a campaign staff of 
Son Ŭi-tong, a Liberty Party member, was caught bartering voting-slips with vouchers for 
wheat-flour ration.    
Other accounts suggested that local governments were complicit in wheat flour bribes 
with the politicians. Both the Liberty Party and the Democratic Party used wheat as an 
enticement to persuade voters. In January 1960, in a re-election campaign in Yŏng’il and 
Yŏngchu, a journalist overheard three rural wives chattering on their way into the voting 
booth. The wives shared information with one another that only the ones who voted for a 
specific, or “endorsed,” candidate could receive the wheat ration. It was possible to ensure 
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that the locals vote for the “endorsed” candidate by teaming three voters in a group as “three-
people voting” or by practicing “open votes.”  As this same journalist saw a Neighborhood 35
Civic Service Office (Tong Samuso) that was withholding wheat flour rations until after the 
election, it seems likely that the three rural wives were exchanging a very veritable and useful 
piece of information amongst themselves. Interestingly, I could not find any reference to 
other foodstuff or other grain that was used to bribe the voters. The candidates were not 
known to be distributing canned port meat or rice.  
The access to surplus wheat-flour was one of the ways that politicians and industrialists 
accumulated power illegally. Such corruption, in return, undermined the legitimacy of the 
new state and its elites. In the April Revolution of 1960, popular demonstrations led by 
students toppled Rhee Syngman’s authoritarian government. Rhee abdicated on 26 April 
1960, taking the responsibility for election frauds and political corruption. 
In between the April Revolution of 1960 and Park Chung Hee’s military coup on May 16, 
1961, freedom of press was granted, and what we see on the press is the continued awareness 
of Korea’s post-colonial situation in which Korea depended on U.S. assistance. This criticism 
was especially linked to U.S. food assistance. A four-cut cartoon on Seoul Kyŏngche Sinmun 
on Sunday, September 25, 1960, shows an American giving a cookie to a Korean boy. The 
boy only takes the cookie after the American confirmed Korea’s independence. The author of 
these cartoons was Kim Sŭng-ok, who drew the cartoons as a college student. Later in his 
career, Kim Sŭng-ok becomes a writer. Kim’s cartoons, titled “Pagoda Old Man” from 1960 
 Tong’a, January 27, 1960. 35
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to 1961, captured the ideas of the April Revolution before Park Chung Hee’s military coup 
d'état in 1961 usurped the state. 
  (cut1) 
   Man: Oh, poor boy, have this cookie.  
   (cut2) 
   Boy: Are you American, or not? 
   Man: I am American. 
   (cut 3) 
   Boy: Is our country an independent nation, or is it not? 
   Man: It is an independent nation. 
   (cut4) 
   Boy: If you say so, I can take it, surely. 
   Old Man: (looking at the scene) I feel like crying.   36
The boy clearly wants the cookie, but he requires a ritual from the American to assure that 
Korea is an independent nation.  
In another cartoon, published on September 27, 1960, Kim Sŭng-ok pokes fun at the 
political and economic fights amongst Koreans. The cartoon shows a beggar accosting a 
passer-by who is dressed like a gentleman. 
(Cut 1.) 
Beggar: Please, spare me a penny. 
Gentleman: I DON’T HAVE ANY MONEY! 
(Cut 2.) 
Pagoda Old Man: (passing by the two who are arguing) Why can’t he spare a coin to the 
beggar? 
(Cut 3.) 
Pagoda Old Man: (picking up a pair of glasses) Here is a pair of glasses that an American 
used to wear. 
 Kim Sŭng-ok, [Pagoda Old Man], Sŏul Kyŏngche Sinmun, September 25, 1960.36
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(Cut 4.) 
Pagoda Old Man: (looks back and sees two beggars arguing) Now I see that it was an 
argument between two beggars.  37
Thus, the cartoon criticized the well-to-do in South Korea. When the source of their meager 
wealth came from U.S. aid, the rich feels no shame and it does not occur to him to share a 
little bit of his wealth with his compatriots. In the perspective of an American, via the glasses, 
both of them were mere beggars.   
Here is another cartoon on the “Pagoda Old Man” on 25 October, 1960, 
(Cut 1.)  
Pagoda Old man: Why don’t I go to the chapel? 
(Cut 2. At the chapel) 
Pagoda Old man: The director of the orphanage came, too. 
Director of the orphanage: (praying by himself) Dear Farther in heaven, . . . 
(Cut 3.) 
Director of the orphanage: If God may have it that the holy spirit descend on the souls of 
the American people, ... 
Pagoda Old Man: ? 
(Cut 4.) 
Director of the orphanage: (continues). . , pray that they, the Americans, send us much 
relief materials this winter.”  
Pagoda Old Man: A~~men.   38
The cartoon again shows Koreans’ reliance on U.S. foreign aid, and the absurdity of the 
Korean elites in relying on it. These cartoons mock Korea’s post-colonial status that rely on 
U.S. assistance. It is interesting that the cartoons were a response or a result of the April 
 Kim Sŭng-ok, [Pagoda Old Man], Sŏul Kyŏngche Sinmun, September 27, 196037
 Kim Sŭng-ok, [Pagoda Old Man], no. 53, Sŏul Kyŏngche Sinmun, October 25, 1960.38
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Revolution of 1960. Seeing that Rhee Syngman’s regime being chased out after the 
revolution, Kim Sŭng-ok, through his cartoons, pointed out that it was precisely U.S. 
assistance that strengthened corrupt Rhee’s regime.  
Interestingly,  while Korean intellectual and newspapers were criticizing Korea’s over-
reliance on U.S. assistance, U.S. reaction to the instability caused by the April Revolution 
was sending even more PL 480 food assistance to Korea. Using Title II, emergency program, 
of PL 480, US Operations Mission in Korea sponsored the “National Construction Service 
(NCS)” in 1961.  Below excerpt is from a priority cablegram sent from USOM/Seoul to 39
Washington on January 31, 1961. Sentences are ungrammatically shortened in the cablegram 
in order to reduce the number of words to deliver. Moyer in Seoul writes, 
With emphasis urgent necessity prompt action subject project permitting Title II 
commodities arrive before end Feb in program […]  
Seriousness of problems of unemployed and underemployed stressed in numerous past 
communications. Bitter winter adding to distress and communist propaganda increasing 
dissatisfaction and social unrest. Urgent need for attention this problem greatly increased by 
events April 1960 permitting freer expression and criticism. Potentially explosive situation 
building up to which ROKG must respond promptly. 
Priorities Given to Areas of Greatest unemployment and poverty should result in 
additional economic development and increase political stability by providing more than 45 
million man-days of labor. ROKG considers aid under Title III For this type program Already 
Approved in principle by Dillon.   40
In his cablegram, Moyer uses expressions such as “communist propaganda increasing 
dissatisfaction and social unrest,” “events (in) April 1960 permitting freer expression and 
 1726-1770; 1733 (pamphlet); #139; Headquarter Office of Far Eastern Operations; RG 469 39
 Priority cablegram from Moyer, Seoul Far East Program, to Sheppard, ICA, January 3, 1961; 1671; #139; 40
HQ; RG 469
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criticism,” and “potentially explosive situation.” In other words, Moyer communicates that 
the freedom of expression granted by the April Revolution could be used to the advantage of 
the communists. In order to prevent Chang Myŏn’s feeble interim government alive and to 
stop South Korean from going, possibly, “red,” USOM implemented the National 
Construction Service (NCS) to give unemployed feeble work. Problems of unemployment 
and under-employment were serious in cities. To disperse the discontent laborers, the 
program created jobs for them in remote areas of Korea under the pretext of national 
construction.  
In fact, the idea about rural development had been entertained by the South Korean Prime 
Minister in 1959, and the Committee on Economic Board (CEB) even proceeded to form a 
rural development committee in August 1959.  Given the urgency of the situation post-April 41
Revolution, USOM implemented it in March 1961. The fund came from Title II (Emergency 
Short-Term Program) of U.S. Public Law 480. For 1961 NCS, Title II 202 to Korea was 
valued at $21.7 million, purchased by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). The United 
States contributed 85% of the cost for the National Construction Service Program in Korea. 
The South Korean state put in the remainder of 15%.  
In Title II (Emergency Program) of PL 480, the U.S. government supplied their surplus 
grain to other nations in emergency situation. The recipient countries use the grain as part of 
wage to workers. In Korea, the NCS program paid workers half in U..S. surplus commodity 
coupons and the other half in cash coupons.  Workers could redeemed the coupons later into 
 S/Proposal to Expand the Functions and Responsibilities of CEBCOM and Establish a CEB Rural 41
Development Committee, August 5, 1959; 2167; #13; P 319; RG 469
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real commodity and cash. The commodities were US surplus cotton sheeting, wheat-flour and 
barley. The NCS Program funded 45.3 million of man-days (number of workers x number of 
days they worked) in 1961.   42
In 1961 Korean program, the projects in the National Construction included 424 projects 
in flood control, which required 229,000 meters of excavation. Levee and revetment work 
was to protect 300,000 acres of farm land once completed. The program had 82 road projects, 
which newly paved, repaired existing ones and road improvement. The NCS also funded 
street, park and sever improvement in 41 municipalities, seemingly referring to myŏn-level. 
There were 400 small irrigation projects, 2000 small soil and water conservation projects, 
and reforestation of 245,000 acres.  43
Although I mention the impact of the April Revolution in instigating the National 
Construction Program, using PL 480 grains for national construction programs was also new 
U.S. global strategy. Thus, South Korea was not the only nation that the U.S. supplied surplus 
grain to give as wages-in-kind. In April 1961, George McGovern, Director of the Food-for-
Peace program under Kennedy administration, negotiated this new Title II programs with 
eight nations, including Dahomey, the semi-autonomous Eritrea region of Ethiopia, Greece, 
Indonesia, Iran, Morocco Taiwan and Tunisia. In Tunisia, 150,000 workers were getting part 
of their pay in food for eighteen months. The global context of this new direction in PL 480, 
called Food-For-Peace, will be discussed in chapter 6.       
 Figures vary from 38.6 million to 45.3 million mandays. 42
 1655-6; #139; HQ; RG 46943
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Given that the U.S. Department of State initially planned the National Construction 
Program to support Chang Myŏn’s interim government, it is ironic that U.S. Operation 
Missions’s National Construction Service Program (NCS) was in fact used to consolidate 
Park Chung Hee’s regime that usurped the state through a military coup on May 16, 1961. 
South Korean newspapers, under the censorship of the military coup regime, publicized the 
National Construction Service (kukto kaebal tan) as Park Chung Hee’s achievement. 
Newspapers did acknowledge that the funding came from Title II of PL 480. However, it was 
phrased that Park Chung Hee’s regime came up withe idea and successfully negotiated with 
the U.S. government to draw the assistance, and this National Construction Program was 
supposed to show the legitimacy of the military regime which the old corrupt Rhee regime 
did not have.  
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Chapter 6.  
FROM DEPENDENCY TO SELF-HELP, 1962-1972 
American Food Relief to the Korean Peripheries 
In earlier chapters, U.S. food assistance began with emergency food relief from 1945 to 
1955, then moved to civilian humanitarian food programs from 1955 to 1962, which in fact was 
originally sponsored by the U.S. Department of State. In chapter 1 and chapter 2, Korean reci-
pients found U.S. relief food such as wheat flour and powdered milk unfamiliar and disagreeable 
to their palates. At the same time, Koreans suspected possible imperial motivations by the United 
States in giving food assistance while stationing a large-scale military contingent in the divided 
Korea. Under these circumstances from 1945 to 1955, U.S. food assistance failed to persuade the 
Koreans in the southern zone to side with the Americans in opposition to the communists in the 
north. However, in chapter 3 and chapter 4, beginning in 1955, U.S. relief food policy changed: 
the U.S. International Cooperation Administration (ICA) co-opted U.S. civilian voluntary agen-
cies and international organizations in order to superimpose the image of humanitarian assistance 
on its food assistance. Food donations in the “civilian” programs were advertised to Koreans as 
having been voluntarily donated by individual American citizens, thus turning food assistance 
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The American farmer is the hero, and Food-For-Peace is the unique instituti-
on which he… and all Americans… have created. It stands against hunger. It 
speaks on behalf of the children of the world. It works for economic devel-
opment in the earth’s far corners. And it speeds the growth of international 
trade.  
- Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, “The Relationship of 
the multi-faceted Food for Peace program to American Agriculture”, 
Food For Peace Seminar Report, January 1- June 30, 1963  
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into a metaphor of a more personified and decentralized image of U.S. hegemony in comparison 
to that of Soviet “imperialism.” Finally, chapter 6 moves to the work-relief programs of the 
1960s, which aimed for the eventual self-reliance of the Korean villages. 
The U.S. Food for Peace Committee’s self-help work (chajo kŭllo) programs, as amended in 
1964, were modernization programs for Third World nations, which used only U.S. surplus food 
as an investment.  Although officially given a new name as the Comprehensive Provincial De1 -
velopment Program (CPDP), both the Koreans and the Americans continued to call it self-help 
(chajo) programs. However, the Provincial Program, as amended in 1964, differed from the pre-
vious self-help programs (1961-1963) in two crucial ways. First, the Provincial Program of 1964 
excluded the use of technology and capital, and only invested surplus food, which was used as 
wages-in-kind for the workers. By this, the Provincial Program abandoned the conventional 
Third World developmental strategy of closing the development gap by employing engineering 
experts and advanced machineries. In the 1964 Provincial Program, funded under Title II of U.S. 
Public Law 480, the Food for Peace Committee could only use U.S. surplus grain for direct con-
sumption by the workers and their families. In the previous programs from 1961 to 1963, the 
Food for Peace Committee had reserved the authority to sell U.S. farm surpluses to the domestic 
buyers in aid recipient countries. Thus, between 1961 and 1963, the program could obtain local 
currency by selling the surplus commodities, and these sales proceeds were then used to purcha-
se raw materials and machines for construction programs. Through this process, in the previous 
 The origin of addressing U.S. Public Law 480 as the Food for Peace Program goes back to U.S. President Eisen1 -
hower’s uses of the term in 1959. “On January 29, President Eisenhower asked Congress today to scrap the Gov-
ernment’s costly system of rewarding farmers for planting less. He urged that the United States and its allies join in 
harnessing their surplus food production for the cause of universal peace.” … “To dramatize food as an instrument 
for building a durable peace…” in New York Times, January 30, 1959.
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programs, the Food for Peace Committee could support large-scale industrial projects such as 
constructing hydraulic dams in India.  
However, by banning Food for Peace Program committees from selling U.S. farm surpluses 
in its 1964 amendment, the Provincial Program of 1964 limited the self-help programs to small 
village-scale projects, which did not require technology and costly raw materials. Incidentally, 
the 1964 self-help work program was introduced to Koreans as originating from a U.S. domestic 
policy in the 1930s. This understanding of the program’s origin had interesting implications on 
the U.S.-South Korea relationship as the U.S. Operations Mission in Korea was then applying a 
U.S. domestic policy of the 1930s to 1960s Korea. It was as if the U.S. government conceived 
Korea and other Third World nations as an extension of the U.S. territory, and thereby attempted 
to transform the recipient countries towards economic development.   
In addition to excluding the use of science and capital investment, the 1964 amendment to 
the Food for Peace Program also required the Provincial Program to employ only unskilled labo-
rers who were registered as “the needy” by the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Af-
fairs. These workers were paid in U.S. surplus grains for working in upland reclamation for far-
ming, irrigation, soil erosion control, reforestation, and fishery development (oyster and clam 
farming) projects. The projects only required raw materials that were free such as earth and sto-
nes. Thus, by making Title II, PL 480 grain as the only insertion from outside, to be used as wa-
ges-in-kind, the Provincial Program made sure that the projects were small scale and only requi-
red unskilled laborers.  
Secondly, differently from the previous program, the Comprehensive Provincial Develop-
ment Program (in short, Provincial Program) of 1964 transited U.S. farm surpluses directly from 
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the Food-For-Peace Committee-and-US Operations Missions Committee (from now on, FFP-
USOM Committee) to South Korean provincial and local governments. In other words, the Pro-
vincial Program bypassed the central Korean state, and it also gradually weaned U.S. foreign vo-
luntary agencies from Title III funding to direct South Korea towards self-help. In collaborating 
with the Food-For-Peace Program, U.S. Operations Mission in Korea set up the Rural Develop-
ment Division (from now on, referred as RDD), and put this office in charge of supervising the 
amended self-help programs. Then, the Food-For-Peace and U.S. Operations Mission Committee 
allocated specific amount of PL 480 grains to each of the nine provinces and two cities of Seoul 
and Pusan.  2
In the direct relationship between the Food-For-Peace and U.S. Operations Mission (FFP-
USOM) Committee and each province, Individual projects were proposed by provincial govern-
ments (devised on the county (kun)-level), selected by the FFP-USOM Committee, funded by 
the Food-For-Peace Program, and administered by South Korean provincial governments. The 
USOM-FFP Committee drew contracts with individual county heads (kunsu), and also kept the 
communication channel with the villagers open. Previously, the U.S. Operations Missions had 
not been able to enjoy such direct contact with the locals, independently from the central South 
Korean government when the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, or when U.S. 
voluntary agencies’ humanitarian programs distributed U.S. surplus food to the Korean reci-
pients. 
 The nine provinces and two cities were Kyŏnggido, Ch’ungch’ŏng-namdo, Ch’ungch’ŏng-pukto, Chŏlla-namdo, 2
Chŏlla-pukto, Kangwŏndo, Kyŏngsang-namdo, Kyŏngsang-pukto, Chejudo, and two special cities of Seoul and 
Pusan.
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Importantly, then, I use Food for Peace Provincial Programs to demonstrate that provincial 
and local governments played active parts in South Korea’s development in the 1960s. In current 
scholarship, 1960s South Korea is constructed as little more than a centralized authoritarian state 
that hauled the nation to a miraculous economic development. This scholarship does not consider 
provincial and local governments separately from the central state. Although Park Chung Hee 
regime placed local governments under the control of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs (Nae-
mubu) and President himself, the Provincial Program shows that local governments could practi-
ce their own agency, unencumbered by the central state. For the Provincial Development Pro-
gram, each country (kun) initiated and proposed its own self-help projects, and competed with 
other counties for the Food-For-Peace funding that the Provincial Government received. For 
example, articles in the magazine, Local Administration (Chibang Haengjŏng, 1952-present), 
show that lower-level bureaucrats in local governments were working and thinking at local-coun-
ty (kun) level, and they were forming their relationship vis-a-vis the central state in those terms. 
Thus, the Food for Peace Program killed two birds with one stone by employing government 
relief recipients in community’s construction projects. Not only did the program provide food for 
the “general needy” families on government rosters, but by paying them in U.S. surplus food, it 
also channeled their labor for modernization and developmental projects. In the end, completed 
projects such as the farming lands and marine products cultivation fields were to function as 
long-term sources of income for the local participants. In other words, it was an relief-work pro-
gram towards the end-goal of establishing self-help village communities.   
The concept of village autarchy, which is similar to the functioning of self-help villages, has 
a long history in Korea since the Chosŏn period. Yi Yulgok, a 16th-century Korean literati, pro-
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posed self-sufficient village economy established by Village Compact (Hyangyak), invoking Chu 
Hsi (Song Dynasty Confucian scholar)’s version of the Lü-Family Compact of 12th-century Chi-
na.  However, Yulgok’s 16th century Village Compact differed from Food-For-Peace’s 1960s 3
context as Yulgok’s did not concern with making a progress and economic development as the 
Food for Peace Program did.  
Although both the Japanese and Koreans adapted the term self-help (chajo) from a late 19th 
century British writer, Samuel Smiles, both Japanese and Korean intellectual-ideologues changed 
the subject of self-help from individuals, which Samuel Smiles had originally intended, to a nati-
on-community. This was because these East Asian thinkers conceived a modern nation as the 
sum of individuals, each of whom was capable of individual self-help. According to Choe Hi-
jŏng, Nakamura Masanao, who translated Smiles’ book in Japan as Saikoku Rissi Hen (Sŏkuk 
Ipchi P’yŏn), and other advocates of self-help in late 19th century Meiji Japan argued that Japan 
needed to build a westernized nation if it wanted to escape western imperial domination. These 
advocates linked national independence to self-help by arguing that a strong nation could only be 
built when each individual Japanese experienced self-awakening by himself. Thus, when indivi-
dual self-help was coopted for the purpose of building a nation, the question of self-help became 
a national problem. In Korea, too, the term self-help (chajo) was first introduced through the Ja-
panese translation of Samuel Smiles’ book, Self-Help (London: John Murray, 1859), and the term 
was coopted to the discourse of national independence from imperial powers.  Thus, the opening 4
See James B. Palais, Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyŏngwŏn and the Late Chosŏn Dynasty. 3
University of Washington Press, 1996. pp. 729-731, and other places. 
 Choi Hee-jung, “Han’guk kŭndae wa chajo chŏngsin .. “1930 nyŏn dae charyŏk kaengsaeng ron ŭi yŏnwŏn kwa 4
singminji chibae ideologi hwa” Han’guk Kŭnhyŏndae Sa Yŏngu. 2012. Winter, Vol. 63.
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phrase of Smiles’ book, “Heaven helps those who help themselves,” was malleably applied both 
to exhort for Korean national independence against imperial encroachments on one hand, and 
also for strengthening the Korean nation under the Japanese colonial state on the other. 
It is also true that in the 1930s, Japan’s colonial state in Korea invoked the term self-help in 
its Rural Revitalization Campaign (nongch’on chinhŭng undong (1932-1940), or keizai kōsei 
undō). However, 1960s U.S. assisted self-help programs in the rural, fishing, and foresting villa-
ges of Korea were fundamentally different from the 1930s rural campaign in their methods of 
carrying out the programs. For U.S. self-help programs in 1960s Korea, self-help was the goal 
and result to be achieved by investing U.S. surplus food in community-building programs. Thus, 
U.S. Food for Peace Program motivated individual Koreans to work with food as wages. On the 
other hand, in 1930s Rural Revitalization Movement, self-help was the method for the faming 
people to sustain themselves. Therefore, I disagree with the South Korean scholars who interpret 
South Korea’s 1970s New Village Movement (1972-1989) as being influenced by 1930s colonial 
campaign.  I argue that Park Chung Hee’s New Village Movement inherited the 1960s Food for 5
Peace Provincial Program both in their vision of modernized villages and their enmeshment with 
a larger capitalist economy. 
Japan’s colonial policy emphasized self-help as the method and the mentality of individual 
rural villagers. Gi-wook Shin and other scholars argue that the colonial state invoked rural self-
help in the 1930s as a justification for making farming people (nongmin) to fend for themselves.  6
Although the colonial state occasionally chose model villages and funded their community pro-
 See for example, Choi Hee-jung, 2012; 20145
 See Gi-wook Shin and Do Hyun Han, “Colonial Corporatism: The Rural Revitalization Campaign, 1932-1940,” in 6
Colonial Modernity in Korea, edited by Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson. Harvard University Press, 1999. p.82
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jects, those were exceptional cases that the state staged in order to promote the campaign. Thus, 
by invoking self-help, the colonial state placed the responsibility for the adverse results of the 
socio-economic structure of the rural society on farming people as individuals. Incidentally, 
Governor-General Ugaki had his ideas for the Rural Revitalization Campaign in 1930s Korea 
from Japan’s domestic rural policy in the 1920s. In 1920s Japan, the Japanese state had over-
stretched its empire in Asia at the expense of its rural population, and it had encouraged the rural 
people to emigrate to Japan’s Asian colonies as settler-colonizers. In addition to being empty rhe-
toric to avoid the state responsibility for rural poverty, self-sufficient rural community both in 
1920s Japan and in 1930s colonial Korea had anticommercial and anticapitalist tenets. In con-
trast, 1960s U.S. Food for Peace Programs and 1970s South Korean New Village Movement en-
thusiastically sought capitalist enmeshment and profit motivations. 
That said, indeed, both 1930s colonial self-help and 1960s U.S. surplus food programs shared 
similar imperial motivations in one aspect. Shin Gi-wook argues that Japan’s colonial state selec-
ted rural self-help as a policy in order to bypass the rural landlord class, and thus for the state to 
speak to the farming people directly. In order to forge a direct relationship with the people, the 
colonial government used rhetorics such as self rebirth (charyŏk kaengsaeng) and spiritual re-
form (chŏngsin kaehyŏk) of each individual. Likewise, U.S. Operations Missions officially ad-
mitted that a key advantage of the Provincial Program of 1964 was in bypassing the central 
South Korean government and in work directly with provincial and local governments, reaching 
the local villagers directly through U.S. surplus grain.  
The U.S. Food For Peace Program in the 1960s emphasized forming relationships with local 
villagers, and helping them directly by building houses and drinking water wells for their every-
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day use. This village-level picture clashed with Park’s industrial economic development. Howe-
ver, despite the clash of opinions, U.S. Food for Peace Program was able to implement its vision 
of a Third World development in Korea. In fact, Food for Peace Program was able to stay inde-
pendently from the South Korean state (when the program desired to be independent) because 
the program only used U.S. surplus food as an investment. The program did not need technical, 
such as heavy machineries, and monetary support from the central state when it was using only 
unskilled labor and raw materials that were free like soil. 
In the early 1960s, both the South Korean state and the U.S. Department of State decided to 
implement economic development programs in South Korea, but the two had different reasons 
and also different visions of modernization. The condition of hunger was still prevalent in the 
late 1960s in Korea, and hunger was especially acute in rural villages. However, the situation 
was generally improving since the immediate post-Korean War period, and for this reason, fo-
reign voluntary agencies had already made moves towards longer-term social development pro-
grams on their own.  
In Korean politics, Park Chung Hee, a Major General in the national military, who usurped 
the control over the state in a military coup on May 16, 1961, strategized to establish his legiti-
macy by modernizing, industrializing and improving the living standard. South Korea’s per capi-
ta income in 1962 was $72.28 - compare with U.S. per capita income $2250, India’s $65, Pakis-
tan’s $53, and Burma’s $47 -.  However, with the state’s two Five-Year plans in the 1960s, South 7
Korean economy was moving to a new industrializing phase. Park Chung Hee preferred to use 
American food aid in constructing industrial infrastructure and heavy industries. Exporting agar-
 Tong’a, August 8, 19627
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agar and oysters to Japan was not Park Chung Hee’s picture of modernization. However, the Ru-
ral Development Division, USOM, consciously decided that it did not wish to be complicit with 
Park Chung Hee and Kim Chong-p’il’s “monumental projects,” which were to aggrandize Park’s 
regime,      8
At the same time, Food For Peace’s Provincial Development Program was also different from 
Escobar-style Third World development. Escobar criticizes U.S developmentalist programs in 
Third World villages for ignoring local conditions and thereby causing long-term damages in the 
natural environment.  It is true that the Food For Peace Provincial Program also altered the Ko9 -
rean landscape and costal lines through upland reclamation, and marine cultivation fields for 
clams and seaweeds. However, in the 1960s Korean program, Korean local government at the 
country-level were invited to propose village projects, and FFP-USOM Committee merely selec-
ted projects among those put forward by the provincial governments. Moreover, local villagers 
implemented the programs by themselves once the FFP-USOM Committee released surplus food 
through provincial governments.   
In the end, this chapter argues that U.S. Food-For-Peace self-help programs in the 1960s was 
the predecessor of the New Village Movement in the 1970s. In a way, when the goal of provinci-
al programs was to achieve local self-help, the implementation of the New Village Movement by 
South Koreans itself attests to the success of the self-help programs of the 1960s. On the other 
hand, the New Village Movement (1972-1989) differed from the Food for Peace Provincial Pro-
 Submission of UPI Washington Report on the U.S. Attitude Towards the ROKG] May 21, 1963, 3056-3058 #12? 8
World Food Program, P583? RG 286 
 Arturo Escobar, Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World. Princeton, N.J.: Prince9 -
ton University Press, 2012 
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grams in embracing the use of technology and capital intensive projects. The New Village Mo-
vement focused on the projects implementing electricity, telephone communications, sewage pi-
pes, methane gas facilities, and water supply to rural villages. On the other hand, the Food For 
Peace program was not enthusiastic with the use of heavy machinery and cash investment. Still, 
both were the village-level modernization programs that emphasized unskilled labor and using 
raw materials that were free. For instance, it is difficult to tell the pictures of the New Village 
Movement program apart from the ones of the Food For Peace Program. The timing of the New 
Village Movement also established it as a continuation of the Food For Peace Provincial Program 
into the 1970s. When the U.S. Department of State terminated Public Law 480 funds to Korea in 
1972, Park continued the program with foreign loans, and also incorporated some of his prefe-
rence of telecommunications and agricultural machineries to it. 
Thereby, Park’s regime appropriated the legacy of the Food-For-Peace Provincial Programs 
of the 1960s as part of the New Village Movement in the 1970s. When South Korean scholar 
working on the New Village Movement such as Ch’oe Kil-sŏng and Pak Sŏp explore the conti-
nuation of the agrarian self-reliance movement in the 1930s to the New Village Movement of the 
1970s, their time-jumping linkage from the 1930s to the 1970s works to undermine U.S. Food-
For-Peace Programs’ influence in 1960s Korean development and its continued legacy into the 
1970s.  On the other hand, when Yi Pyŏng-hwan acknowledges the continuity of the 1960s Pro10 -
vincial Program to the New Village Movement, he argues that Food-For-Peace Program was es-
sentially a program owned by the South Korean Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to Yi, the 
United States provided surplus grain, but the South Korean Ministry of the Internal Affairs de-
 Ch’oe Kil-sŏng, 1997; Pak Sŏp, Yi Haeng, 1997; Kim Po-hyŏn 2011; Ch’oe Chin-a, 2003 10
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signed to put the grain into use in village developmental projects, planned, implemented, and su-
pervising.  However, Yi’s argument belies my findings about the roles played of the Food For 11
Peace Committee, U.S. Operations Missions and 11 local governments of South Korea. In fact, 
even when provincial governments requested technical help from the state, they directed it either 
to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry or to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, not to 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. I did not find any reference to the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
with regards to the Food-For-Peace Provincial Programs. Instead, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
had their own programs in parallel to the Food For Peace Program, and this will be discussed in 
conclusion following this chapter in comparison to the Food For Peace Program. Lastly, also 
considering similar self-help programs in Latin America and in Africa in the 1960s and the 1970s 
that made use of U.S. Food for Peace Program, Park’s role in New Village Movement should be 
re-evaluated.    
  
Fishing Villages in Food-For-Peace Provincial Programs, 1964-1968 
Did U.S. surplus food in the Provincial Program of 1964 provide channels to create and sha-
pe U.S. influence in South Korea? In what ways? Or, did it work at all? I chose to discuss fishing 
villages and forests projects in the Provincial Program in order to clearly convey the different 
vision of U.S. Third World development projects. The Comprehensive Provincial Development 
Program did not only transform inland agricultural areas, but it also reached out to the furthest 
boundaries of the peninsula’s coastlines and several hundreds of its small islands. When many of 
 Yi Hwan-byŏng, “1960 nyŏn-dae maŭl kaebal kwa nongch’on saemaŭl undong ŭi ch’ogi chŏngae kwajŏng”11
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the post-1964 fisheries and coastal projects were designed to only require PL 480 grains and lo-
cal unskilled labor, these projects clearly bring out the vision of the 1964 Provincial Program. 
The U.S. surplus food given as wages-in-kind in the programs, while transforming South Ko-
rea’s geography, reclaiming tidelands, building fishing villages and developing chosen types of 
marine products, also changed everyday food habits of their Korean recipients. Food-For-Peace 
work-relief programs distributed surplus wheat-flour (and also barley) to the needy families who 
participated in the program. In 1968, 8.2 percent of the total population was registered as the 
“general needy,” which is a substantial number as people who were eligible to participate in the 
programs and therefore receive U.S. surplus wheat flour. The U.S. Department of State sent 
mainly wheat flour, and some barley, to be paid as wages-in-kind, but it did not include rice 
when rice was the favored staple of the Koreans. U.S. officials argued that by giving ill-favored 
food such as wheat-flour, the grain injection from the United States would not disturb the Korean 
rice market. 
Families that were registered as the “general needy (yokuhoja)” could obtain one work-per-
mit per family that made a person eligible to participate in the work-relief program. Although the 
member was specified to be a male member, in practice, female members often took up the op-
portunity to earn U.S. surplus food. She received 3.6 kilograms (8 pounds) of surplus grain for 
her daily labor. The amount, 3.6 kilograms, was based on the amount of grain required to feed a 
family of five people. This was to ensure that all grain was directly consumed by the family, and 
the family would not have any extra grain to sell in the market. A worker could work up to 20 
days a month, and 20 days would bring 72 kilograms of grain to his family. It was a significant 
change in relief policy that recipients were given food by the number of days they worked, not 
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based on their needs. Before 1966, relief food could not be used, in principle, to induce people 
work (ch’ui-ro). 
I will explain the 1964 amendment through the first Food for Peace model Fishing Village 
Project in a small town called Munam-ri in Ch’ungch’ŏng-pukto. Munam-ri received Food-For-
Peace grant for two-year project in 1967-8, and the village project captures the process of Pro-
vincial Programs well. Munam-ri was located 13 kilometers north of the City of Sokch’o in 
Kangwŏn-do and 6 kilometers from Kangsŏng where the Kosŏng Country office was seated. The 
village had 761 people and 136 households in 1966, and more than three thirds of its households 
were engaged in fishing. Munam ri was first registered under the colonial state as a village in 
1919. When the United Nations divided Korea in 1945, and the village was incorporated in the 
Soviet-occupied zone. However, after the Korean War, the South Korean state claimed the region 
back in 1954. The Government Action Law for Resettlement District (Subok chigu imsi haeng-
jŏng choch’i pŏp) in July 27, 1965 incorporated the village to South Korea. Interestingly, Mu-
nam-ri, as part of Kosŏng-gun, had a large number of war refugees from the north who settled 
down in the area after the Korean War, ad Munam-ri was one of the resettlement villages. The 
sea adjacent to Munam-ri was a habitat for squid and edible seaweed (miyŏk), which the villa-
gers made use of for their livelihood. 
Munam-ri in Ch’ungch’ŏng-pukto was chosen as the model fishing village by a committee 
composed of six Americans. On March 6, 1967, L.E. Wakefield, Fishery Advisor in the Rural 
Development Division, USOM/Seoul, informed the South Korean Office of Fisheries Affairs that 
his committee, of two American Korean Foundation officials and four USOM officials, chose 
Munam-ri as the site for a pilot fishing village project. Earlier in February, Wakefield’s commit-
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tee had visited five proposed villages in Kangwŏn-do, which were Chumun Chin, Kisamun-ri, 
Oeongch’i, Inku-ri and in Munam-ri in Ch’ungch’ŏng-pukto. All five villages were in the same 
province because Food-For-Peace programs worked with bilaterally with each provincial 
government. Thus, it was a joint project between the Food for Peace Program and the provincial 
government of Kangwŏn. As mentioned earlier, by working directly with provinces, the program 
could enhance the extent of its independence from the South Korean state.  Since the villagers 12
consumed U.S. surplus wheat-flour given by the program, it in a way formed an understanding of 
certain direct relationship between the Food-For-Peace Program and the locals.  
Thus, Munam-ri project was administered by FFP-USOM/Korea and Kangwŏn Province 
provincial government. In terms of administering individual projects in the village, Kosŏng-
myŏn, a county in the Kangwŏn Province, was actively involved. For the pilot village project, 
individual projects should not require much more than unskilled labor and the grains to pay them 
with. Although the project was to build a self-supporting village for fishermen, it was not limited 
to developing fishing industries for their sustainable livelihood. This comprehensive program 
aspired to change villagers’ lifestyle from housing to social arrangement such as the fishing coo-
peratives (from kye) to the welfare of the elderly and the education of children in the village. The 
main projects included building port facilities (breakwater, anchoring yard, and fishing quay); 
coastal development (seaweed, octopus traps, ear shell pearl cultures, artificial fish habitat); pu-
blic facilities (kindergarten, public hall, salty fish storage tank, public bath house, waiting room 
for fishermen, village wholesale and retail store); fishing equipment improvement; tourism de-
The nine provinces and two cities were Kyŏnggido, Ch’ungch’ŏng-namdo, Ch’ungch’ŏng-pukto, Chŏlla-namdo, 12
Chŏlla-pukto, Kangwŏndo, Kyŏngsang-namdo, Kyŏngsang-pukto, Chejudo, and two special cities of Seoul and 
Pusan.
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velopment and livelihood improvement (housing, latrine, improvement, wall improvement, pu-
blic well construction electric power installation (all 136 households), wire radio (all houses). 
Nominally, the Munam-ri Model Fishing Village Project was a partnership program with the 
South Korean central state and the province of Kangwŏn. In that sense, it was an exceptional 
program in the Provincial Programs. However, that partnership was merely nominal, and throug-
hout two years, the Food for Peace-USOM Committee played a central role in the projects. In the 
nominal partnership, in addition to PL 480 grain, the central state, Kangwŏn Provincial Govern-
ment, the Central Federation of Fishing Cooperative (CFFC), and self-funding by the villagers 
each made commitment to contribute funding. Thus, according to the initial plan, the Food for 
Peace grain was supposed to be only part of the funding. However, subsequent process of the 
projects show that the RDD-USOM had the power to make decisions quite independently from 
the central state while the South Korean central state did not honor its commitment and stayed 
out of the project. 
Whether the central government wanted to sabotage the model fishing village program by not 
providing the committed funding, or it could not, the central state ended up not providing the 
funds that it had pledged. Thus, PL 480 grain ended up playing a major role. The Food for Peace 
Provincial Program provided 701- 1000 metric tons of PL 480 grain for the Munam-ri project.  13
In its initial planning, PL 480 grain was to comprise only about 11 percent of the funding. 
However, by the end of 1967, Title II program released 267 tons of PL 480 grain, and thus, now 
the PL 480 grain took up 55.53 percent of the total investment. An increase from 11 percent to 
55.53 percent was substantial. The central government only sent 16.8 million wŏn out of 67.3 
 4475-6, 4531, #2; P589; RG 286 13
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million wŏn that was initially promised. The Fishing Cooperative (CFFC) had pledged to bring 
in loans from banks to construct cuttlefish drying plant and seaweed multiplication. However, 
only one ninth of the loan committed by the Central Federation of Fisheries Cooperative (CFFC) 
arrived.   In the end, it would have been difficult to continue the project without the help from 14
the American Korean Foundation, which provided 5.8 percent of the total expenditure for the vil-
lage projects. Together, the American Korean Foundation, self-financing of the villagers, and PL 
480 grain took up 77.63 percent of the total investment.  However, the American Korean Foun15 -
dation and self-financing were mostly for housing project, which raises the percentage of PL 480 
grain contribution for other projects significantly. The cooperation from the central state and the 
Fishing Cooperative did not come in 1968, either, and thus Food for Peace Title II grain ended up 
providing 50 percent of the funding.  16
The History of Food-For-Peace Program in the United States since 1961 
In fact, the Comprehensive Provincial Development Program of the 1964 amendment came 
three years after Kennedy’s initial Food for Peace Program in 1961. What the Kennedy admini-
stration sought to achieve through long-term development projects in the Third World, using U.S. 
surplus food was to develop an image of the United States that people in other nations - not their 
states - would later voluntarily choose to imitate. In the excerpt below, Richard W. Reuter, Speci-
al Assistant to President Kennedy and Director for Food for Peace Council, clarifies the goal of 
 4462, 4520; #2; P589; RG 286, CFFC 14
 4506, #2; P589; RG 286 15
 4501-4512, #2; P589; RG 286 16
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the program to the National Conference on Food for Peace on September 30, 1963. Reuter clear-
ly sets apart Food for Peace’s as “development” program from the earlier “humanitarian” food 
assistance (1955-1962). In answering the question if U.S. surplus food was helping dictatorial 
and socialist regimes like Yugoslavia “against the will of the people,” Reuter says, 
But to give a practical, as distinct from a humanitarian answer to that question, I would say 
simply that I do not believe it to be the case (that U.S. surplus food was sustaining dictatorial re-
gimes)- and I think that the magnitudes involved make it plain that it is not the case- that the ab-
sence of our assistance in such a country would, in fact, be the instrument, or even one of many 
instruments, in bringing about a collapse of such a highly organized Communist society. They 
are not that near to a breakdown, and our help is not that great in its importance. We (Food-For-
Peace) are not in a position, by what we do or do not do (through Food-For-Peace) in this rather 
limited area, to move governments in and out of power halfway around the world, leaving aside 
for the moment the question whether we should be in such a position, or would wish to be. 
We are in a very different position, in which our relation to these governments is one element 
in their assessment of the directions in which they will bend, in due time. Our assistance, even in 
areas which are Communist by their own proclamation or are tending or moving in that direction, 
is one more element in our assertion that the kind of world which we would like to have in our 
own interest in and in the interest of the peace of all is a world in which different countries, with 
different purpose, learn to exist together and to cooperate for the common welfare.  
Against the Communist notion of a monolithic society, organized under a single, centralized 
authority, we uphold the right of societies to develop in their own image and purpose and under 
their own convictions. It is therefore logical, in the very nature of our policy that we should be 
prepared to give cooperation and support, in areas that make sense to both sides, to societies very 
different from our own. And the act of doing so is a means of holding out to those societies a 
very different picture of the future of the world from the one which they can learn about from 
Moscow or Peking.  
That is why when you have an instrument that does serve interests of ours as well as interests 
of others, that does reach beyond the rather narrow and limited processes of states and of states-
men to the needs of people, you welcome and use it.   (italic emphasis, mine) 17
Aside from Reuter’s particularly American belief in the universal good that what we Ameri-
cans do in good heart, the others in foreign lands would appreciate, what comes through strongly 
in the above excerpt is the state and civil society division in Reuter’s structuring of a nation. He 
 Richard W. Reuter, Special Assistant to the President, Director Food For Peace, to the National Conference on 17
Food for Peace, September 30, 1963, 4/329 (note 5/67); #1; P153; RG 286
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says, “we uphold the right of societies to develop in their own image and purpose…” The logic 
was that U.S. food assistance could possibly convince the societies to stand against their repres-
sive governments, and in an ingenuous move, U.S. surplus food makes it possible for the United 
States government to directly, while vicariously, form contacts with the people in those societies.  
However, although Reuter emphasized that the Food for Peace program could go “past 
governments to people,” Kennedy and Reuter’s Food for Peace Programs supported large-scale 
industrial projects. In these projects, the recipient governments were heavily involved in the 
planning and administering the programs. For example, Reuter’s speech was made when the 
Kennedy’s Food for Peace constructed the Rihand Dam (irrigation and hydroelectric power stati-
on) in India, which opened in January 1963. In Algeria, U.S. Food for Peace Program funded a 
large-scale reforestation project in order to alter the climate of the part of Mediterranean area.  18
Similar projects worldwide were in large part financed by selling U.S. surplus food to accrue lo-
cal currency.  
In fact, the Far Eastern Bureau of the USOMs was not the first to turn to use U.S. surplus 
food for economic development in the Third World. The Latin American Bureau of the USOMs 
recognized and practiced the community development concept before the Far Eastern Bureau 
did. In Korea, precedent to the Comprehensive Provincial Development Program was the Natio-
nal Reconstruction Program in 1961.  In Taiwan, the “free China, ”Food-For-Peace began in 19
1962. Taiwan program mostly employed unemployed and partially employed farmers. Interestin-
gly, one USOM report described the projects in terms of food. For example, a dyke project was 
 4/329 #1; P153; RG 28618
 For National Reconstruction Program of 1961, see my chapter 5. 19
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explained as a project of “109,125 kilogram of flour, a similar amount of rice and 25,317 lbs. of 
edible oil.” The nature of projects were similar as those in South Korea, building small dams for 
flood control, irrigation, drainage canals, wells, and cisterns, and building rural-to-market roads, 
reforestation, and soil protection and restoration. 
Thus, Johnson’s Comprehensive Provincial Development Program in 1964 partly inherited 
and partly transformed Kennedy’s Food for Peace Program.  As a change, the ban on sales of PL 20
Title II grains under Johnson’s program shaped the types of projects that Food for Peace could 
sponsor. After 1964, the Food-For-Peace and RDD-USOM committee selected projects that did 
not require assistance beyond PL 480 grains. Thus, the unskilled village laborers were expected 
to move towards self-help without the assistance of machinery, construction materials, nor mo-
ney. 
Given these restrictions, the Food for Peace Provincial Program tended to  support certain 
specific types of marine productions such as oyster, cockle, short-necked clams, and agar-agar. 
To add to the list, Munam-ri project planned seaweed (miyŏk) farming field. These marine pro-
ducts were chosen over others mainly because the projects for these marine products did not re-
quire high-tech experts, machines nor large cash investment. Their production was the results of 
a simple labor of stone cutting, transportation and spreading the marine product cultures. Not 
 Johnson changes Food-For-Peace programs again in 1966. It had two goals of increasing food production and 20
decreasing population. Johnson’s War on Hunger amendment in 1966, Section 109 - Title I sales was supposed to be 
re-invested into agricultural production center. such as fertilizer plant. etc. Also, Johnson in his February 10, 1966 
message on Food for Freedom approach laid out three changes. One was that food was no longer “surplus” but “re-
serve acreage be returned to production as needed.” Two, Title I sales which had been for local currencies changed 
to long-term dollar credit purchases. Three, PL grains was to be used for family planning programs. Also, the 
amendment in Title I, Section 109 (b) made the recipient-nation be responsible to put a percentage of profit from 
Title I sales to self-help and agricultural production measures. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture had 
been supplying surplus food to Korea at one tenth of the price. Now a percentage of that nine tenth profit had to be 
invested in self-help and agricultural programs. Also, in 1966, U.S. Congress allowed using Title I and Title IV 
grains also for economic development in addition to title II grains.
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only unskilled workers could fulfill the job, but also the projects did not need any raw materials 
apart from locally available stones that were free.  
In fact, fishing villagers had been practicing oyster, agar-agar, and seaweed farming in the 
colonial period as well. Spoken of as a means of livelihood easily available to the poor and uns-
killed fishing villagers, the  marine agriculture tended to invite class-struggle interpretations in 
newspapers. During the colonial era, Haech’ang bay in Kohŭng of Chŏlla Namdo was a well-
known site for oyster (sŏkhwa) farming. An article in Tong’a newspaper explains that a Japanese 
resident, Tomita Gisaku, from Chinnamp’o of Pyŏngan-namdo, took out a loan to reclaim the 
tideland for clam farming. However, the clam farming would have claimed the costal area where 
the locals had been oyster farming for a long time, and thereby taking away the villagers’ liveli-
hood. Fortunately for the locals, Tomita did not proceed with the reclamation. When the deadline 
set for Tomita’s reclamation had passed, 750 local Koreans gathered, and with the help of a Ja-
panese official, they formed a cooperative to keep this coastal area for oyster farming.  Another 21
Tong’a article mentions that Japanese companies increasingly invested in oyster fields in Yŏng-
hŭng of Hamgyŏng Namdo in 1931. The journalist interpreted the crowding-out of the locals by 
Japanese firms as a class struggle between labor and capital.  For our immediate relevance, 22
oyster and clam farming was what poor coastal people could do for a living, and USOM chose 
these to be their work-relief projects towards self-help.       
 “Chop’aeryu yangsik ŭro yŏnsan paek’ip manwŏn” Tong’a June 27, 1927; Seiichi Tomita, Singminji Chosŏn ŭi iju 21
ilbonin kwa chiyŏk sahoe: Chinnamp’o ŭi Tomita Gisaku (Kukhak Charyowŏn, 2013)
 “Ilbon Susan Hŭngŏpsa Sŏllip- Yŏnghŭng kul ŏjang chŏmryŏng” Tong’a, April 3, 1931   22
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Another project that Food for Peace supported in Munam-ri (1967-1968) was the constructi-
on of port facilities such as wharves and breakwater. These projects did not require other materi-
als as wharves and breakwater were entirely built with rough stones that were free. For example, 
Food for Peace’s construction of breakwater and wharves in Ch’ungch’ŏng-namdo in 1965 allo-
cated only 3 percent of the total expenditure for material expenses. The rest 97 percent was all 
expensed as wages-in-kind, which was the PL 480 grain.  23
In many Provincial Programs programs (there were exceptions), PL 480 grain was the major 
contribution for projects. For 1965 Title II flat tidal area development program, the South Korean 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry calculated that 80.7 percent of the funding for the oyster 
and agar-agar culture fields was done through PL 480 grain. The central government and provin-
cial governments divided the rest of the funding, each contributing approximately 10 percent.  24
In 1966, PL grain took up 90.6 percent of the total expenditure in 48 projects for oyster, short-
necked clam, hard clam shellfish, and breakwater in Ch’ungch’ŏng namdo.  The projects em25 -
ployed 26,991 persons, paid for the total of 448,050 number of man-days (number of workers x 
number of days they worked). In Cholla Namdo, PL 480 grains took up 75 percent of the total 
cost.  
The Food for Peace’s Provincial Program had to turn down projects proposed at the local-le-
vel if the projects required cash to purchase machines and materials unless the the village could 
procure extra funding from the central government or the provincial government. In 1965, the 
 see picture; 4443, #4; P589; RG 286 23
 “1965 nyŏn-do Title 2 e taehan susan chŭngsik saŏp.” Nongnim Pu, Susan kuk p.5; 4363 #4; P589; RG 28624
 4326 #4; P589; RG 286 25
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provincial government of Ch’ungch’ŏng namdo asked the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
to examine the feasibility of oyster, short and hard clam farming projects for the Provincial Pro-
gram before the provincial government sent the proposal off to the FFP-USOM Committee. The 
Ministry responded positively for oyster and short-necked clam (pajirak) projects, but warned the 
province that the hard clam (paekhap) project might not qualify for the Provincial Program. The 
Ministry found Hard clam (paekhap) farming project impracticable because it needed bamboo 
fence, the cost of which material took up 36 percent of the total expenditure. The rest of the cost 
was wages-in-kind, calculated in PL 480 grains. Since the cost of bamboo was a problem, the 
number of hard clam farming projects had to be reduced from six to four in Ch’ungch’ŏng-nam-
do.   26
Further, the particular picture of development that Food for Peace espoused, by minimizing 
cash expenditure and the use of machinery, can also be highlighted in its disagreement with the 
World Food Program (WFP) regarding flood control projects.  The U.S. State Department wor27 -
ked with its European allies  in the U.N.D.P. to set up the project as a pilot project in 1966. The 
World Food Program, which had its Headquarters in Rome, Italy, was an attempt by the United 
States to move foreign food aid from multiple bilateral agreements between the United States 
and the recipient countries, to a multilateral effort. Except some slight difference in agenda, the 
Food for Peace and the World Food Program were essentially engaged in same projects. In fact, 
 “P’aejoryu Chŭngsik Saŏp Kisul Kŏmt’o Ŭiroe” from Tcha Kyun Hi, South Korean Minister of Agriculture and 26
Forestry, to the South Korean Minister of Health and Social Affairs on April 21, 1965; also see 4333; #4 Munamli; 
P589; RG 286
 World Food Program (WFP) 2984-3001; #12; P583; RG 286 27
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for the United States, funds for Food for Peace and World Food Program both came under Title 
II of Public Law 480.   
The basis for disagreement between the Food for Peace and the World Food was that the 
World Food Program was especially interested in river projects, which required large capital in-
vestment.  This went against the amendment of 1964 Food for Peace’s Provincial Programs, 28
which minimized the use of capital and technology. Furthermore, the World Food Program in 
Korea sold its grain to obtain the local currency with which to purchase machineries and raw ma-
terials. On the other hand, the Food for Peace amendment had banned the sales of aid grain in 
1964, and only to use surplus grain for direct consumption by the workers and their families. The 
World Food Program had a different opinion to this. It considered flood control projects in rivers 
an excellent use of surplus grain since the projects were labor intensive.  In the end, since Title 29
II of PL 480 to Korea allowed 10.5 percent (16,601 MT) of the funding on flood control and wa-
tershed development, the U.S. Operations Mission in Korea notified the World Food Program 
that when the World Food Project allocated surplus grain on flood control projects, the USOM 
would commensurately reduce the allocation for Food for Peace’s flood programs, which only 
had a fourth priority in the list of projects.   30
In one other incident, when the South Korean Ministry of National Construction enquired 
about using Food for Peace PL 480 grain in highway construction projects in early 1967, the Ru-
ral Development Division, USOM, spurned the proposal, writing to the ministry that Food for 
 3945; #22; P583; RG 28628
 3940; #22; P583; RG 286 29
 From AID/W to AID/TO Circular, sent on September 8, 1966, 3946; #22; P 583; RG 286 30
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Peace grain was reserved for small village self-help, and labor intensive projects. This, once 
again underlines particular vision of development espoused by Food for Peace, of which inde-
pendence was secured by only using PL 480 grain. The highway program, which would be ag-
grandized as an achievement by Park Chung Hee, required machineries, technological experts, 
and not a few number of skilled laborers. To this, the Food for Peace Committee maintained that 
technological expertise required for the project had to be within the capacity that provincial 
governments could provide. In other words, Food for Peace would not request technological as-
sistance and machineries from the central Korean government. A highway project required speci-
al technology for major highway consolidation of embankment materials. In addition, the size 
and consolidation of base materials for highway could not be performed by using unskilled labo-
rers. The consolidation of embankment was especially important as the project was proposed to 
be completed in a short period of time. It also required intricate technical design and it needed to 
be supervision by qualified field engineers and inspectors. Thus, the RDD, USOM, suggested 
that the South Korean Ministry of National Construction to take up the project on its own since it 
has the resources to use heavy machinery. Food for Peace would not take part in it. Further, the 
Rural Development Division also objected that the unskilled labor that the Ministry of National 
Construction proposed to hire in the highway project were not relief recipients registered with 
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs.  Instead, the South Korean ministry had proposed to 31
use conscripted labor from Korean youth.  
The Origin of Self-help 
 May 10, 1967, 3323-3326 136-139/241; #16; P583; RG 286 31
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Before Food for Peace’s Comprehensive Provincial Program was implemented in Korea in 
1964, the South Korean state and state-affiliated social workers began introducing the program to 
the South Korean public as a transplantation of 1930s U.S. policy to overcome the Great Depres-
sion. The origin of work-relief (kŭllo kuho) in 1930s American work-relief programs is interes-
ting because it also has implications on the origins of the New Village Movement in the 1970s. 
Scholarship in South Korea maintains that the New Village Movement was inspired by the Japa-
nese colonial campaign of the Rural Revitalization in the 1930s and that it was not significantly 
influenced by the U.S. programs in the 1960s.  
However, here in 1963, before the beginning of the Provincial Program, Ha Sang-rak, a pro-
minent professor of Social Works at Seoul National University, published on newspaper that the 
Provincial Program originated from a 1930s’ U.S. policy to overcome the Great Depression. Ha 
Sang-rak cited U.S. President Roosevelt’s FERA (Federal Emergency Relief Administration) and 
WPA (Work Project Administration) as the originals.  Excerpt is from Ha’s newspaper column, 32
“A Path to Overcome Poverty: Work-Relief,” published in Tonga on 13 July 1963.  
Providing relief to the poor by giving them work has many precedents. As an example, I will 
show the case of the United States of the 1930s. The infamous Great Depression of the 1930s 
created some miserable sites such poor people filling up feeding stations and starving men col-
lapsing in the streets. Even in a relatively wealthier state, 40 percent of the population received 
aid from the state, and there was a state which had 90 percent of its population receiving the state 
aid. The United States government implemented many policies to get over this crisis. Among 
them, two programs were most effective: FERA (Federal Emergency Relief Administration) and 
WPA (Work Project Administration).  
The FERA was administered in May 1933 with Harry Hopkins in charge. Work-relief was 
more effective than simple provisions of relief materials. Moreover, FERA, based on the premise 
that it could promote poor people’s self-reliance without hurting their integrity, 1. provided 
work-relief to urban citizens in cities of populations over 5,000, 2. supported rural reconstruction 
 Ha Sang-rak, “Pingon ŭl nŏmŏ sŏnŭn kil: Kŭllo Kuho” Tong’a July 13 1963. 32
!244
Chapter 6. From Dependency to Self-Help, 1962-1972
and development programs to make rural and fishing people self-reliant, 3. settled landless rural 
population in non-urban areas, 4. gave relief materials only to the needy who could not work.  
However, since FERA was an emergency measure, it was reorganized as the Work Project 
Administration (WPA) in May 1935. The WPA was a colossal undertaking that rescued 13.5 mil-
lion unemployed people (in the United States) by giving them jobs. The programs included con-
struction and repair of public facilities such as roads, bridges, sewers, schools, hospitals, sport 
stadiums, airfields. The programs also implemented projects reclaiming unused land and develo-
ping drinking water, or providing jobs to unemployed professionals like artists, teachers and nur-
ses so that they could contribute to their local communities.   
However, Ha did not clarify if the Korean program was initiated by the U.S. Food for Peace Pro-
vincial Program in Korea, or if it was done by Park Chung Hee’s regime. 
Ha Sang-rak and many others used a fishing lesson analogy to explain the usefulness of 
work-relief programs, as originating from the United States. In the fishing lesson analogy, when 
you give the man fish, he lives a day, but if you teach him how to go fishing, he can use the skill 
for the rest of his life and live on it. Importantly, this fishing lesson analogy and the work-relief 
programs were presented to the Koreans as having been learnt from the Americans. In other in-
stances, social workers and intellectuals cited Samuel Smile’s first sentence, “Heaven helps those 
who help themselves” in order to motivate people to work in self-help programs. Ha Sang-rak in 
the newspaper column emphasized that Koreans should use work-relief programs to give hope to 
the rural and fishing poor. Strangely, it seems to credit the South Korean state for initiating and 
implementing self-help programs by actively learning from the 1930s American program and by 
putting it into practice in Korea in 1962 after the Typhoon Sarah. Thus, Ha did not clarify if it 
was the U.S. that was initiating the Provincial work-relief program in Korea, or it it was a Ko-
rean state’s initiative. 
Here is another example of explanation for work-relief programs in Korean newspaper. The 
article explains that the work-relief program was built on the basis of the Livelihood Protection 
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Law, Law No. 913, which the South Korean National Assembly had passed on December 3, 
1961. Livelihood Protection Law had replaced Chosŏn Kuho-ryŏng, which was a colonial state’s 
law. The colonial law was now given the verdict as having served no purpose for anyone. Work-
relief programs were explained as an extension of the Livelihood Law.  
The work-relief program, rigorously implemented since 1963, prevent the harmful effects of free 
relief, which is the reliance on the public (state), laziness, and the recession of employment (un-
employment). At the same time, the programs also promote sound motivation to work and the 
spirit of self-help (chajo). In addition to providing livelihood, they provide for comprehensive 
local development. One side relief and one side construction, this kills two birds with one stone. 
In particular, this program is directly administrated by the state, so we can see the government is 
trying to implement creative and enthusiastic policies. The program already has achieved 
much.   33
It was well known that the grains were U.S. aid grains from PL 480 aid. However, the article in 
the above excerpt, credits the South Korean state for administering the program, and does not 
acknowledge the role of the USOM/Korea nor does it distinguish South Korean central govern-
ment from its provincial governments.  
The Effects of the Work-Relief Programs  
The agricultural section of the Food for Peace’s Provincial Program mobilized 42,937 farm 
families and reclaimed 8,823 hectare of land in 1964. Since the amount of wheat flour for each 
day’s labor was based on the gain requirement for a family of 5 members, the total number of 
people who depended on the Provincial Program wheat flour numbered 214,685. In turn, the 
whole Food for Peace Program fed approximately 397,564 people with U.S. surplus wheat flour 
(calculated based on 54 percent) that year. In addition, newly reclaimed land was distributed 
 Kyŏnghyang sinmun, September 14, 1963. 33
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amongst 16,318 families for their livelihood. The program also improved 39,504 hectare for in-
creased production, helping to increase the families’ income in the long run. In 1965, the pro-
gram worked with 41,028 farm families. The projects reclaimed 28,858 hectare of new land, and 
it was distributed among 29,824 families. The 1965 program also improved 21,142 hectare of 
less productive land.  We can also surmise the impacts made by the program and the Food for 34
Peace grains from the volume of grains made available through the program.  
More than half of the Food for Peace Program grain that the U.S. Department of State sent to 
Korea was wheat flour. In 1967, the Comprehensive Provincial Development Program allocated 
125,000 metric tons of grains to 11 provincial governments. Of this, 100,000 tons of wheat flour 
came from the United States, and South Korea provided 25,000 tons of barley. In the 1967 pro-
gram, U.S. Food for Peace provided 48.8 percent of the funding, and the South Korean state pro-
vided 51.2 percent of the funding. The U.S. contribution to the Provincial Program was entirely 
made of wheat flour, in that 100,000 tons. The South Korean state paid its 51.2 percent with 
25,000 tons of barley and the rest in local currency, hwan.  Although the Provincial Program 35
existed since 1964, it was in 1967 that the Program picked up the momentum and started expan-
ding rapidly. That year, the total wheat supply in Korea was 1,232,532 metric tons, showing 25.4 
percent increase in wheat supply from that in 1966. In 1967, the PL 480 grain took up 37 percent 
of the total wheat supply to Korea, and in 1968, PL 480 surplus wheat flour took up 32.8 percent 
of the total wheat supply.  When the total grain consumption was about 10.5 million metric tons, 36
 Part of report from Paul H. Russell, AD/P-FFP to L. Wakefield, RDD, 1966. “Provincial Comprehensive Devel34 -
opment Program (Title II Section 202), 4315; #4; P589; RG 286 
 4320, #4; P589; RG 286 35
 4320-2; #4; P589; RG 286. 136,900 metric tons of wheat to be processed into 100,000 metric tons of flour. 36
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wheat comprised approximately 11.5 percent of the total grain consumption.  In 1968 program, 37
the supply of wheat flour for the Food for Peace Program was also 125,000 metric tons.  Consi38 -
dering that the total wheat flour allocation per month was 25,000-40,000 metric tons for Korea, 
125,000 tons was not a small amount. In addition, all these were supposed to go to the families 
designated as the “general needy” in government rosters. Therefore, these “needy” people’s diet 
was more affected than people who were purchasing food in the market.  
From 1961 to 1966, U.S. Operations Mission in Korea brought in $72,245,000 worth of Title 
II Food for Peace commodities to Korea, and of this, wheat cost $38,217,400, taking up 53 per-
cent of the total.  The Bank of Korea calculated that a rural worker with five family dependents 39
received 200 kilogram of combination of wheat and barley for 100 days of work. An average ru-
ral family consumed 400 kilograms of wheat and barley the year before.  40
In 1967, grain from the concessional sales through Title I and Section 402 - called “concessi-
onal” because they were given at one tenth of the world market price -represented 2.2 percent of 
the total Korean grain consumption. It took up 2 percent for 1968.  The donated surplus grains 41
for Section 202 under Title II was approximately 3.6 percent of the total grain consumption in 
Korea. 
 3270-3275, #16 FFP; P583; RG 286 37
 4310-4311, #4; P589; RG 286. The figure does not include WFP and PL 480 Title II, this is only for National FFP, 38
February 1967. 
 Summary of U.S. Economic Aid to Korea, FY 1964-FY 1966 as of 30 June 1966, United States Operations Mission 39
to Korea, 3915-6; #22; Central Subject Files, Mission to Korea, P583; RG 286. 
 Stats from the Bank of Korea, 195940
 3266 #16; P583; RG 286 41
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The self-help programs under Section 202 distributed 75,000 metric tons of grains for 20.6 
million “man-days” worth of food ration in 1964.  “Man-days” was the number of workers mul-
tiplied by the number of days, which would give the total portions of food to be distributed. In 
1965, the PL 480 grain was 110,000 metric tons to pay for the 30.6 million mandays. In 1966, it 
was 125,000 metric tons to pay for the 41.6 million mandays.  1966 was the first year that South 42
Korea contributed grains with the 25,000 tons of barley. Before 1966, all Provincial Program 
grain was American donation.  
Despite the familiarization through the fifties, eating wheat flour instead of rice was still con-
sidered a hardship that was reserved for the poor. A local official in Naju kun named Mun Hong-
kyu from the Bureau of Internal Affairs sent a letter to the official gazette for local governments, 
Chibang Haengjŏng, empathizing with the suffering of the poor who depended on U.S. surplus 
wheat flour. In his letter, Mun argues that the government should make rice available for the self-
help programs even if it increases the cost of the program. This remark shows that Mun does not 
grasp the overriding goal of the self-help grain programs. However, his point on the hardship of 
having to eat unfamiliar wheat flour is well-taken. Mun also points out that the market price of 
3.6 kilogram of wheat flour is 100 wŏn when a day laborer can earn 200 wŏn for his daily labor. 
Despite the fact that the work-permit for the work-relief program was issued to one male mem-
ber in the family, Mun argues that the low wage is the reason why women take up the job instead 
of men. Men could get better paying jobs elsewhere.  Indeed, the pictures of the self-help pro43 -
grams show many women engaged in the work-relief program.  
 3267 #16; P583; RG 28642
 Mun, Hong-kyu, “Chajo Kŭllo Saŏp kwa Kuho,” Chibang Haengjŏng, Vol. 17, Issue 174. Seoul: Taehan Chibang 43
Haengjŏng Kongjehoe, 1968. 162-165
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Given that the criteria to be registered as the “general needy” was to earn less than a 3000 
wŏn income per month, these families could afford little other provisions beyond food. It is pos-
sible that some families were dishonest about disclosing their income in order to be qualified for 
relief food and work permit. However, the percentage of income that families spend on food was 
also extremely high for an average household, not just the “general needy” household. On avera-
ge, food took up 64.4 percent of the total family expenditure in 1959; 59.2 percent in 1962; 58.6 
percent in 1966; and 55.7 percent in 1969 on average.  Assuming that with the “needy” popula44 -
tion, the percentage of food expenditure was likely to be higher than that of the average, the im-
pact of U.S. surplus food such as wheat flour and barley in their diet must have been substantial.  
Outcome of programs 
Korean villagers called the Comprehensive Provincial Development Program simply as self-
help (chajo) program, and it is interesting to see how much local villagers depended on the self-
help work program as a last resort to obtain food before facing starvation. It is not clear if these 
reports were meant to be critical of the state that could not otherwise feed its people.  
In some villages, local villagers voiced that the self-help program grains were the only solu-
tion to their predicament of hunger. In 1965, the villagers of Sŏngsan Purak in Kyŏngsang Nam-
do informed a Tong’a reporter, Ko Su-kyun, that most of the villagers would have starved if there 
had not been the self-help (chajo) grains.  Ko heard that there were 116 families in the village, 45
but only 10 families had grain to eat. The only way that the rest of the villagers could obtain food 
 Pogŏn Sahoe Pu, Pogŏn Silchŏk kwa Chŏnmang [Pogŏn Sahoe Haengchŏng Paeksŏ], Pogŏn Sahoe Pu, 1971, p7744
 Ko Su-kyun, Sŏngsan Purak, Chindong myŏn, Ch’angwŏn kun, Kyŏngsang Namdo, Tong’a, March 16, 1965 45
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was by working for the self-help work program in Tongjŏn-ri, the program site, 20 ri (7.9 kilo-
meters) away from their village. In order to walk 20 ri and get to the work site on time, the villa-
gers had to get up at dawn. They relied on the 3.6 kilogram of cornmeal and wheat flour they re-
ceived from the self-help program. However, the problem was that they could only work for 10 
days a month, instead of 20 days a month as had been planned by the Program. With what they 
received for 10 days of labor, they could only feed their families with gruel for 7 days.  
The same reporter, Ko Su-kyun, witnessed that the situation was not different in a neighbo-
ring village, Tongch’on. Its villagers also had to wake up at dawn and walk 20-30 ri (7.9-11.8 
kilometers) to arrive at the self-help work project site. Unfortunately, some of the hungry villa-
gers did not even have the energy to walk the distance to go to the site. According to its Village 
Head (ijang) in Tongch’on, out of the 130 households, only 4 to 6 families had some grains to 
eat. The rest merely depended on self-help work programs. However, district officials in the local 
government claimed that no household in Chindong myŏn was experiencing grain shortage. 
In addition, Mun Hong-kyu, the officer in the local ministry of internal affairs in Naju-kun, 
also argued that the Provincial Program is the only hope for Naju-kun. Not only for food, but he 
believed that Provincial Program could solve the problem of rural exodus to urban areas (“inong 
hyangdo”). At the same time, Mun Hong-kyu, even as an officer in the local administrative or-
gan, does not understand the objectives of the Provincial Program. Firstly, Mun discusses the 
Provincial Program as the South Korean central state initiative, which is far from the picture that 
I have gathered. As he misunderstands of the motivation and the goal of the Food for Peace pro-
gram, this official Mun exhorts the central South Korean government to pay the workers in rice 
instead of wheat-flour, and also argues that the central state should not base the payment on the 
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number of days the villagers work, but base it on the worker’s family’s grain requirements. These 
were exactly the points that 1964 Food for Peace’s Provincial Program set out to change.  Yet, 46
the author remains very hopeful of the benefits of self-help programs for the locality.  
In addition, the South Korean state was blamed for the failures of the Provincial Develop-
ment projects even though it was the provincial governments that administered self-help pro-
grams. Often, the projects were not carried out as planned. For the 1965 program, Food for Peace 
(“Pyŏnghwa rŭl wuihan singryang") Committee had granted 1,096 project sites, but only 647 si-
tes commenced the projects by September.  In Puch’ŏn in 1965, 184 tons of work grain was not 47
paid to the workers. In 1968, Kim Paek-yong, 29 year old farmer, wrote to Kyŏnghyang Sinmun 
that he had not been paid for a year of work-relief labor, and he asked the authorities (tang’guk) 
to make the delayed payment.   48
On the other hand, the letters of appeal sent to the Director of USOM in Korea shows the lo-
cal recipients were aware that the surplus grains came from the United States and that USOM 
had the power to allocate grains. In the 1960s, local Korean recipients sent letters of appeal ad-
dressed to the Director of U.S. Operations Mission in Korea. In these letters, the locals asked for 
more U.S. surplus grains for their village communities. Two of such letters, written by slash-and-
burn farmers in Wŏndang Ri, Kangwŏn do, and by the ones in Ch’ŏngsong kun, Kyŏngsang puk-
to, are particularly interesting. Included with the letter of appeal, each head of families, 16 fami-
lies representing 98 people, in the village wrote down his name and stamped his personal seal 
 Mun Hong-kyu, [Chajo Kŭllo Saŏp kwa Kuho] Chibang Haengjŏng. Vol 17, no. 175, 1968, pp. 162-16546
 Kyŏnghyang, September 22, 196547
 Kyŏnghyang, August 10, 196848
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around the pages of Wŏndang Ri, Kangwŏn do (Ch’unch’ŏn, RDD).  I present one letter here. 49
The translation from their original Korean language to English was done at the USOM.  
LETTER OF APPEAL  
November 17, 1966 
To; Joel Bernstein  
      Director of USOM/K 
We are grateful for the assistance rendered by the Government and the U.S. We were fire-
field farmers before we came to resettle here. We now have our own reclaimed farmland and new 
houses, thanks to the Food for Peace Program.  
We hope that we can repay such assistance rendered by you, doing our best in farming.  
It seems, however, that farming cannot be done with physical efforts and zeal alone. Last 
year, we had little harvest on our farms because of frost and floods.  
We are now faced with another serious problem, i.e. lack of fertilizer, oxen, farming loans, 
and labor. Our trouble is hot to continue our living without food this winter.  
We hope that you will give a sympathetic consideration to our predicament and help us by 
providing grains for our subsistence for the period from November this year through June next 
year. 
Sincerely yours,  
Cho Ki-song (seal) 
Kim Kun-chong (seal) 
An Su-tong (seal) 
Kim Hyon-song (seal) 
Yi Pom-su (seal) 
Pak Sang-pom (seal) 
Pak Il-pong (seal) 
Kim Ki-mun (seal) 
Kim Su-san (seal)  50
In another letter of appeal, 45 families, representing 238 people from Ch’ŏngsong kun in Ky-
ŏngsang pukto, wrote a similar letter to the Director of US Operations in Korea, Joel Bernstein.  51
 A Reply From Roger Ernst, Acting Director USOM Korea, to Kim Su-San, representative of the fire field re-set49 -
tlers at Wŏndang Ri, Tong-myŏn, Yangju kun, Kangwŏndo, to December 22 1966, around 3191 #16 P583 RG 286
 Letter of Appeal from fire farmers to USOM/K November 17, 1966; 3191; #16. Food For Peace I; P583; RG 28650
 On fire farmers (Hwa nongmin) see 3191- 3197; #16; P583; RG 286 51
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When they lived and farmed in mountains without ownership rights over the land,  slash-and-
burn farmers traditionally stayed outside the governing eye, not paying the state taxation and also 
geographically distant from the benefits of the modern amenities such as roads and electricity. 
The letters of appeal to the U.S. Operations Mission show that U.S. surplus grains were used to 
built settlement villages for slash-and-burn farmers and as a result brought them back in the fold 
of the state. Importantly, the farmers did not send their letters of appeals to their own provincial 
governments, which implemented the projects and distributed grains to the recipients, but instead 
addressed them to Director of the US Operations Missions in Korea. Roger Ernst, Acting Direc-
tor, replied to both letters, re-directing the farmers to their respective provincial government for 
answers to their requests. The letters reveal that South Koreans who were as marginal as fire-
and-slash farmers and foresters were informed that U.S. Operations Mission had the authority to 
give grains to their projects, and thus, the farmers sought direct communication with the USOM 
by addressing letters to its director. 
It is significant that Food for Peace’s Comprehensive Provincial Development Program 
(CPDP) reached out to Korea’s furthest peripheries such as islands, coastal villages, and fire far-
mers in the forest by channeling grains to local village projects. While documents such as the 
farmer’s letters of appeal to U.S. Operations Mission show that the recipients were aware of the 
grain coming from an U.S. source, we also saw some room for ambiguity in the Tong-jŏn li pro-
ject in which the participants did not show any discrimination between the South Korean state 
and U.S. Operations Missions. However, regardless of which organization the participants of the 
program credited for operating the projects, it is very likely that these Koreans knew that wheat 
flour was coming as part of the PL 480 negotiation package with the United States. 
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Incidentally, the ground-level lack of discernment and interest about the source of power con-
tributed to a facile transition from Food for Peace’s Provincial Development Programs to Park 
Chung Hee’s New Village Movement in 1972. When the objective of the Food for Peace Pro-
gram was to make Korean villages self-reliant, i.e. no more need for foreign assistance, officials 
in U.S. Operations Mission assessed the New Village Movement as a successful result of the 
Food for Peace programs, implemented in the 1960s. South Korea needed a program such as the 
New Village Movement in 1972 because the U.S. government terminated the PL 480 aid to Ko-
rea in 1972. Park Chung Hee’s New Village Movement successfully inherited the Food for Peace 
Provincial Program, and Park’s regime became the beneficiary of the Provincial Program’s  ex-
pansion of power to Korea’s peripheries. 
However, contemporary South Korean scholarship denies the continuation from 1960s 
USOM-FFP programs to 1970s South Korea’s New Village Movement. For example, Ch’oe Hi-
jŏng summarily dismisses the Food for Peace Program for having left little impacts, implying 
thus that Food For Peace had little connection to the later New Village Movement. Instead, 
Ch’oe explains the link between 1930s colonial rural Re-Vitalization Program and 1970s New 
Village Movement. Firstly, when Food for Peace Provincial Program provided U.S. surplus grain 
to 2% of the South Korean population, I disagree that feeding 2% of the poorest section of the 
population, who saw the self-help (chajo) programs as their last hope for food, left insignificant 
imprints. Secondly, I agree that the spiritual aspect of the New Village Movement was similar to 
that of 1930s self-help campaign, in which each rural dwellers were left to fend for himself. 
However, such approach of a state leaving its people on their own was not particular to the Japa-
nese colonial state’s invention. Invoking self-help of individuals is the only policy that a state can 
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muster when it does not have resources to spare to the rural section of its population. Besides, a 
state could easily convince itself that agricultural people, by the virtue of their  profession, 
should be able to feed themselves. On the other hand, I see Park’s emphasis on the spiritual vo-
luntarism with the slogan, “we can do it,” as a choice imposed on the regime when South Korea 
no longer received the Food for Peace’s Title II grains.  
The transition from Food for Peace’s Provincial Program to the New Village Movement ma-
kes more sense when we consider the beginning of the Food for Peace Title II program in Korea 
in 1961. Although Title II program made a crucial shift in 1964 to the Provincial Development, 
its basic structure of mobilizing unemployed workers in construction projects and paying them 
with PL 480 grains was established since the National Construction Service Program in 1961.  52
Letting aside the nature of U.S. Public Law 480 as a global program, an immediate motivation of 
the U.S. to institute the National Construction Service Program in Korea in 1961 - and not later - 
was to stabilize the society in the aftermaths of the April Revolution of 1960. The large number 
of small public works could absorb the unemployed workforce in urban areas and also disperse 
them throughout rural areas, thus dissipating their political and social discontents. However, the 
NCSP that the U.S. Operations Mission had requested to support Chang Myŏn’s fragile interim 
government after Rhee Syngman abdicated from presidency as a result of the April Revolution, 
actually ended up supporting Park’s new regime, which usurped power in a military coup on 
May 16, 1961. Park and his military supporters set up a revolutionary committee, consciously 
named as the “Supreme Committee for National Reconstruction (Kukka Chaegŏn Ch’oego 
Hoeŭi).” Having gathered 700,000 citizens of Seoul in Seoul Sport Stadium for the General Ral-
 See the end of chapter 5 for details on the National Construction Program of 1961. 52
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ly for National Reconstruction (kukka Chaegŏn Ch’ong Kwŏlgi) on June 13, 1961, Park Chung 
Hee’s spokesmen announced National Reconstruction as the rationale for the military coup and 
as its revolutionary mission (hyŏngmyŏng kwaŏp).  Chang To-yŏng, the puppet head of the 53
committee, declared that “the committee staged the military coup on May 15, 1961 in order to 
rescue the unemployed,” and announced his “revolutionary committee”’s plan to mobilize them 
in reclamation projects and to disperse them to rural areas. Chang characterized the NCS work 
program as a direct policy (chikchŏp chŏngch’aek) of solving the unemployment question. Fur-
ther, the National Reconstruction Committee argued that now was not a time for political divisi-
on, now was the time for national reconstruction, and the emergency legislations promulgated 
under the committee was called the Emergency Measures for National Reconstruction. From 
then on, while acknowledging the procurement of the fund from U.S. PL 480, Park’s National 
Reconstruction Committee appropriated all the credits due to the Food for Peace’s National Re-
construction Program. 
The April Revolution of 1960 towards a democratic system failed as a result of Park Chung 
Hee’s military coup on May 16, 1961. However, what ultimately reinforced the authority of 
Park’s illegitimate Committee was the U.S. surplus wheat flour and cotton sheets donated for the 
National Construction Service Program under Title II of US PL 480. Many South Korean intel-
lectuals and political opponents have considered, and many still do, the April Revolution of the 
1960 as the lost chance to transform Korea to democracy, and it was the U.S. grain that suppor-
ted the legitimatizing of Park’s coup, or his “revolution.” Thus, in fact, even before inheriting the 
New Village Movement, Park Chung Hee’s regime was already appropriating Food for Peace’s 
 [kukka Chaegŏn Ch’ong Kwŏlgi] Tong’a, June 13, 1961, and many other places, including Kyŏnghyang, May 23, 53
1961
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Title II program in 1961. The appropriation of the Food for Peace Provincial Program at the time 
of PL 480’s termination in 1972 seems very consistent with the pattern of regime legitimation 
that Park assumed since 1961. Thus, the structure of repression only shifted from a postcolonial 
imperial power to a military dictatorship. Further, the military dictatorship attempted to legitima-
tize its rule by continuing U.S. food program, and to this, U.S. was complicit through out the 
1960s until the programs end in 1972.  Given this structural continuity from the U.S. imperial 





I use the history of familiarization and appropriation of U.S. foodstuffs in South Korea as a 
way of exploring various processes that brought about South Korea’s modernization and 
development. The topic of foreign food becoming familiar enables me to present an example of 
globalization as interactive historical processes among local Korean recipients of food, local 
villagers, local provincial and city governments, nutritional experts, and Cold War military 
spending, all premised on the shipments of U.S. surplus -and non-surplus- foodstuffs. 
Koreans were liberated from Japan’s colonial rule on August 15, 1945, but they immediately 
faced other imperial influences under U.N. Trusteeship with United States occupation in the 
south and Soviet occupation in the north. Even after the formation of a separate South Korean 
state on August 15, 1948, food dependency on the United States - especially on U.S. surplus food 
programs of Public Law 480 after 1955-, was frequently mentioned to point out Korea’s inability 
to function as a sovereign nation by political opponents of the new state. The April Revolution of 
1960 especially revealed the discontents built around South Korea’s post-1945, both new and 
old, political and industrial elites that were arrayed according to their accessibility and proximity 
to U.S. aid materials such as surplus wheat flour. I call the termination of Emergency and Self-
Help programs (TitleII) and U.S. Voluntary Agency Programs (Title III) of U.S. Public Law 480 
in 1972, the end of the “Aid Economy” in order to capture the pervasiveness of U.S. material aid 
in the Korean daily life in post-1945 South Korea.  By the mid-1970s, the Park Chung Hee 1
 A poet, Ko Ŭn, gives a sense of the early 1970s when the unprecedented scale of U.S. aid materials after 1945 was 1
finished and South Korea was entering the age of mass consumption. “Ko Ŭn’s autobiographical novel: Na ŭi Sanha, 
Na ŭi Sam, 122,” Kyŏnghyang, October 2, 1994.   
#259
Conclusion
regime and the media were able to celebrate the transitioning out of the “Aid Economy” as an 
overcoming of the past poverty in the past, both ironically but logically, by continuing and 
appropriating former U.S. surplus food aid programs under the South Korean state.  
While revisiting the earlier U.S. food assistance in the post-1945 period, I show that the 
importation of U.S. foodstuffs to South Korea did not sufficiently guarantee the production of 
markets for these unfamiliar foodstuffs. When new foodstuffs did not appeal to Koreans’ cultural 
and physical taste, they avoided eating wheat flour, if they did not have to depend on relief food. 
While the supply of foreign foodstuffs through relief channels and direct state-to-state aid 
succeeded in imposing consumption, it was an unwilling consumption, of which meanings 
became associated with post-liberation poverty and dependency on foreign powers. In the late 
1940s, newspapers such as the Chayu Sinmun that espoused anti-trusteeship stance feasted on the 
foreignness of the foodstuffs in order to taunt USAMGIK about their imperial motivations. In the 
late 1950s, the South Korean state attempted to induce a market for wheat flour through 
nutritional education and national campaign. However, Koreans still did not even consider 
replacing rice with wheat flour. Not only the failure to spur the market demand for wheat flour, 
the inducement also backfired by channeling media attention of even politically rather modest 
newspapers like Tong’a and Kyŏnghyang to the corruption of the South Korean state elites that 
functioned on U.S. surplus wheat flour as a fodder. However, it is crucial to note that the earlier 
efforts in the 1950s began to produce results by enlisting voluntary consumption of formerly 
unfamiliar food such as wheat flour and milk when the South Korean state coopted wheat flour 
and milk for South Korean national development. By framing - or rather subsuming- the foreign 
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foodstuffs under national economic development and catching up with the West, the state 
succeeded in mobilizing much of the South Korean nationals (kungmin) in the 1970s. 
Thus, the state education and promotion under the Park Chung Hee regime brought about 
markets for wheat flour and milk in the 1970s and the 1980s. In particular, Park coopted wheat 
flour, which was still U.S. imports, in the efforts to industrialize. Cheap U.S. wheat flour was to 
feed the workforce in urban areas, and the state propped up mass-produced ramyŏn (fried instant 
noodle) as a viable substitute for rice.  Ramyŏn - ramen in Japanese- was invented in 1958 by a 2
Japanese businessman, Ando Momofuku, who founded Nissin Food. According to Ando’s own 
words, he invented ramen in order to make use of the large quantity of U.S. surplus wheat flour 
in post-1945 Japan.  The food was introduced in the Korean market in 1963 by Samyang 3
Company. However, enlisting consumers for ramyŏn needed more than the product’s 
introduction in the market. For the first three years, the sales record of ramyŏn in the consumer 
market was miserable. The market took off only after the state instigated a mass campaign for the 
“promotion of wheat flour food (punsik changryŏ)” in 1967, and the Seoul City implemented 
“Distribution Reforms (yut’ong kaehyŏk, 1969-1974)“ and began operating city-controlled 
“supermarkets.” The city government and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry instigated 
“supermarkets” in order to facilitate the delivery of ramyŏn and other mass-produced daily 
commodities directly from the factories to the urban consumers at cheap prices. Assisted by state 
promotion, in 1987, average annual ramyŏn consumption per person increased to 9.9 kg. When 
 Ramyŏn is instant noodle product, which was mass-manufactured by frying the dough of wheat flour kneaded with 2
salt and alkali agents. 




total wheat flour consumption per person per year was 35.8kg - compared to 19.6kg in 1956 -, 
ramyŏn took up 25.7% of the use of wheat flour.   4
Then, did the formation of a commercial market for wheat flour in the 1970s and the 1980s 
mean that the earlier American efforts of supplying surplus wheat flour for free or at 
concessional prices ultimately succeeded in creating markets for U.S. wheat flour in foreign 
nations that did not have substantial markets for wheat flour before? As seen in chapter 5, the 
South Korean state imported far more U.S. wheat flour than there was demand in Korea because 
the state made exceptional rates of profit by importing U.S. surplus wheat flour at the 
concessional rate of U.S. Public Law 480 (Title I), which sold surplus farm commodities at one 
tenth of the market price. However, by the end of the 1960s, the market was produced, and more 
significantly when U.S. terminated concessional sales of wheat flour in 1972, the demand for 
wheat flour in Korea did not substantially decrease despite having to pay the full price for it 
now.   5
We can see the acknowledgement of ramen and wheat flour industry from the panic caused 
towards the the end of the Public Law 480 aid. The approaching end of the aid prompted the 
South Korean state and state-affiliated research institutes to search for an alternative to U.S. 
surplus wheat flour in the late 1960s. The attempt was unsuccessful. Despite having to pay the 
full price for U.S. wheat flour, the wheat flour food industry in Korea continued to import wheat 
flour from the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 Chinese restaurants purchased more than 33%, but given the late habit of instant noodle eating, the percentage 4
percentage is significantly high. Kim Sŏng-gon, “Milgaru ŭi p’umjil t’ŭksŏng kwa ramyŏn ŭi p’umjil,” Han’guk 
Siksaenghwal Munhwa Hwahak Chi, 1991
 Title IV of Public Law 480 was not terminated. 5
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By 1970, U.S. foodstuffs such as wheat flour and powdered milk began to take on new 
meanings, which were largely instigated by the South Korean state. After the prelude of 
establishing milk as the most naturally nourishing and scientifically complete food in the 1950s 
with the help of UNICEF and U.S. voluntary agencies, milk was now coopted in the nation-
building, especially pertinent to the care of school aged children who were help up as the future 
of the nation. Thus, when domestic factories in South Korea began pumping out packs of instant 
noodles (ramyŏn) and milk in the mid-1960s, it was celebrated as a moment in which South 
Koreans began superseding yesterday’s dependency on foreign powers. The time of “eating” 
milk gruel - because people depended on U.S. food assistance - was over, and milk was newly 
established as a supplementary feeding, which was in fact its original purpose when UNICEF 
started the program. From then, Koreans begin drinking milk. Milk (gruel) was no longer a 
substitute for rice, but now it was a complementary food. By incorporating milk into its nation-
building process, the South Korean state successfully appropriated the history of milk in Korea 
which started with the UNICEF milk feeding program in 1953. 
In other words, the familiarization of wheat flour and powdered milk can only become 
meaningful when it is seen as a process, changing from unfamiliar foreign commodities to 
familiar domesticated national products. Importantly, by seeing it as a process, the associations 
that U.S. relief foodstuffs had formed earlier with post-liberation poverty and the presence of a 
large-scale U.S. army contingents was not forgotten, but was given a new crucial role. 
Overwritten on the past memories, the food commodities were now contributed to and produced 
by South Korea’s nation-building and industrialization. Thus, in the 1970s, it was only by 
remembering the bygones of the post-liberation and post-Korean War hardships that Koreans 
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could celebrate the overcoming of the past before consumer commodity markets and 
industrialization. The initial shock and repulsion against U.S. surplus wheat flour and powdered 
milk was incorporated into the narrative of South Korea’s modernization. Needless to say, 
catching up with the West and industrialization bring about another form of subjugation to the 
hegemonic system, both global and local. Regardless, since the 1970s, Koreans have considered 
ramyŏn (fried instant noodle), milk, and instant coffee-mix as their “national people’s foodstuff 
(kungmin mŏk’kŏri),” and only recently have they replaced this foreign food turned familiar with 
other foodstuffs such as “home meal replacement (HMR),” probiotic yogurt drinks, and 
multinational Starbucks’ Caffè Americano.  6
Emphasizing the history of familiarization and appropriation of foreign food as processes is 
important for our understanding of globalization as their historical processes tell us not to 
naturalize the habit of wheat flour and milk eating. The vulgar misrecognition of globalization as 
inevitable and as “natural” results of market competition and scientific management is the result 
of disregarding the processes of familiarization. Thus, organic expressions such as a “growing” 
milk market are politically fraught rhetorics. The new dietary habits spread rapidly in post-1945 
Korea as results of convergence of several historical incidents; first was the availability of 
surplus wheat flour and nonfat powdered milk - for example, instead of bananas or quinoa - in 
the United States, and U.S. government’s decision to link the problem of its domestic farm 
surplus to foreign food assistance as a tool to create its sphere of influence in the Cold War 
competition. Ideas like the competitiveness of U.S. capitalist market, principles of democracy, 
and advanced science and technology were not merely transplanted, but they were channeled 




through U.S. imperial governance, which depended on the number of U.S. warships to overhaul 
surplus foodstuffs over the Pacific Ocean, and on instigations of various food assistance policies 
such as humanitarian food assistance and local self-help programs through which the United 
States distributed food to local Koreans. Also importantly, South Korean vendors in the black 
market and corrupt politicians who channeled U.S. mass-manufactured foodstuffs and surplus 
wheat flour did so in their own terms, further giving other meanings to the foodstuffs. On the 
other hand, these other meanings given by black marketeers and corrupt politicians, in return, 
shaped Korean understanding of U.S. imperial governance because the origin of the foodstuffs 
from the United States could not be crossed off. Counterfactually, had there not been food 
shortages in post-1945 Korea, and had there not been U.S. sponsored humanitarian milk and 
school lunch programs for children and the Food for Peace development programs in Korea, 
foodstuffs such as wheat flour and powdered milk would have been channeled through different 
networks, and thus, they would have developed very different meanings.  Likewise, “things,” de-7
attached from their cultural memories that have been attained in the process, would write 
different histories from the histories that we have.  
 In U.S. foreign food aid, foodstuffs were substitutable, which meant that powdered milk could replace cornmeal or 7
wheat-flour, and vice versa. Had powdered milk not been on the list of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities in 
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